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MAX BELOFF	American Foreign Policy
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The Predicament of American Foreign Policy

Max Beloff

To ask a citizen of the United Kingdom to interpret in the spring of 1957 the foreign policy of the United States to a Canadian audience is to confer a compliment but to take a risk. I can only justify the Editor's confidence by being perfectly frank in this article while admitting at the same time that any attempt at applying an historical perspective to a present predicament is necessarily a subjective one and that I am conscious that others of my compatriots equally or better qualified to treat this subject might handle it in a very different fashion.[1]

If I place the duty to be frank as the first condition for writing on this subject it is not because I want to seize the occasion to envenom current controversies but because all our instincts, in Britain no less than in Canada, are in the other direction. So conscious have we become of the importance of the North Atlantic alliance that it is easy to fall back after any crisis in its affairs upon the well-tried stock of "Pilgrim Dinner" platitudes of the "hands-across-the-sea" variety. Even at a scholarly level it is possible to write the history of Anglo-American relations from a teleological point of view as if an indissoluble North Atlantic partnership were the necessary and permanent outcome of the whole long development since the American Revolution.[2] Indeed this is the normal attitude of most of those British scholars and intellectuals—and their number is growing—who make the United States their special subject of study. And their instinctive sympathy with the American point of view and their consequent tendency to equate that point of view with Britain's own best interests may make them good interpreters of the United States to Britain, but certainly makes them dangerous when they act as interpreters of the British scene to Americans or Canadians.

It must be stated quite clearly that the actions of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles over the past year have gone far to undo the good in the sphere of Anglo-American relations

that was done by President Roosevelt and perhaps still more by President Truman. Whatever gestures may be made, Englishmen will not easily forget that the self-styled champions of the world against Communism made common cause with the Russians against us at the United Nations, or the fact that it was almost certainly the threats against us that made us call off the Suez operation, or the indifference to our national needs and those of our French allies that these actions showed.

As far as the future is concerned all this may be more important for British than for American policy. Britain's decision to continue trying to be a "nuclear Power," which could be criticized on many grounds, is substantially a vote of no-confidence in the automatic working of the North Atlantic alliance, a refusal to believe that British and American interests are so identical that a total merger of forces is possible. It is not a nostalgia for our position as a World Power that moves us, but rather a feeling that it is not possible to take it for granted that the British and American view of the nature and direction of a major threat will always and necessarily coincide. And yet as the Bermuda agreement has shown, we are in fact assuming that normally the North Atlantic alliance will operate and that in vital respects we can accept dependence.

For such sentiments, and the drawing of such consequences from them, need not of course prove permanent. Indeed a view of the future based upon the inevitability of Anglo-American divergences would be no more justified historically than one based upon the idea, already criticized, that they must inevitably find themselves in ever increasing agreement. On the contrary, the proper way to regard the history of foreign policy is as a series of choices, each of which is no doubt conditioned to some extent by the choices that have been made in the past, but is nonetheless a free choice within the limits that the country's particular situation imposes. All that need be said to link these preliminary remarks with the main topic of this essay is that the United States appears to be facing some new problems in the development of its foreign policy, and that it appears at the time of writing (April 1957) to be trying to solve them in ways inimical to British interests, and indeed to the interests of the Western world as Britain sees them. What then are these problems and how if at all do they relate to the American past?

In the first place it is important to realize that the present situation is quite novel and one which it would have been difficult even to foresee not so long ago. Lecturing in Paris on this subject in March, I pointed out how easy it was to forget in the stress of present emotion the very

diverse stages through which our relations with the Americans had passed: "We should remember," I said—I am now translating—"the very different kinds of criticism that American policy incurred in the first three years of the Eisenhower-Dulles régime. At that time what we reproached the Americans with was being too rigid with regard to Communism. It was we who were afraid of being dragged by them into a war in the Far East, or even—given the Republican platform of 1952—into a war in Europe. It was at that time we, the Europeans, who warned them against the temptation to consider all policies and all countries simply in reference to the struggle against Communism, and to neglect the opinion of those countries like India who did not wish to declare themselves upon one side or the other. It was we again who wondered whether the Americans would have the good sense to be ready to spend their money in order to give support in Asia to non-Communist governments even when they did not wish to declare themselves anti-Communist."[3] Lest it should be thought that I exempted myself from such criticism, I might add that in an essay written in the summer of 1956 and recently published, I had made the same point, that it was easier for American Congressmen and the American public to appreciate the need for military assistance for their partners in pacts like SEATO, than the need for economic aid to "countries like India which expressed disapproval of many United States policies, and arrogantly claimed to be the exponents of a more correct and morally superior outlook on world affairs."[4]

The decision of the United States not after all to assist with the Assouan High Dam—the one that precipitated the Suez crisis—seemed well in line with such an assessment of American policy. Nor of course has it simply been superseded by a new one. Indeed Far Eastern policy, and for that matter European policy, have been little affected so far by the subsequent shift in American thinking. And even in the Middle East itself, the decision to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact indicated that something of the old methods was being carried over into the new period. On the other hand, the events in Hungary amply demonstrated that any idea of "liberation" as the object of American policy towards Communism was an illusion—that in a nuclear age, the West would not risk war to help rescue a captive people from Communist bondage, and that the great mistake had been to let propaganda give currency to any such idea.

The foreign policy of the United States as revealed after Nasser's seizure of Suez was thus not composed of solutions to a single predica-

ment. On the contrary, as far as most of the world was concerned, Americans seemed conscious of no predicament at all. The policy inherent in the "Truman doctrine," in NATO, and in the intervention in Korea—the policy rightly known as "containment"—remained in force. A clear attempt to extend by force the area of Communist control in those zones covered by security pacts would be met with forcible resistance. The predicament arose over other areas, immediately and most forcibly in the Middle East, but with a possible extension ultimately to other doubtful and "uncommitted" parts of the globe.

The simplest way towards defining the predicament that the United States faces in regard to these areas is to ask why it was not possible for the United States government simply to extend to them those policies which it had adopted elsewhere. In trying to answer this question, there is the obvious difficulty that must arise when one tries to assess, without full knowledge of the facts, the contemporary policy of a foreign government. In this case the obvious problem is the extent to which the policy represents not some general shift in American attitudes but a narrowly personal choice on the part of the President himself, Mr. Dulles, and some of their more intimate advisers. We do know that some aspects of the policy have come in for hot criticism from leading figures in the preceding administration and from other quarters and that in revising the original version of the Eisenhower doctrine, Congress for the first time showed some independence of the Presidential wishes.[5]

We can nevertheless say that whatever the weight to be attached to personal factors in this case—and one should never forget that the American system of government is the most dangerously personalized one among all the major democracies—they cannot be held to be the dominant element. President Eisenhower may have been highly incensed at the "deceit" practised upon him by the British and French governments—though there is good reason to believe that not all American governmental circles were equally ignorant of these governments' intentions—but this cannot by itself explain subsequent policy. For the basic line was obvious from the time that Mr. Dulles made it clear that the Suez Canal Users' Association was not a means of bringing any real pressure upon Egypt; this decision was thus a cause not a consequence of the Anglo-French intervention.

The American policy that has developed over the past year is then a policy that has, as one might expect, its roots deep in American attitudes and opinion. The personalities of Mr. Dulles and of President Eisenhower have been responsible perhaps for giving a rather different

emphasis to its two most striking aspects. It is Mr. Dulles who seems to have been the most determined to try to secure America's desires in the Middle East by seeking Arab friendship, and President Eisenhower who seems to have been the more determined to make the United Nations the foundation of American policy here and elsewhere. For it was, after all, Mr. Dulles himself who was so reluctant to allow the nationalization of the Canal to be referred directly to the United Nations when it was first proclaimed.

In giving a statement of what this American policy is, it is perhaps likely that the outside observer will be more precise than is possible for its official defenders who have to be on their guard, especially in view of the divergences of opinion within the United States itself. But up to the time of writing there has been a fair degree of consistency in action if not always in speech. Where purely military considerations have still been dominant, as in relations with Saudi Arabia, political considerations have, as one might expect, been over-ruled. It is salutary to remember that in 1911, the United States denounced its 1832 treaty with Russia because that country had refused to honour the passports issued to American Jews, following in this action on a resolution of the House of Representatives which includes the statement that the United States government will not be "a party to any treaty which discriminates, or which by one of the parties thereto is so construed as to discriminate between American citizens on the ground of race or religion."[6] In 1957, on the other hand, the United States accepted as part of the price for continued use of the Dahran air-base a provision that no American serviceman of the Jewish faith would be allowed to form part of its garrison. A right upheld against the Tsar of all the Russias was waived for the sake of an Arab slave-trading potentate to whom the Mayor of New York rightly refused a civic welcome.

But even where the more political aspects of the policy are concerned, the American willingness to neglect the problem of Israel's security and maritime rights for the sake of securing Arab friendship is noteworthy, and not simply because American political pressure had so much to do with the actual creation of the Israeli state. It is important because it bears out one's general impression that with the United States' emergence on the main theatre of world politics as a principal actor, and not simply an occasional auxiliary, considerations of internal policy are bound to exercise less weight than previously. Mr. Dulles has effectively exploded the myth that American Middle Eastern policy must always be determined by the "Jewish vote."[7]

Nevertheless, it is a part of the American predicament that this policy probably cannot be carried to its logical conclusion, which would mean acceding to the often-voiced demands of the Arab States for the total destruction of Israel. It is hard to see how this consummation, which American public opinion at large could hardly swallow, could be permitted by any American administration. And for this reason, it is possible to say that the solution to the local aspect of the predicament has not in fact been found.

But the desire to be associated with the Arab States while simultaneously avoiding the issue of the annihilation of Israel is only the most acute form that the American dilemma takes. For even among the Arab States themselves there is, despite the appeal for some intellectuals of pan-Arabism or pan-Islam, a wide diversity of interests which but for the existence of common enemies in Israel and "Western Imperialism," of which Israel is regarded as the agent, would probably by now have erupted into overt hostilities. The American attempt to make light of these and to act on the assumption that they all have common ground in their objections to Soviet communism—a remote and uncomprehended threat—is almost certainly foredoomed to failure.

The Middle Eastern predicament thus illustrates from one angle the most important and persistent of America's inheritances from a simpler past, the tendency to overlook the real constituents of a situation and to impose upon it instead a pattern predicated on the assumption that the world is populated entirely by Americans, or would-be Americans. The main trouble about Mr. Dulles's Middle East is that it does not exist. In the Middle East, this attitude in fact leads to a policy which in other circumstances has been styled the policy of "appeasement"; and it is perhaps no accident that the modern statesman whom Mr. Dulles most nearly recalls to a European observer is Mr. Neville Chamberlain, whose own policy towards Hitler—equally pacific and honourable in its purposes—was also vitiated by the fact that he was dealing with a quite imaginary Germany. But such impatience with the facts need not involve appeasement; it may on the contrary involve extreme rigidity. Thus the policy of non-recognition of Communist China would only make sense if there were a reasonable prospect that Chiang Kai-shek, with or without foreign aid, was in the near future going to make an end of the Chinese Communist régime. It can only be justified by another refusal to face the facts—since non-recognition as a sign of moral disapprobation has been proved over and over again to be a diplomatic error of the first order.[8]

There is ample evidence now available—and it will I hope one day be fully explored—of President Roosevelt's strong and often uninformed bias against European empires and the British Empire in particular and of his use of the wartime alliance to try to bring pressure on the British government to hasten its liquidation.[9]

The present state of affairs in Southeast Asia, in particular the chaos in Indonesia, gives adequate warning of the consequences of premature grants of independence; while the relative stability of the Indian subcontinent is clearly due not so much to any greater natural unity, but to the inheritance from generations of British rule of a steel framework of civil and military organization available for the new leaders of its countries to work with. But the lessons of this have not so far been applied by the United States in the Middle East, though America's scarcely veiled political responsibilities in South Korea and southern Viet-Nam suggest that the inhibitions against political intervention in the affairs of other countries can be weakened where the necessities of the anti-Communist struggle demand it. Nevertheless the Eisenhower doctrine with its self-denying ordinance restricting intervention to where the local government actually demands it, is not an acceptance of responsibilities but a refusal of them. What Europeans have cause to complain of is that in an area vital to their security and prosperity, the United States will neither let them exercise their strength nor use its own.

With the anti-colonial element in this line of approach is linked the other principal stand to which I have alluded. The European student of American policy-making cannot but be struck by the great difficulty which Americans seem to find in considering military and political problems as part of a single whole. This again is understandable in the light of the nineteenth-century abeyance of foreign policy, although it would hardly have seemed realistic to the Founding Fathers who took care to make the nation's executive head also its commander-in-chief.[10]

There are, however, two other important strands in American thinking on foreign policy to which recent American action in the Middle East gives a useful clue. In the first place, there is in Mr. Dulles's obvious belief that he can win the Arabs (and others) into the anti-Communist camp provided he can steer clear of involvement with British and French policy, an important vestige of one of the most enduring of American attitudes—anti-colonialism. The fact that the American belief that "manifest destiny" would one day bring Canada under the stars and stripes has waned in the present century, may lead Canadians to forget too easily the persistent hostility of many Americans to empires in

general and to the British Empire in particular. Americans have consistently tended to over-estimate the positive values of self-government and under-estimate those of government as such, and to be unaware of the real difficulty in many areas of the world of finding a form of government that does not rest overtly or covertly upon exterior power. If the ability to achieve self-government and prosper under it had been as widespread as American democratic theory assumes, there would have been fewer empires. Europeans, seeing how often in post-war years European power and influence have been more or less succeeded by American power and influence, not unnaturally tend to give credence to the view, so often espoused by Communist and Communist-inspired propaganda, that American anti-colonialism is merely a cover for America's own form of imperialism, that its true device is: "Ote-toi que je m'y mette." But such cynicism though tempting is unrealistic. It is far truer to say that until very recently the problem of authority itself has played so small a role in American thought, that the problem of what would happen when the European empires were removed in Asia and Africa has hardly impinged upon the American consciousness.

What happened when both foreign policy and defence considerations became more important was that the President retained control of the former while accepting in the case of the latter the advice of his military representatives. A corollary of this development was the growth of a tradition among American military men that the political consequences of their actions were no part of their business. In the Second World War they voiced consistent suspicion that their British allies took a different view and were too prone to allow long-range political objectives, other than total victory, to distort their strategical arguments. When it was suggested at a late stage in the war that the Americans should make an effort to liberate Prague before the Russians got there, General Marshall commented: "Personally, and aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implications, I should be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes."[11] A British commander would have found it hard to see for what except political purposes it is right to hazard lives in war at all; and would hardly allow war aims to be limited to imposing "unconditional surrender" upon the immediate enemy. Europeans know —as Americans are learning—that power politics and all that this implies are the necessary consequence of living in separate political societies and that war does not enable one to contract out of this condition.

It is true that the post-war development of American government,

particularly the growing role assigned to the National Security Council, suggests that the gap between military and civilian thinking is now better recognized and that attempts are being made to bridge it; but the legacy of the past is strong and it is certainly true that in the Middle Eastern affair no clear relation between political and military ends or means has yet emerged.

It is nevertheless evident that although it is over the Middle East that American policy has shown its principal divergence from that of its main European allies, it is the different attitudes towards the United Nations that look like causing most trouble in the future; and it is indeed the one point of difference that the British Prime Minister insisted upon when giving his own account of the Bermuda conference.

Just as anti-colonialism is simply the carrying too far of an idea which has much to commend it in itself, so too the American insistence upon the subordination of national policy to the United Nations is the product of a generous and far-sighted impulse—the only trouble is that it may once again be too far-sighted and too negligent of more immediate aspects of the international situation. Thoughtful Americans were bound to feel, once the Second World War came upon them, that they might after all have done better to heed Woodrow Wilson's warning, and to take part in the first attempt to organize world affairs on the basis of collective security. The creation of an effective world organization was thus an important American war-aim; and the shape which the United Nations Organization ultimately took owed more to the United States than to any other Power.

The principal demand made by the United States was that the new organization should be universal, making no concessions to regionalism; its political demands were thus in harmony with its contemporary economic attitudes, which were expressly hostile to all forms of economic co-operation limited to specific groups of countries such as the British system of Imperial preference and the sterling area. On the other hand, it was realized at the time that responsibility could not be divorced from power; and the so-called veto in the Security Council reflected the contemporary hope and belief that the victorious Great Powers who formed the core of permanent members of that body would stay united.

Rightly fearful of a return to isolationism, successive American administrations have failed to make it clear to the American public how far the United Nations has departed from its original shape and purpose. Its history has indeed been one of a series of paradoxes in which each American move has produced results the contrary of what was intended.

The unanimity of the permanent members proved an unattainable fiction from the beginning and was relentlessly used by the Soviet Union to make up for the fact of its own minority position. Against the wise warnings of Sir Winston Churchill, President Roosevelt insisted upon China being one of the original permanent members of the Security Council, expecting no doubt that its government would accept the American lead. Instead, Chiang Kai-shek was swept away by the Communists, and the United States, by denying to the Chinese Communist government its undoubted right to China's seat in the United Nations, made the first major breach in its own principle of universality.

But the greatest paradox was yet to come. Because of the fact that Russia was temporarily absent from the Security Council at the time of the Korean aggression, the "collective security" provisions of the Charter were able to work in favour of the United States and its allies and a new enthusiasm for the institution itself was generated. Realizing that this state of affairs could only be temporary, the American government then set itself to try to get round the Soviet veto by inflating in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution the role of the General Assembly to which the makers of the United Nations had rightly refused to grant major political responsibilities. The United States seems to have taken the view that it could always rely upon the "free world" being able to outvote the "Soviet bloc." But this also was proved to be an illusion with the rapid increase in the non-Western membership of the United Nations. The balance of voting power is now in the hands of the so-called "uncommitted" nations—that is to say of countries which are not themselves pro-Communist (and may even in some cases be quite strongly anti-Communist) but which regard the main issue in world politics as being that of "Western imperialism" and not that of Communism or Communist aggression. The very different conduct of these countries over the alleged Israeli "aggression" against Egypt as compared with that towards the undoubted Soviet aggression against Hungary was significant enough.

The predicament of United States policy has now been made clear here also. Either the United States in trying to clear itself from the taint of "colonialism" must, as in the Suez affair, part from its natural allies and associates in the West, or it must accept the fact that since it will be unable to get majorities for its policies in the United Nations, reliance upon that body condemns it to a permanent state of inaction. The gallant attempt of Canada to give some effectiveness to the United Nations has only proved its incapacity.

Once again, one has the feeling that a reading of America's own unique historical experience into a quite different contemporary situation is largely responsible for the illusions that American statesmen entertain. They tend to think of Asian anti-imperialism as a simple reaction to the fact of foreign rule. But as recent events have shown, it can be as virulent among countries which are not (and have not been for some time) so subordinated. It is not the desire to be sovereign but the desire to equal the material achievements of the West that provides the main driving-force behind these movements—and it is the belief that Russia has a technique for catching-up with the West in a brief space of time that gives Soviet Communism its major appeal in these countries. America cannot therefore escape from enmity by not having colonies of her own or by dissociating herself from other people's colonies. The real division is between the rich and the poor—and how can America avoid being classed with the rich?

Even her generous programmes of foreign aid—the whole "Point Four" concept—perhaps do more to emphasize America's wealth than they do to relieve Asia's poverty. Why should American "experts" be popular when the humblest of them may be living on a standard above that of a local cabinet minister or high official?

What brings prosperity and progress to a country is neither technique nor even a good endowment from nature, but a social system that enables that technique and those resources to be exploited. Social and legal institutions, even the heritage of religious and philosophic attitudes, may account for more in purely material terms than material circumstances themselves. Whether foreign assistance of an economic or technical nature is of value or not will depend on the social and political structure of the receiving country more than on the intentions of the givers. The brilliant success of "Marshall Aid" in Europe has provided a totally misleading analogy for considering policy in Asia. Western Europe was a society equipped with the means for economic development but one that had suffered a temporary set-back. American aid helped it to get over that set-back without recourse to the more barbarous Soviet methods of economic development and the consequent subordination of its needs to the demands of the more primitive economy of the Soviet Union itself. But aid on a similar scale given to "underdeveloped countries" without any political controls could easily seep away in a morass of inefficiency and corruption.

Reflections of this kind which come naturally to any European student of the contemporary scene, are obviously "un-American" in the most

literal sense of the word. Yet until Americans have grasped their implications it is all too likely that they will be confronted by the most severe of all their predicaments: the frustration of their most generous impulses to share their own achievements and conquests with suffering humanity at large.

The fact that the United States seems to be confronted at the present time with a series of interlocking problems to which the term predicament can well be applied, means no more than that its great position of strength does not render it immune from the common fortune of states and empires. If it seems occasionally to hesitate and confound the expectations of its friends, we should remember that in moments of supreme crisis in the Western world it has hitherto always intervened before it was too late, and with decisive effect. Certainly we in Britain cannot forget what American aid and comfort have meant in the past. Given the general attitude of the United States to the rest of the world half a century ago, the wonder may indeed be not that it has made so many mistakes, but that so far it has made so few, and no irretrievable ones. And from its own people's point of view, what other country has come through two world wars as a belligerent with its own territory untouched and its own prosperity and vitality enhanced?

And in accounting for such errors as we believe we see, two more things must be taken into consideration. In the first place there has in the last few decades been an acceleration of the historical process of a kind particularly likely to disturb a people that not only relies upon historical example for guidance, but that has also inherited from the past a system of government whose conventions were elaborated under vastly different circumstances. It has had to learn too many lessons and those too quickly.

In the second place we must remember that so far we have been talking only about predicaments peculiar to the United States. There is also, overshadowing all aspects of foreign policy, the greater predicament that the United States shares with all the world. No generation before this one has had in its hands the power of life and death over the whole of civilization and perhaps over humanity itself. This very fact is itself enough to explain why an historical explanation of national policies is inadequate. All Great Powers in the past have had the possibility of waging a major war as the implicit sanction of their policies; with this virtually removed, the difficulty of making policy is surely intensified. And if this were not enough, this perilous gift has been given to mankind just at the moment when the civilized world is more deeply divided

than at any previous period in history. It is not that American and Russian interests are more strenuously in conflict than has been the case with other pairs of warring empires in the past; it is that their ideological antipathy makes negotiation between them scarcely possible because of an almost total inability to communicate. For this inability to communicate, the United States is only to the smallest extent responsible. It is the Russians who, by subordinating the realities of politics to the demands of Marxist dogma and national self-assertiveness, have made it so difficult to have a genuine exchange of views even on issues where the common interest is glaringly obvious. Meetings at the "summit"—a favourite American formula—have revealed their inadequacy.

Nevertheless, whoever may be responsible, the "bomb" and all that it entails remain, and the United States has to face in the first instance its responsibility for a weapon it was the first to use. In the clear American awareness of this predicament, in America's obvious devotion to peace—even at times to peace at any price—in its refusal to be stampeded into accepting its enemy's lineaments, those of a "garrison-state," lies the best hope of all of us.

NOTES

1 See my article, "Suez and the British Conscience," *Commentary*, New York (April 1957).
2 See, e.g., H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States* (London: Odhams, 1954).
3 From "La politique Américaine vue de l'Europe," an unpublished lecture delivered at the Institut des Sciences Politiques, Paris, March 13, 1957.
4 From my essay, "American Foreign policy and World Power" in H. C. Allen and C. P. Hill, eds., *British Essays in American History* (London: Arnold, 1957).
5 The revisions were principally directed towards strengthening Congressional control over the action to be taken.
6 House Joint Resolution no. 166, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session. Cf. C. Adler and A. M. Margalith, *With Firmness in the Right* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1946), 278 ff.
7 I made the same point in a lecture given at Johns Hopkins University in November 1954. See my book, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; London: Cumberlege, 1955), 80–1.
8 Cf. *ibid.*, 45–6.
9 For a discussion of the relation of this sentiment to Anglo-American financial and commercial negotiations during and after the Second World War, see Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (Oxford, 1956).
10 Cf. my essay, "Benjamin Franklin, International Statesman," in *Manchester Memoirs* (vol. 97, Session 1955–6).
11 *History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy*, vol. VI, by John Ehrman (H.M.S.O., 1956), 161.

Is Evolution Finished?

T. A. Goudge

As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length . . . to progress towards perfection. CHARLES DARWIN

In the first flush of enthusiasm produced by the work of Charles Darwin, his achievement was often compared with that of Newton. Just as *Principia Mathematica* formulated laws which govern the domain of inanimate matter, so, it was said, *The Origin of Species* formulated laws which govern the domain of life, at least in its historical aspect. Furthermore, just as physical bodies must obey the law of universal gravitation, so living bodies must obey the law of evolution by natural selection. It was an easy step from this view to the belief that the evolutionary process described by Darwin is not just something which happened in the past. The process is also going on in the present, and is destined to continue throughout "a secure future of great length." For most Darwinians in the nineteenth century, biological evolution was literally a work in progress.

Today this optimistic belief is far from being unchallenged. No informed person can doubt that there has occurred on the earth during the past two thousand million years an evolutionary process which has brought about the enormous diversity and complexity of organisms from remote ancestors who were relatively simple and homogeneous in structure, function and type. But some informed persons doubt whether this process is now going on. There are reasons for believing, they argue, that evolution is virtually, if not actually, finished. In the present paper I propose to outline certain of their arguments and make a brief estimate of their cogency. Since man, like all living things, must be subject to the evolutionary forces which produced him, he can scarcely be uninterested

in the question whether they are or are not still at work, especially if he surveys his prospects in the universe with a philosophical eye.

I

We may begin by considering a group of arguments based on large-scale features of the history of life.

In the course of this history there has occurred an immense multiplication of the different kinds of organisms which inhabit the earth. The classification of these kinds is the special province of taxonomy or systematics, and its scheme of categories is hierarchical in arrangement. At the base of the hierarchy is the category of *species*, of which approximately one million and a half are recognized today. The palaeontological evidence makes it fairly clear that nothing like this number of species existed when life was in its early stages. Near the top of the hierarchy is the category of *phylum*. Only about twenty phyla can be distinguished within the animal kingdom. Each of them represents a broad and fundamental form of animal organization, such as is exemplified in the protozoans, the annelids, the molluscs, the arthropods, and the vertebrates. Between the phyla and the species other systematic categories (e.g. *classes, orders, families, genera*, etc.) have their place, and each has been subject to numerical increase as evolution has proceeded.

Now it is pointed out that the broadest forms of animal organization, the phyla, have all been in existence for a very long time. No new phylum has appeared for at least four hundred million years. Moreover, by no stretch of scientific imagination can we discern in any type of organism living at present the potentialities which might enable it to give rise to a new phylum in the future. Every type of organism is so specialized in structure and function that it is biologically impossible for changes of the magnitude required to begin, let alone be completed. The conclusion here seems evident. Phyletic evolution not only is finished but was finished hundreds of millions of years ago. We cannot reasonably expect that the future course of life will require the addition of any fresh categories at the top of the taxonomic scale.

What about the categories at the bottom of the scale? Is evolution likely to produce any new species in the foreseeable future? Those who argue for a negative answer to this question often point out that Darwin's theory about the causes of evolution—or at any rate the contemporary reformulation of that theory—forces us to conclude that the phenomenon of specialization is something which tends always to in-

crease. For the chief of these causes, natural selection, operates in such a way as either to bring about the extinction of a species or to make it more and minutely adapted to a particular way of life. In the latter case, an organism's potentialities for further change tend to decrease, so that as time goes on it is less and less likely to give rise to a new species. From this point of view, it is contended, "evolution is . . . seen as a series of blind alleys. Some are extremely short—those leading to new genera and species that either remain stable or become extinct. Others are longer. . . . But all in the long run have terminated blindly."[1] The situation today is that every species, with the possible exception of man, has advanced so far into its own *cul-de-sac* as to bring evolution at this level also to a stop.

The above argument is sometimes reinforced by another line of thought. Attention is called to the fact that the way of life characteristic of an organism is determined in part by the environmental niche which it occupies. Each living thing has an "adaptive zone" proper to it, and only in this zone is it able to survive and reproduce. But when one considers the over-all economy of nature, one is driven to the conclusion that all the major adaptive zones are filled. There is no vacancy into which a new form of life could move even if it did evolve. T. H. Huxley is said to have compared the evolutionary process to the filling of a barrel first with apples, then with pebbles which occupy the spaces between the apples, then with sand which packs down between the pebbles, then with water which pervades the spaces between grains of sand, and so on. Eventually a point is reached where the barrel can hold nothing more. This, it is argued, represents the present state of affairs on the earth. All the environmental niches which can support life as we know it are "packed to capacity." Accordingly, the evolutionary process must have ceased and will remain in abeyance until such time as the extinction of some existing form of life leaves room for new forms to arise. Even then the process will not recommence unless the new forms prove to be viable in the vacated zone.

The final argument we shall consider in this group stems from the doctrine powerfully stated by Decugis in his *Le Vieillissement du monde vivant*. This work undertakes to show that the living world manifests many signs of diminishing vitality due to the onset of old age. Chief among these signs are the numerous stationary species or "living fossils" which have remained in a state of evolutionary stagnation for hundreds of millions of years. Then there are the cases of degenerate species, such as the various types of harmful parasites and disease-producing bacteria,

whose virulence seems to have increased during recent millenia. The higher organisms are more and more susceptible to pathological disturbances of cellular and glandular functions, and to perversions or enfeeblement of normal instinctive activities. Even the plant world reveals traces of senescence. These facts, the author argues, oblige us to conclude that we are approaching "la fin de l'évolution." Man has entered the evolutionary drama towards the close of the final scene. "L'Homme est venu bien tard dans un monde déjà vieux, encombré de formes séniles, stagnantes, ou dépérissant lentement. La vieillissement des espèces vivantes est beaucoup plus advancé qu'on ne le croit communément. Aucune ne peut y'échapper."[2] Evolution, if not finished, is certainly finishing.

The cumulative effect of these arguments is impressive at first glance. Yet they need to be scrutinized closely. For the subject with which they are concerned is so complex that important aspects of it can easily be overlooked or underestimated. We must therefore review some of these aspects briefly and try to determine how far they affect the cogency of the arguments.

It is widely recognized that evolution is for the most part a gradual process. Basically the process involves the slow transformation of populations of organisms during long stretches of time. Successive generations of the population undergo small changes in their hereditary equipment (genes and chromosomes) and in the observable characteristics (bodily structure and function) controlled by this equipment. As a result the population can maintain itself in an environment which is altering. More than half a million years are required for such changes to bring about the production of a new species. Throughout this period each generation must have a minimal degree of adaptation to the environment, and at the same time the population as a whole must be sufficiently adaptable to meet future environmental alterations. Adaptability, however, depends on potentialities hidden in the hereditary mechanism. For only when these potentialities are actualized (as genetic mutations or recombinations) can organisms develop the characteristics which enable them to cope with an altered environment. Sudden, large changes are at best infrequent occurrences in this process.

Now if we take a short-range view of populations we are likely to emphasize unduly the adaptation of their members to particular environmental niches. In each case the adaptation may be so precise that it is difficult or perhaps impossible to envisage any changes arising in the adaptive pattern. Hence a short-range survey of existing species tempts

us to conclude that they have reached the limits of their evolution. This conclusion, however, ignores the possibility that species may be adaptable as well as adapted. Their genetic mechanism or "gene pool" may contain many hidden potentialities for further change. Because adaptability cannot be observed, it must not be forgotten or assumed to be insignificant. From a strictly genetic point of view, complete loss of adaptability can be safely inferred only when a species has become extinct. This is not to say that every type of organism now living possesses potentialities for further evolution. It is simply to say that we are not warranted in concluding that all or most contemporary species lack such potentialities, and hence are in a state of evolutionary stagnation.[3]

This question can be approached from another angle which is not to be neglected. One of the philosophically striking features of evolution has been its extraordinary inventiveness. As Simpson has remarked, it "seems to have tried out almost every conceivable possibility, and never to have followed a simple and uniform pattern."[4] Unlike inorganic processes which appear to take place in accordance with the principle of parsimony, evolution appears to take place in accordance with the principle of plentitude. Throughout the history of life it has happened that when a new type of organism emerges, it radiates into a number of adaptive zones, takes on astonishingly varied characters, and gives rise to lines of development which could scarcely have been predicted at the point of its emergence. Suppose a biologist were transported back to the Ordovician period, four hundred million years ago, and deprived of his knowledge of the actual course evolution has taken since then. Would he be able to predict by studying those strange, archaic vertebrates, the Ostracoderms, that from them would arise the bony fishes, from the bony fishes would arise the amphibians, from the amphibians would arise the reptiles, and from the reptiles would arise birds and mammals? It seems highly unlikely. These later forms are at least in part an expression of the inventiveness which has marked the evolutionary process at so many points. By a simple extrapolation we can conclude that if life continues on the earth for another four hundred million years, equally novel and unforeseeable developments will probably occur. "To think otherwise is to imagine that with the coming of man, so insignificant in time, the advance and inventiveness of evolution, steadily carried on through an unimaginable vista of years in which no trace of slackening can be observed, has all but come to an end."[5] Only human conceit, not an impartial survey of the evidence, could motivate such a conclusion.

These general considerations, some will say, do little to diminish the

force of the contention that in a world where organisms are highly specialized and adaptive zones fully occupied, evolution must have stopped. To this the reply can be made that no one has shown that all or most of the million and a half species now on the earth *are* "highly specialized" in any precise sense. All of them are certainly specialized in the sense that each species is adapted to its particular environmental conditions. But this has been true of organisms at every stage of evolution, and it is perfectly compatible with the gradual production of new species. Increasing specialization no doubt restricts evolutionary possibilities. It does not eliminate them entirely. As for the alleged "packing" of adaptive zones with life, expert opinion is far from unanimous in regarding this to be a fact. Thus Simpson observes: "It seems probable . . . that unoccupied major zones now exist. There is, for instance, no true aerial plankton, although I see nothing impossible in the eventual evolution of one. If it did appear, this in turn would create other major zones. . . ."[6] Huxley's barrel is not demonstrably full; and in any case, it is expansible.

The discussion so far seems to permit the following conclusion to be drawn. If we can asume that terrestrial life will endure for some hundreds or even thousands of millions of years, then the evolutionary process is almost certain to continue throughout that period. Hence novel and unpredictable forms of life may be expected to arise as significant environmental changes take place. But to what extent *are* we justified in assuming that life has such a future before it?

Until quite recently the answer to this question was fairly unanimous. It was agreed that barring some cosmic catastrophe, such as the explosion of the sun or the irruption into the solar system of a giant comet or a wandering star—events whose probability is very small—the earth will continue for an enormous stretch of time to be a suitable abode for life. Physical forces *per se* do not present any imminent threat to the evolutionary process. Today this answer requires grave qualification. For it has come to pass that evolution's youngest child has suddenly gained control over one of the most powerful of these forces and may well use it for universally destructive ends.

The situation here is so familiar as to require little elaboration. Man's irresponsible use of nuclear energy may put an end to all terrestrial life and even to the earth itself. The biosphere, that fragile envelope within which organisms exist, may in the near future receive a degree of radioactive contamination to which no living thing can adapt itself. Radioactivity may damage irreparably the genetic material of all living

species so that none of their offspring will be viable. Indeed, as the eminent physicist Sir C. G. Darwin recently pointed out, if man ever succeeds in detonating a true hydrogen bomb (the one we have being of the hydrogen isotope, deuterium) "it is extremely probable that such an act would set fire to the whole sea. There would appear a blaze of the brilliance of the sun for something like three weeks or three months, and then it would be over."[7] The occurrence of any of these eventualities would ring the curtain down on terrestrial evolution.

II

Quite often in the past the failure of a species to adapt to the environment has led both to its own extinction and to the extinction of some other species dependent for survival on it. But never before has one species been a threat to *all* other forms of life, as man is at present. Evolution has produced a being with the power of obliterating both itself and its creator. We may next examine certain arguments designed to show that this power will probably be put to use in the very near future.

There is not much disagreement about man's place in the broad evolutionary picture. *Homo sapiens* is almost certainly the youngest species of animal now on the earth. His point of origin lies somewhere in the Middle Pleistocene period, about 200,000 years ago. He is the only surviving species of the genus *Homo*, and his nearest living relatives are the large anthropoid apes. For approximately four-fifths of the time since his emergence, however, the group which he formed was a small, relatively insignificant one. But during the last 50,000 years a process has taken place which is unprecedented in the history of life, namely, the occupation of the entire earth by the human species and the evolution of various sub-groups of the species from a state of savagery to one of civilization. Judged in terms of the geological time-scale the tempo of the human planetary invasion and of cultural evolution has been extremely rapid. The most vivid way of illustrating these events is to represent the stretch of time since the beginning of life on the earth as a period of 12 hours just completed. On this scale *Homo sapiens* arose within the last 5 seconds; his occupation of the globe occurred during the last second; and civilization began less than a quarter of a second ago.

Now it can be argued that two important conclusions follow from the above facts. In the first place, the human species is far from being zoologically mature. The study of fossils has shown that it takes well over

half a million years of evolution to make a new species of animal. Since *Homo sapiens* has existed for much less than that period of time, he is, biologically speaking, still in his infancy or at most in his early adolescence. He does not yet have a fully developed set of *human* traits. In the second place, man's evolution has been accelerating with such intensity during recent millenia that he is at present a badly adapted creature. Although pre-human evolution did not all take place at the same rate, yet its maximum was immensely slower than the pace set by mankind since the end of the last Ice Age. A gradual evolutionary process tends to ensure good adaptation to the environment on the part of those who survive. But when the process becomes abnormally rapid the character of the adaptation deteriorates. This deterioration is apparent in modern man. He has moved so fast from a Neolithic to a civilized mode of life that he has been unable to achieve a harmonious adjustment to his world.

Man's rapid evolution has not given him time to divest himself of a number of primitive emotions and impulses. These probably played an important part in helping him to survive during the early phase of his history. But they now constitute a serious liability. For emotions such as fear, anger, and hatred, being physiologically conditioned, may reach a state of uncontrollable violence. Under their domination *Homo sapiens* has outstripped all other animals in the performance of acts of savage cruelty and senseless destruction. When reinforced by cupidity, lust for power, and tribal egotism, these emotions constantly jeopardize humanity's collective existence. They can even overrule the requirements of enlightened self-interest.

Another source of man's biological instability is his fund of surplus energy. This is far in excess of what he needs to establish a settled pattern of life. Indeed, his surplus energy always threatens to disrupt—and has in fact disrupted—every pattern of social adjustment which he has set up, as the history of civilization testifies. Man's restlessness may be connected with the fact that he belongs to a family of animals which has gone in for the intensive development of one organ, the brain. In the initial stages of its evolution, the brain undoubtedly survived the process of selection because it promoted the viability of species possessing it. Yet in later stages it has conferred on its possessors the capacity to invent innumerable new activities. These may or may not be advantageous. But the trouble is that if they are disadvantageous they can be carried on *before* natural selection is able to test them. Harmful activities cannot, therefore, be nipped in the bud. Hence it is biologically dangerous for

a species to be too vital and inventive. Little wonder that *Homo sapiens*, with his hyper-active brain, his primitive emotions, and his super-abundant *élan*, is evolution's problem child!

The upshot of this line of argument has been well stated by L. L. Whyte.

> As a species *Homo sapiens* is too young for the adaptive value of his distinguishing characteristics to be regarded as established. He may have survived no longer than other types of *Homo* which have disappeared, and he may still follow them. The entire history of man may be the expression of a set of unfavourable mutations, which on the short run appeared favourable as they enabled man to achieve mastery over all other species, but have still to demonstrate their lethal character.[8]

It would seem, then, that so immature and labile a being as man can scarcely be counted on to use his newly acquired power over atomic forces wisely. The odds immensely favour his using these forces destructively on a global scale. Since this is likely to occur in the near rather than the remote future, the prospects for the continuance of evolution even to the end of the twentieth century are poor. Thus the evolutionary process is virtually if not actually finished.

How cogent is the reasoning just outlined? Before attempting to appraise it, I shall mention a few points in the reasoning with which I agree. It seems evident that judged by the best biological standards the human species is both young and immature. Man has not been on the earth long enough to have established a pattern of life adequate to his potentialities. Hence many of these potentialities are still unrealized or exercised only sporadically. It can hardly be denied, for example, that present-day man is an extremely imperfect type of rational animal. Moreover, his waywardness, his liability to outbursts of violent emotion, and his unstable social organization do constantly threaten his individual and collective existence. All this, I think, must be granted.

The case is otherwise, however, with regard to the contention that *Homo sapiens* is a badly adapted creature, already on the road to extinction and likely to take the rest of the world with him. To this contention one can object that it is based on an appraisal of man's adaptation which fails to recognize that his environment is qualitatively different from that of the other animals. These animals adapt themselves to an environment which is predominantly bio-physical. It consists of inorganic and organic matter and of other living things. A non-human species is well adapted to this environment when it fits harmoniously

into its particular niche and maintains or increases its numbers. The human environment, on the other hand, while it includes bio-physical elements, is predominantly cultural. It consists of the complex products of man's own activity. These products are of two main sorts: (*a*) material implements and techniques for the production of food and other supplies, laws governing the ownership of property, the distribution of goods and services, etc.; and (*b*) beliefs of a religious, ethical, philosophical, or scientific kind about the universe and man's place in it. Such beliefs impart a meaning and serve as a stimulus to the activities of the community. The material components of culture depend at bottom on the human capacity to employ tools or machines. The psychical components depend on the human capacity for conceptual thought which is transmissible through spoken or written languages. The cultural environment forms a whole, appropriately called the "noösphere" to differentiate it from the biosphere upon which it has been superimposed.[9] And it is in relation to the noösphere, not the biosphere, that the adequacy of man's adaptation should be judged.

To arrive at a proper judgment certain other considerations must be kept in view. By progressively creating the noösphere the human population added a new environmental layer to the earth's surface; and by progressively adapting itself to the new environment, the human population added new characteristics to itself. What this means is that man's evolution, although made possible by the organic evolution which preceded it, is nevertheless *different in kind* from the latter. With the rise of the hominids a new evolutionary process began on the earth.

This process has been marked by a number of novel features. But three of these are particularly relevant to the present discussion and must be mentioned briefly.[10]

(i) During its long pre-human period, the inventiveness of evolution was, as far as we can see, unplanned. At each stage evolution simply utilized the materials that happened to be available, improvising with marvellous ingenuity but without prevision. Since the appearance of man, however, purposive activity and the power to devise and execute plans have become part of the evolutionary process. This power of planning, which can be organized on a collective scale, opens up a new era in the development of terrestrial life. Inventiveness no longer needs to be limited by contingent material or by the absence of prevision. It can be geared to rationally constructed, long-term plans for the realization of human goals. Already the noösphere shows the manifold effects of this new and more efficient type of invention introduced by man. He

has thus gained a large measure of control over his environment and an increasing ability to direct his own future evolution.

(ii) Before the arrival of the hominids, evolution had to rely on the genetic mechanism to provide a hereditary link between generations. Despite its effectiveness at the pre-human levels, this mechanism has the disadvantage of operating slowly and wastefully. Most serious of all, it cannot transmit characteristics acquired by individuals of one generation to the individuals of the next. In human evolution a new sort of heredity which is not genetic but cultural has overcome these disadvantages. Thanks to language, man's cumulative experience can be stored, complex ideas and techniques can be transmitted, and the inheritance of acquired characteristics made a reality through education. Thus with the emergence of the noösphere, cultural heredity, which is incomparably more sensitive and efficient than genetic heredity, becomes a paramount factor in the evolutionary process.

(iii) When an animal population persists for a long time, it tends to split up into branching systems of varieties or sub-species. Some of these eventually become new species, anatomically distinct and reproductively isolated from one another. Each pursues its separate way of life. In the case of man this pattern has not been followed. The human population has not split up into a number of zoological species during its evolution. It has remained a single, reproductively homogeneous group. Hence mankind is characterized by a profound biological unity. At the same time, there has occurred a splitting within the noösphere which has generated the diverse forms of culture. One can plausibly argue that the various human cultures are for the noösphere the equivalent and the true successors of zoological species in the biosphere. If so, we can say that a new type of speciation has arisen in the evolutionary process. Moreover, "cultural species" are much better fitted than their predecessors to promote evolution at the human stage. For zoological species as they evolve become increasingly isolated from each other. They inevitably diverge. Human cultures, on the other hand, mutually influence one another, and can converge to the point where they form a more inclusive whole. Their permeability facilitates swift and effective transmission of planned inventions, ideas, and techniques across cultural boundaries. Perhaps most important of all is the fact that the capacity of cultures to coalesce provides a basis for achieving a single world-culture in which man's biological unity can be matched by a spiritual unity, purged of the divisive forces which haunt him at present.

These distinctive features of the human evolutionary process seem to warrant the following inferences. First, the new and more efficient forms of inventiveness, heredity, and speciation have played a far larger part in determining human evolution than have genetic mutations and natural selection. If we judge that evolution exclusively in terms of genetic or selective factors we are bound to be misled. We will, for instance, conclude that the tempo of human evolution has been abnormally rapid. In fact, the tempo seems to have been wholly appropriate to the new and more efficient agencies at work. Second, man's abundant energy, so far from being a disruptive force in his evolution, has perfectly complemented his ability to utilize tools and employ conceptual thought and speech in the interests of purposive action. Third, man is not properly described as a badly adapted creature. For the human species has been able to encompass the earth, to increase its numbers at a staggering rate, and to cope with its unique environment, the noösphere. This is surely sufficient to show that man has found his proper niche in nature. The noösphere constitutes his milieu, just as water is the milieu of fish or air the milieu of birds. Fourth, man may, however, be described as an incompletely adapted creature. For he is still creating the noösphere, and still striving to increase his understanding and control both of it and of the bio-physical world. He is thus continuing the process of his own evolution. The waywardness and instability of *Homo sapiens* are not signs of maladaptation. They are signs that he is still evolving towards his fully human stature.

Those who believe that he has little chance of success in this arduous adventure tend to underestimate one fact. Repeatedly, if sporadically, during his career *Homo sapiens* has shown that he can learn quickly from experience and can utilize new knowledge constructively to promote his collective welfare. His capacity to do these things is a matter of record. I fail to see why he should be unable to exercise this capacity now that he has command of atomic forces. The evidence from his evolutionary past does not, of course, *guarantee* that man will refrain from exterminating himself, destroying all life, or turning the planet into a star by means of a super-bomb. But the evidence does provide some basis for thinking that in the long run his constructive impulses will prevail over his destructive ones, as they have prevailed at critical points in the past. There may be convincing grounds for pessimism about man's earthly future, but they are not to be found in the record of his evolution.

None of the arguments I have considered, therefore, seem to prove that terrestrial evolution in general or human evolution in particular

are finished. On the contrary both processes appear likely to continue far beyond the present epoch. Perhaps the confidence with which we anticipate "a secure future of great length" is small beside that of Darwin. Yet here, as on so many matters, his view was essentially sound.

NOTES

1 Julian Huxley, *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis* (London, 1942), 571.

2 Henri Decugis, *Le Vieillissement du monde vivant* (Paris, 1941), 364.

3 Cf. R. A. Fisher, *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (Oxford, 1930), 96. One of the most striking cases of contemporary species exhibiting adaptive potentialities in the face of a changing environment is that of so-called "industrial melanism" among moths in England. Cf. Julian Huxley, *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis*, 93ff.

4 G. G. Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution* (New York, 1949), 40n.

5 J. Ritchie, "Perspectives in Evolution," in *Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1940* (Washington, 1940), 267.

6 G. G. Simpson, *The Major Features of Evolution* (New York, 1953), 212.

7 C. G. Darwin in the report of a symposium discussion printed in *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, ed. W. L. Thomas Jr. (Chicago, 1956), 1115.

8 L. L. Whyte, *Accent on Form* (New York, 1954), 127.

9 Julian Huxley, *Evolution in Action* (London, 1953), 110. See also the reference following.

10 Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "The Antiquity and World Expansion of Human Culture," in *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, 103–112. I am greatly indebted to this stimulating and remarkable essay.

Dryden: Professional Man of Letters

George G. Falle

In his brilliant and doctrinaire essay on Dryden Lord Macaulay represented the poet as the most eminent of the writers of his age who, "by obsequiously cringing to the public taste, had acquired sufficient favour to reform it." According to Macaulay, Dryden's influence was counterbalanced by the influence of the age upon him, for "on no man did the age exercise so much influence." As Macaulay's very low opinion of the temper of the Restoration period is only too familiar, it is obvious that his statement was intended as one of his many slurs upon Dryden's integrity. But if we discount the deep-rooted partisanship of his Whiggism there is an intrinsic truth in his argument that may be turned to Dryden's advantage. This reciprocal flow of ideas between Dryden and his age serves to confirm the opinion that he was at the hub of contemporary intellectual activity. His business was literature, and he brought to his professional practice what Dr. Johnson later called "great stores of intellectual wealth," tireless energy in the pursuit of his aims, and uncompromising faith in the dignity and integrity of his chosen field of activity. If we add to these his innate poetic sensibility, which manifests itself in virtually all his critical utterances, we have a portrait of a man who rendered to his language and his literature services the magnitude of which makes accurate assessment very difficult. Any final assessment of Dryden's contributions to English literature should be made, not exclusively in terms of his services to poetry, to drama, to literary criticism, or to our knowledge of the intellectual history of an age, but in terms of his position as professional man of letters.

In the forty years that followed the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the offices of the literary arts, which had lost their true identity amid the political and religious upheavals of the Interregnum, were given a new definition and focus. Literature began to reassert its normal

function within a larger social and cultural context. The revival of the patronal system, a responsibility normally attendant upon a monarchic régime, the body of poetry occasioned by that system, and the Court's dilettante interest in arts and letters—these resulted in a close identification of the professional writer with the public life of his day. The genuine literary interests and endowments of such men as the Duke of Buckingham and the Earls of Rochester, Mulgrave, and Roscommon made possible an immediate connection between the social amenities of the urban life of the Court and those of the rising middle class from which the most significant literary figures of the age were drawn. Although much of the satire of the late Restoration period reflects bitter political and, in some cases, personal animus, practising writers, whether aristocratic or bourgeois, enjoyed for the most part a mutual respect and admiration. The common interest in matters literary and aesthetic, although observing certain lines of social demarcation, worked towards the establishment of a healthy intellectual milieu of which a middle-class poet, dramatist, and critic was the leading spokesman and arbiter.

Dryden's professional career was a consistent exemplification of Hobbes's aim, defined in the critical essays and in relevant passages in *Leviathan*, to establish the practice of letters as a normal human activity. Poetry as the verbal consequence of a theoretical *furor poeticus* or divine *afflatus* had failed to pass the new empirical and Cartesian musters. The very delicate balance between thought and sensibility in the work of Donne and members of the metaphysical school had given their poetry a special aesthetic validity of its own; but such concinnities were too fragile and subtle to serve as the basis for a poetic which might survive within the new Cartesian frame of ideas. By the mid-century it was clear that a new corporate body of critical principle which would stand in some reasonable relationship to Baconian empiricism and Cartesian rationalism was a positive necessity. Davenant and Hobbes, in their joint definition of the terms of the "new aesthetic," attempted to fill this need. But Hobbes's philosophical mind saw the desirability of redefining the poet's place in society, and he proceeded to justify that place first by insisting upon poetry and other forms of literature as a branch of *scientia*, that is, knowledge rooted in rational and verifiable truths, and secondly by postulating ethic as a part of artistic function. According to the first argument poetry is seen as contributing to epistemology, that is, to the totality of human knowledge and of man's intellectual experience; and according to the second it presents an imitation of nature which reflects what Dryden was later to call "the highest pattern of

human life."[1] His work thus squared with the new philosophical ideals, the poet's position was assured. By thus relating literary art to a system of knowledge and by postulating its ethical function, Hobbes asserted the natural integrity of the poet, commended the career of the professional man of letters, and upheld the dignity of that profession and the naturalness of its activity.

But Hobbes's neo-humanistic view of poetry was not to go unchallenged. Within fifty years Locke was propounding a new theory which anticipated the later middle-class suspicions of art. He disparaged the artist's activity; he denied to poetry any place in an epistomological system; he expressed contempt for the man whose profession was neither useful nor remunerative; and he displayed a total indifference to aesthetics: probably, as his most sympathetic critics point out, the greatest limitation of his famous *Essay*. Further, he limited participation in any activities involving the work of the imagination to those who have no better use for their energies, or to those whose independent fortunes furnish them with the leisure and idle inclination for such fancies. But Hobbes was spared this materialistic refutation of his reasoned poetic apologia, and Dryden was spared the theoretical profanation of his way of life. Supported by Hobbes's philosophical arguments, Dryden was constant in his aim to assert the integrity of the artist's work and to stimulate that free exercise of the reasoning and imaginative faculties which, in their disengaged analysis of the states of man's thought and sensibility, would contribute directly to his greater virtue and happiness. If Locke's *Essay* and minor critical writings represented among other things a refutation of Hobbes's statements concerning the value of the poet's work and of his place in society, Dryden's career (and later Johnson's) stood as an open challenge to Locke's disparagement of literature in general and of poetry in particular as a source of public enlightenment.

Any careful study of Dryden's intellectual temper almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that he was not a strictly disciplined thinker but rather a well-informed Restoration gentleman of cultivation, wit, and discernment. As Dr. Johnson remarked, his learning was inferior to that of either Milton or Cowley, and the "few books" which Dryden mentions in his critical writings are "those such as lie in the beaten track of regular study; from which if ever he departs, he is in danger of losing himself in unknown regions." Johnson concentrated on the breadth, not the depth, of Dryden's knowledge; the intellectual range is wide but it lacks focus. In measuring his scholarly abilities, Johnson rather ruefully

deplored his lack of thoroughness and method; and yet, if Dryden's mind was not schooled in the usual fashion of carefully and deeply meditated reading and study, it was nonetheless amply informed on a wide variety of subjects.

> His works abound with knowledge, and sparkle with illustrations. There is scarcely any science or faculty that does not supply him with occasional images and lucky similitudes; every page discovers a mind very widely acquainted both with art and nature, and in full possession of great stores of intellectual wealth. Of him that knows much it is natural to suppose that he has read with diligence: yet I rather believe that the knowledge of Dryden was gleaned from accidental intelligence and various conversation, by a quick apprehension, a judicious selection, and a happy memory, a keen appetite of knowledge, and a powerful digestion; by vigilance that permitted nothing to pass without notice, and a habit of reflection that suffered nothing useful to be lost. A mind like Dryden's, always curious, always active, to which every understanding was proud to be associated, and of which everyone solicited the regard, by an ambitious display of himself, had a more pleasant, perhaps a nearer way to knowledge than by the silent progress of solitary reading. I do not suppose that he despised books, or intentionally neglected them; but that he was carried out, by the impetuosity of his genius, to more vivid and speedy instructors; and that his studies were rather desultory and fortuitous than constant and systematical.

That the learned and book-loving doctor should be willing to concede the validity of such circuitous approaches to knowledge is ample evidence of his respect for Dryden's degree of learning, limited though it may have been, and hallowed, as it was, by neither orthodox nor sensible practice.

Numerous attempts have been made to evaluate Dryden's indebtedness to philosophical attitudes and traditions. To associate his philosophical position with the tradition of scepticism or of Ciceronian and Academic probabilism, or with the philosophic determinism of Hobbes, or with certain Platonic attitudes, as has become the habit of several recent scholars, is to oversimplify the issue. Taken together such studies serve mainly to underline the eclectic character of his learning and the catholicity of his selection and taste. To contemporary philosophic movements, one might expect of such an alert mind as Dryden's more immediate response and direct reference than his writings actually indicate. This is not to suggest that he was ignorant of the weighty arguments and implications of either Cartesianism or Hobbism, but rather that he was neither naturally nor temperamentally disposed to accept a view of the world that was rigidly rationalistic or oppressively determinist. The innocent Adam's limping line in *The State of Innocence*, "For that I am/

I know, because I think," may well be an ironic reflection of Dryden's evaluation of Cartesian doctrine. As for Hobbes's philosophical influence, there is less question for there are more frequent indirect references, particularly in the plays. Although Dryden's philosophical temper is essentially alien to Hobbes's world of sense, motion, and political mandate, Hobbism, with its recognition of the need for order and authority and its certainty of the existence of means by which social order and authority could be realized, might well have momentarily displaced the intellectual doubt and disorganization induced by his experience and his naturally sceptical inclinations. Further, there is ample evidence in the prose works of the 1660's that Dryden had been studying *Leviathan* and had found it useful in providing him with working definitions of critical terms.

Such attempts to define Dryden's intellectual temper inevitably issue in the conclusion that the milieu in which he wrote was one of great philosophical ferment. It would seem ill advised to attempt to place Dryden in any particular stream of tradition. The flexibility of his mind, unschooled as it would appear to have been by any one predominant doctrine or dogma, the catholicity of his taste, and his intrinsic poetic sensibility make it impossible to do more than ally him, somewhat superficially perhaps, with the many currents of ideas which circulated so freely among men of his cultivation. As Professor Bredvold has observed, "when Dryden said that he laid by his 'natural diffidence and scepticism for a while' to take up the dogmatical way of Lucretius for the purpose of translating him, he indicated his own essential quality both of mind and temperament."[2] If we are capable of stemming the contemporary urge to categorize Dryden as Platonist, sceptic, philosophic determinist, probabilist, or Cartesian, he emerges in the medial position of the professional writer, knowledgeable, reasonable, and sensitive, *le moyen homme intellectuel* of his age. As such he was better equipped than any other critical figure in our literature (with the possible exception of Dr. Johnson) to encourage an interest in, and stimulate a love for, the free play and independent exercise of the mind in problematical matters concerning the arts of poetry and prose. His vigorous and active intellect was constantly engaged in ferreting out and defining the relations between the world of poetry and the world of affairs. Throughout his critical writings he maintained the conviction that the work of the creative artist was justifiable only in terms of its ability to contribute to the clarification of the universal problems of mind and spirit.

Dryden's mind was not one of those that aimed at philosophical synthesis. He never attempted a correlation and systematization of his knowledge into any coherent world-view. Rather he responded quickly and sensitively to the superficies of things, delighting in the immediate pleasures of experience and carefully preserving those images in which, intuitively, he observed significant meaning; but he made no attempt, indeed saw little reason, to codify them into a meaningful experiential and, ultimately, a philosophical pattern. Consequently it would be unreasonable to expect from Dryden a consistent aesthetic. For him the examination of the processes of the rational and imaginative faculties so necessary to the formulation of aesthetic theory held little interest. Unlike Hobbes he made no attempt to analyse these processes or their respective functions in aesthetic activity; that he did not achieve in his critical writing a coherent philosophy of literary art would have caused him but little distress. His ultimate purpose lay in another direction. He hoped to stimulate a broader and less restricted interest in literature than had been attained in its past history and to demonstrate by his own practice how, in raising the level of public taste by achieving some uniform standards of judgment, it might contribute to man's greater understanding of himself and to the betterment of his society. He thus implicitly identified the function of literature with that of divinity, philosophy (more particularly, moral philosophy), and good statesmanship.

As literary theorist Dryden was unquestionably on surer ground. His critical utterances are pervaded with his poetic sensibility and they reflect the intellectual assurance of a man who was master of his craft. He was possessed of an independent critical temper which gave to his theoretical statements a uniform excellence of tone. Such assurance and independence were in large part due to the general recognition of his position as an established professional writer; the authority reflected in his critical pronouncements was in part at least the result of the security afforded the practising man of letters by his society, a security which Hobbes and other framers of the "new aesthetic" had so vigorously urged. This is not to say that Dryden's critical position is either consistent or coherent. Had he had the philosophical mind of a Hobbes he might well have developed a theory of literature both consistent and coherent; but lacking such secure philosophical and psychological foundations his critical essays are what one might expect of the professional man of letters—a palimpsest of the best that was being thought and said on the subject of literature over a period of almost forty years,

and containing the seasoned reflections of a gentleman of cultivation and taste.

The general temper of Dryden's criticism displays the same flexibility, not to say bewilderment, that we have seen to characterize his philosophical temper. He was constantly aware of the responsibility to society of a professional author—of enlightening the public mind and of improving the level of public taste. Consequently he felt the need of some common critical mode, and this led him to the occasional acceptance of certain firmly established rules by which the value of works of literary art might be measured with some degree of objectivity and accuracy. The rules, ostensibly derived from Aristotle, had been defined with sufficient trenchancy by the Continental formalists (more specifically, Rapin, LeBossu, and Dacier), and for a time at least Dryden's conscience led him to an acceptance of their rigid critical dicta. The French critics did, however, leave a lasting mark in their insistence upon the Horatian "instruction" as the primary law of poetry. Rapin and LeBossu served to provide this contention with an added weight and authority so that ethical function is the one consistent element in Dryden's criticism. But he never deserted the brief he held for delight, the other side of the Horatian coin, as a poetic element. Since the rules were very frequently at odds with those means which afforded pleasure and delight to the reader, an essential ambivalence was set up in Dryden's mind from which he was never totally free. He felt that as a theorist he was obliged to suppress certain innate sensibilities which were part of his poetic endowment, and such an obligation he could not acknowledge. As he had found rationalistic method deficient in formulating philosophical principles, so he found it deficient in formulating critical principles. Dryden could not bring himself to endorse any critical standard which might encroach upon the free exercise of his poetic intuitions. His theory of literature is consequently inchoate and unsure because of the conflict between his purely individual impulses as a poet and lover of literature and his voluntarily assumed responsibilities as a professional man of letters.

Whether at Wills's, or in the houses of the great, or at his own work-table, Dryden was unremitting in his efforts to establish the integrity of literary activity within the social framework. His pronouncements on literature may lack philosophical basis and they may defy codification into a strictly consistent and coherent critical theory, but they do nonetheless reveal states of mind and levels of sensibility not common to many literary critics conscious, as Dryden was, of the

importance of conformity to established rules. He was, as T. S. Eliot has pointed out, the "*normal* critic."[3] But the epithet is appropriate for reasons other than those cited by Mr. Eliot. It is true that, as a critic, Dryden adopted a less particular method than Dr. Johnson, that he was more orderly and restrained than Coleridge, less defensive of his own practice than Wordsworth, and, unlike Matthew Arnold, "not too largely concerned with finding the moral lesson." However, more important than these considerations was the attempt of Dryden to achieve in his general critical position the modes by which literary judgments might be judiciously made. Like Pope later, he firmly believed that a normal standard by which critical judgments might be evaluated was attainable; and that it was one of the poet's functions to define this standard and to school his public to conform to its level. It was by this means that the public taste might become more cultivated. Since a greater refinement of taste suggested a keen apperception and appreciation of the ethos underlying the work of art, the public would become more enlightened and more conscious of the means by which art conduces to the moral betterment of society.

Such preoccupation with the essentially ethical function of poetry has made many contemporary critics suspicious of the aims underlying the literary criticism of the latter half of the seventeenth century in general, and of Dryden in particular. True, it is a strange blend of contending forces, but it is not without its essential unity. That unity is, however, not static but dynamic, and is achieved largely through constant inquiry into the state of literature, its purpose and possible effects, and the means by which those purposes and effects might be ultimately and most consistently resolved. The new philosophy had called all in doubt and had challenged the thinking minds of the period to reconcile art with the new trends. Since all poetry moves in time and since the creation of art is one of the most perdurable of human experiences, the function of art must adjust itself to a flexible philosophic temper. The characteristics of art considered as a dynamic and constantly evolving organism will be determined largely by the prevailing intellectual needs of a given age. To avoid the dangers of emotional excess it must submit to a controlling judgment whose mild governance will assure it a lasting place in thought as well as sensibility.

The main sources of the so-called "neo-classic" theory were neither "exclusively didactic" nor "rigidly restrictive" nor "lacking in sensibility" nor "pragmatic," as so many of our contemporary critics have tried to prove. That the later authoritarian attitudes of a Rymer or a Dennis

were guilty of an excessive formalism, another tiresome commonplace of recent criticism, might carry a greater validity; but the "formalists" do not provide the critical norm of the new criticism. Rather they represent a deviant which demands the acceptance of established authority and which would doubtless have appalled the more liberal attitudes of a Hobbes or a Dryden, as the exegetic practices of Dennis were later to appal Pope. Dryden's temporary commitment to French formalist doctrine may be attributed to the fact that he sometimes allowed his intellectual curiosity to get the better of his critical judgment. In any case the pyrrhic victory of the formalists was but short-lived, and Dryden's liberal views, derived largely from Hobbes and Davenant, were reasserted in compelling terms.

In the final analysis there appears little reason to question the moral emphasis in seventeenth-century criticism. Coleridge may well have found that the moral of *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* was too emphatically expressed; and the romantic tradition, in a modified form of which we consciously or unconsciously (and sometimes even subconsciously) operate today, provided us with a myth that ethical values be regarded with some suspicion. (It is worth recalling Shaw's comment on this vexatious subject that great art can never be anything else than deliberately didactic.) Seventeenth-century thinkers were less squeamish on this subject than we are, and they recognized in art a form of knowledge that, to no discredit of art, was a part of truth, and possessed moral sanction. A lofty and yet practical code of ethics, which is allied to the revaluation of the function of mimetic elements in art, is the legacy of the cognitive theory proposed by Hobbes and Davenant and exemplified in the literary practice of Dryden. It was an attempt to give to poetry and to life some sense of order and unity. The easy assurances that whatever is is right had not encroached upon the dynamic world of seventeenth-century criticism; rather the latter half of the century is characterized by what Miss Jonas has called "a heroic resolve that whatever is must be made better, and that art has her role to play in that reform."[4]

Dryden's emphasis upon the ethical function of the artist was by no means of that didactic order of criticism that so frequently excludes the element of sensibility from its criteria. More a Horatian than an Aristotelian, he firmly subscribed to the theory that it is only by delighting the reader that the poet may hope to instruct. If his ardour was a little less controlled in the early than in the later prefaces, he consistently maintained that the element of delight is of primary importance in the

work of art. His cultivated sensibility is in evidence throughout his critical appreciations of literature ancient and modern. When he appears to give greater deference to the judicial faculty than one would normally expect of him, it is only because he subscribed to the principle that in any critical evaluation the judgment must curb the higher flights of fancy. Dr. Johnson recognized in Dryden's *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* the qualities he brought as a poet to his critical judgments:

> In this, and in all other essays on the same subject, the criticism of Dryden is the criticism of a poet; not a dull collection of theorems, nor a rude detection of faults, which perhaps the censor was not able to have committed; but a gay and vigorous dissertation, where delight is mingled with instruction, and where the author proves his right of judgment by his power of performance. . . . With Dryden we are wandering in quest of truth; whom we find, if we find her at all, drest in the graces of elegance; and, if we miss her, the labour of the pursuit rewards itself; we are led only through fragrance and flowers.

In all his critical writings Dryden tried to achieve a balance between sense and sensibility that would constitute a reasonable standard for literary judgments. Occasionally he made a conscious effort to subdue his enthusiasm as an artist and craftsman in order to emphasize the judicial faculty, but his poetic intuition was always at work. While giving explicit definition to that uniform standard by which the value of poetry and the other arts might be reasonably and objectively measured, he demonstrated at the same time how the practising artist, endowed, as Wordsworth was later to put it, with a "greater knowledge of human nature and a more comprehensive soul," was capable of a "grace beyond the reach of art" and its critical standards. Primarily he was the well-poised man of letters, epitomizing the dignity of his profession, strongly opposed to the enthusiastic zealots whose irrationality had threatened the prestige of letters, and firmly convinced not only of the justifiability but also of the immediate need of a judicious practice of poetry and criticism in any harmonious society.

Objectivity and aesthetic distance are more immediately apparent in Dryden's poetic practice than in his critical evaluations. His taste and poetic intuition served him as unerring guides in the composition of lyric and satiric verse, and his resultant propriety of language and effect in these genres reflects a nice balance between form and expression, thought and sensibility. His poetic objectivity is thus a part of the indefinable quality of his taste and genius rather than a consciously defined component of his poetic theory. It was Dryden's contention that "poets

themselves are the most proper, though . . . not the only critics," and that "the judgment of an artificer in his own art should be preferable to the opinion of another man."[5] But in addition to his more immediate preoccupation with the technical details of his art, there is the elusive and flexible insight, the heightened degree of which cannot be fairly regarded as part of the criteria for the common critical mode that he, as a professional writer, felt it his duty to establish. In his criticism he was constantly torn between his intellectual respect for the rules and his admiration for poetry which did not seem to conform. Like one of his own dramatic heroes he found himself in the midst of a conflict between love, the voice of his higher intuitions, and honour, the voice of ineluctable obligation.

In his critical writings Hobbes had attempted an aesthetic synthesis of the judicial and the imaginative, a synthesis by which observation of the work of art as a complete artistic entity would not be subordinated to a minutely detailed appreciation of its individual parts. By nature indifferent to the kind of psychological analysis necessary to such a synthesis, Dryden was more immediately sensitive to a regard for the poetic art as craft, that is, as the artistic result of the operation of poetic skills and natural endowments upon what Johnson called "large materials." Dryden's attention was focused upon the intrinsic brilliance and virtuosity of the artist's performance. "In general," he wrote, "the employment of a poet is like that of a curious gunsmith, or watchmaker: the iron or silver is not his own; but they are the least part of that which gives the value: the price lies wholly in the workmanship."[6] As a literary theorist he had made a conscious effort to define and establish a uniform critical standard; but as an evaluator of poetic performances he was consistently at odds with that norm because it restricted the independent exercise of his heightened sensibility.

Unlike Pope, Dryden did not dwell at any length upon the qualifications of the critic; but, had he done so, obviously he would have cited as one of the most important a cultivated taste, and he understood one of the functions of the practising man of letters to be the formulation of a standard of taste which the man of normal intelligence and sensibility might attain. He was contemptuous of *les petits esprits,* the enthusiastic crowd "who like nothing but the husk and rind of wit" and whose "judgment is a mere lottery."[7] But he saw the need of reforming social manners and popular taste and he hoped to effect the required improvement through men endowed with some intelligence and sensitivity. Sir William Davenant had observed that the common crowd prefer "to

be corrected by laws, where precept is accompanied by punishment, then to be taught by Poesy"[8]; and Dryden doubtless agreed. But his methods were less aristocratic than those of Davenant. Dryden never lost faith in the possibility of cultural reconstruction, which, he firmly believed, might best be achieved by an appeal to the common sense of the intelligent man of affairs. With this conviction and supported by his vigorous and active mind, he "refined the language" and "improved the sentiments" of the age whose most distinguished gentleman of letters he was destined to become.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Dryden's mind is its power of assimilation of critical doctrine and practice both ancient and modern. Closely related to this is its exercise of selective judgment which seldom fails to exhibit good taste and natural sensibility. These abilities, to assimilate and to select, are probably the major requisites of the man whose business is the study and practice of literature; and Dryden had them in abundance. Independent in his critical judgments and contemptuous of pedantry, Dryden recalled and evaluated the seminal ideas of ancient and modern criticism, and measured their validity in terms of their reasonable relevance in solving the immediate problems which confront the reformer of public taste and manners. Whether it be Longinus or Dacier, both respectable practitioners of the critical art, Dryden extracted the essence of the argument, weighed it in terms of contemporary need, and finally accepted or rejected it, or allowed it merely to remain, inactive, on the periphery of his mind.

Dr. Johnson, one of the sanest and, indisputably, the best qualified of Dryden's commentators, made one of his shrewdest observations when he wrote: "By him we were taught '*sapere et fari*,' to think naturally and express forcibly." His "natural diffidence and scepticism" issued in a critical temper illustrative of the belief that, in Tennyson's words, "There lives more faith in honest doubt, / Believe me, than in half the creeds." Dryden never subscribed, except in moments of enthusiasm occasioned by his careful reading of a LeBossu or a Rymer, to a rigid neo-classicism. His own intellectual disposition led him to regard as invalid any literary criteria that would restrain the flights of great poetry. But such personal convictions did not blind him to his responsibility to teach his age to "think naturally and express forcibly," and his theory of literature reflects that degree of reason and common sense that he knew would commend it to a large body of intelligent readers. In the same way his admirable prose style is most aptly geared to the purposes of critical disquisition; and his critical faculty had the virtue of defining

what Saintsbury called "the pure language of criticism."[9] Throughout his career his chief endeavour was "to delight the age"[10] in which he lived, and he understood clear thinking and pleasurable expression to be indispensable to the critic's task of contributing to "the highest pattern of human life."

Dryden's reputation as poet, dramatist, and critic must, in the final analysis, be gauged in terms of his service to professional letters. As Professor Mark Van Doren has said: "Dryden lives not as one who went out to rear great frames of thought and feeling, nor as one who waited within himself and caught fine, fugitive details of sensation, but as one who elastically paced the limits of a dry and well-packed mind."[11] The observations of a skilled poetic craftsman upon his own craft must always have a special and intrinsic interest and value; and Dryden's are pervaded by a tone that is confident and authoritative at the same time as it is sensitive and sincere. His critical disposition exemplified the free and independent exercise of the searching mind and achieved most admirable and exemplary results. His intellectual temper, his artistic performances, and his career as a man of letters consistently testify to his primary aim: to assert in theory and practice the integrity and dignity of professional literary activity.

NOTES

1 *Essays of John Dryden*, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford, 1900), I, 154.

2 Louis I. Bredvold, *The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden: Studies in Some Aspects of Seventeenth-Century Thought* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1934), 152.

3 T. S. Eliot, *John Dryden: The Poet, the Dramatist, the Critic* (New York, 1932), 62.

4 Leah Jonas, *The Divine Science: The Aesthetic of Some Representative Seventeenth-Century English Poets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 271.

5 *Essays of John Dryden*, I, 195.

6 *Ibid.*, I, 147.

7 *Ibid.*, II, 223; I, 100.

8 Sir William Davenant, Preface to *Gondibert*; in *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. J. E. Spingarn (Oxford, 1908–9), II, 14.

9 George Saintsbury, *A History of English Criticism* (New York, 1911), 127.

10 *Essays of John Dryden*, I, 116.

11 Mark Van Doren, *John Dryden: A Study of his Poetry* (New York, 1920), 266.

French Composers of Today — *Norman Demuth*

When, in 1935, the French composers Yves Baudrier (b. 1906), André Jolivet (b. 1905), Daniel Lesur (b. 1908), and Olivier Messiaen (b. 1908), banded themselves into a coterie known as "La Jeune France," they deliberately acknowledged the continuity of the French Tradition and confirmed their belief in Hector Berlioz as the founder of, and authority for, modern French musical philosophy. It was under this banner that the great Hector fought his many battles; true, he fought them mainly on his own behalf, but he was, nevertheless, concerned also with establishing a standard of judgment and a national sense of cultural values.

The panorama of French music displays a striking picture of continuity and a refusal to be swayed by alien aesthetics. Paris, the Mecca of operatic composers for so many years, has harboured many notable figures, the pilgrimage from abroad dating from the Italian invasion initiated by Cardinal Mazarin. Taking a little from this composer and a little from that, the French have never lost sight of their individual *esprit*. French music has thus grown out of itself. It has invariably been a step ahead of any other culture and if at times such a step has proved sterile, it has always had enough virility to set tongues wagging and make argument rife. Sterility having been proven, matters have quickly moved on to some other revelation. This has been effected quite naturally and may be said to have resulted from the passion for voluble and extremely active coteries.

Contemporary jargon provides commentators with useful catchphrases, not the least so being references to the "Gallic Goût" and the "French Temperament." These form a convenient way of avoiding issues. We may say briefly that the "Gallic Goût" in music implies a feline quality of melody, an instinct for clarity, a vivid use of the imagination, an innate feeling for elegance, and a tendency to place the emphasis on *sound* rather than on *line*. The "French Temperament" includes a strong vein of excitability, a sensitivity to things creative, a feeling for beauty

and logic, and an instinct to act on the spur of the moment—I would add a love of argument, although this is not reflected in the music.

Sensitivity, however, has emphasized sentimentality, and the general view of French music is that it is fundamentally effeminate. This is but one of the misunderstandings and instances of single-pointedness of view under which French music and the French temperament labour. Marianne, however, has long since assumed some of the amazonian qualities of her sister, Britannia, and the situation is now radically different from what it undeniably was during the last century. French music today is invariably elegant, but it can also be extremely masculine, and to see it as effeminate is to acknowledge but one side of the picture. People remember Sedan, but forget Verdun.

When Debussy produced his "Prélude à l'Après-Midi d'un Faune" in 1894, he diverted attention from the neo-classicism of the time, as exemplified in the works of Camille Saint-Saens, and from the effeminate lyricism of Gounod and Massenet. From the moment the significance of Debussy's "Prélude" (and, later, Préludes for Piano) was appreciated and realized it has been the custom to describe nearly every French composer of the twentieth century as an "Impressionist." I say "nearly" advisedly, for the great Franck Tradition steadily pursued its symphonic path undeterred and untempted by the opposing easy delights. Yet impressionism was no new thing. Berlioz may be credited with the first example in the "Fantaisie sur 'La Tempête,'" which later formed part of the hotch-potch known as "Lélio, ou La retour à la vie" (1832), and in the "Queen Mab Scherzo" in "Roméo et Juliette" (1865).

The next reflection is not quite so positive, but César Franck's "Les Eolides" (1876) is certainly impressionistic by reason of its semitonalism. Franck, however, had an innate sense of symphonic continuity, and this led him to line rather than sound; Berlioz' works belong to the latter aesthetic. Each of the four works to which I have referred has its own literary context and, therefore, literary and extra-musical impulse, the Berlioz alone having a sung text (of no great length or profundity!). We may conclude, therefore, that French musical impressionism relies very largely upon the exploitation of orchestral timbres and not of themes, and aims at *sound* rather than *line*.

Impressionism has become confused in the minds of the unthinking with pictorial romanticism, with musical landscape painting, and it has provided commentators with a useful escape from categorical difficulties. From this point of view, Mendelssohn's "Hebrides Overture" could be regarded as impressionism, which is absurd, but not more so than it

would be for "Daphnis et Chloé" (1904–6) by Maurice Ravel and "La Poème de la Forêt" (1904–6) by Albert Roussel. Ravel's music is too clearly defined and Roussel's symphony is purely landscape painting. Roussel nearly approached impressionism in his three "Evocations" (1910–11) of India, but even here he did not really touch it.

French musical impressionism reached its apogee and impasse with Debussy, for the language and technique were too limited to allow any development, and the inevitable result of trying to extend the aesthetic was so much repetition. I can find only one instance of twentieth-century impressionism, this being "Nuit" (1924) by Gustave Samazeuilh (b. 1877), written in memory of Fauré. This is even more evocative than impressionistic and it thus becomes necessary to separate impressionism from music which is only impressionistic. One good thing came out of the "-ism" and that was the revelation of pictorial romanticism, and in this area French composers have always reigned supreme.

The refusal to appreciate the question of impressionism and everything it represents seems even more absurd where a composer like Gabriel Fauré is concerned. Fauré became almost synonymous with French music itself. Being easily assimilated and always charming, his music propounded no problems. It drew attention away from the Franck Tradition which preached the doctrines of symphonic continuity and expansion, and of formal and tonal exigencies. The Franck Tradition might acknowledge the claims of the opposing school of thought, but the traffic went in one direction only, and to the opposition, "Franckisme" and "d'Indyisme" were anathema.

The opposition still maintains that Franck was not a French composer. True, he was by birth a Walloon, but he was trained at the Paris Conservatoire and thus inherited the French system and tradition. His case is similar to that of Arthur Honegger who was of Swiss parentage, but who was born in Le Havre, and, like Franck, studied at the Paris Conservatoire, later transferring to Widor and d'Indy, privately. Both these composers were infinitely more French than Handel was English, his claim resting solely upon his signature to naturalization papers. Recently we have seen the Roumanian-born Marcel Mihalovici (b. 1898), not only becoming a naturalized Frenchman, but absorbing the Gallic tradition at the Schola Cantorum under Vincent d'Indy. Honegger, incidentally, lived permanently in Paris without becoming naturalized.

No matter what the fundamental temperaments of Franck and Honegger may have been, they composed like Frenchmen. Starting their studies at an age sufficiently early to be receptive, they added what

they absorbed to their inherent way of thinking. If Franck became a French composer through absorption into French culture, he exercised a strong influence on French music; all his important pupils, with the exception of the Belgian Guillaume Lekeu (1870–94) and the Irish Augusta Holmes (1847–1903), were pure-blooded Frenchmen.

The influence the Franckistes exercised on a culture tending to become increasingly superficial was of incalculable value. By their example they gave French music a substance and dignity unknown since the days of Berlioz. They made French music universal without ever allowing it to lose its Gallicism and enabled it to be taken seriously in those places where it was regarded as merely pretty entertainment. They were charged with poisoning the "Gallic Goût" with the Wagnerian virus. For years this had been the reproach levelled at everything not immediately comprehensible. Today, for Wagnerian, read "atonal"; both charges are grossly exaggerated. Now and again one finds Wagnerian tendencies in works like d'Indy's "Istar Variations" (1896) and "La Péri" (1912) by Paul Dukas, not a Franckiste—but they signify nothing at all.

It is significant that the French composers most frequently played in Germany were Berlioz (up to 1914, "Benvenuto Cellini" (1837) had been performed more than six hundred times in Germany) and Emmanuel Chabrier, two composers with no Teutonic affiliations whatsoever. Although Chabrier was not a direct pupil of Franck, he absorbed the quantities of Franckisme through his personal association with the Franckistes. Purists regard Chabrier as the father of modern French music, mainly on the ground that he was French-born. Berlioz' position as its founder remains unchallenged.

In Berlioz lies the source of all modern music and his reflection is both direct and indirect, from Franck's "Le Chasseur Maudit" (1882) onwards. This is intriguing, for although Franck was a fellow-pupil in Antonin Reicha's class with Berlioz the two composers never made personal contact, never heard each other's music, and never mentioned each other to their friends. Yet if French music sprang from one source, it branched out into two courses, and each in its own way is typically French. The Franckiste has always been the less popular because it allows no compromise, no lines of least resistance, and is intransigeant in its quantities.

II

Although Berlioz went through the technical mill like any other Conservatoire student (it is incorrect to say that his training was

incomplete or haphazard), he was virtually self-taught as a composer. He composed during the period of his basic training as every student worth his salt does, although perhaps not quite so effectively. Berlioz studied Gluck, Salieri, Weber, and Beethoven, and his creative force was always ahead of his technical equipment. His personality in one direction lies in the feline qualities of so many of his themes. These qualities were something which nobody could teach him and they represent the fusion of the "Gallic Goût" and "Temperament."

As Berlioz made his impact rather late in the nineteenth century, it is not surprising that composers overlooked him; but if we play the theme of the "Ballet des Sylphes" from "La Damnation de Faust" (1846–54) and slide at the end of the first phrase into the "Prélude" from Fauré's music to "Pelléas et Mélisande" (1898), the inherent continuity of the "Gallic Goût" becomes obvious. Fauré was also virtually a self-taught composer. This continuity of melodic quality suggests that the question of temperament plays a subtle and subconscious rôle in the formation of musical personalities, and influences impartially widely different characters. The continuity can be carried further by playing the second movement in the Fifth Organ Symphony by Charles Marie Widor—French-born but Belgian-trained—and sliding at the appropriate moment into Fauré's "Clair de Lune."

Yet in general Fauré belongs to the tradition of Gounod. With Fauré, French lyricism became more subtle and introverted, and more pertinent to each particular composer. This inheritance from Gounod and Massenet remained effeminate, and Debussy's "Clair de Lune" might very well be a piano transcription of any duo from any Massenet opera. We may note the close resemblance between the Massenet melodic aesthetic and that of Puccini.

Berlioz thought broadly, not extravagantly as is too often maintained. It is *not* possible to dispense with this or that instrument, for Berlioz never indulged in vain doublings. He never made the mistake of placing a theme on two or more instruments where one was sufficient, save in a tutti passage, especially one forming the peak of an orchestral climax. Following Berlioz' example, French composers began to think in terms of instruments and to suit their ideas to those instruments, to the orchestra in fact, instead of suiting the instruments to their ideas. It no longer mattered that a theme would "go" equally well on oboe or clarinet; it had to be the one or the other. Textural clarity became more than ever the first essential in the "Gallic Goût," and this has always been accomplished through the simple means of saying only one thing at a time, and on one instrument only wherever possible.

Although Ravel's scoring is in the Rimsky-Korsakov tradition, his habit of doubling only in tutti passages is undoubtedly based upon the principles of Berlioz, who doubled only on behalf of timbre. Rimsky-Korsakov undoubtedly knew Berlioz' orchestration. Ravel scored like a virtuoso. "La Valse" (1919–20) is highly decorated and the printed score looks complex, but the lines are never obscured.

Today, Berlioz' power is reflected in "Psalm XLVI" (1904), "La Tragédie de Salomé" (1907–10), and "Symphonie Concertante" (1928–31) by Florent Schmitt, and his sense of colour in "La Péri" by Paul Dukas. At the time, the last-named work appeared to form the culmination of the aesthetic postulated by Debussy in "La Mer" (1903–5), but this eventually proved to have been not the case. "La Péri" is a remarkable work which has been completely overshadowed by the easier delights of "L'Apprenti Sorcier" (1897). It is impossible to deny the Gallic qualities of its strength and colour. Its free use of 6/4 chords, its shimmering scoring, its mysterious undercurrents, to say nothing of its symphonic continuity maintained in spite of the fragmentary quantities of the material, make it one of the landmarks in French music. In effect it is overwhelmingly beautiful, and French composers were not to aim at this consummation until many years later when Dukas' own pupil, Olivier Messiaen, awoke echoes of the former glories in his monumental "Turangalila Symphonie" (1946–8).

In the meantime we find the noble character of Charles Koechlin (1867–1950) who, at the age of thirteen, knew Berlioz' "Faust" practically by heart. Koechlin wrote many works of all sizes. Few have been performed, and few published. Regarded as a *maître*, he earned a great reputation as a teacher of the basic technique and wrote many valuable treatises, including one on orchestration which covers the subject in a manner making the terms "thorough" and "comprehensive" seem understatements.

Koechlin composed because he could not help doing so. In 1904 he wrote, "The first essential is that the works should be written, and the second, that they should be played—that is more difficult." He wrote for the orchestra with the assurance of a virtuoso, but since he was uncompromising in his orchestral demands, regular performance may present economic obstacles.

Of the younger composers born in the last century, Marcel Mihalovici shows his ancestry in the clearest manner; this is exceptional, for Vincent d'Indy's pupils do not in general afford very much evidence of a Berlioz descent. Mihalovici's "Symphonies pour le Temps Présent" (1944) and his opera "Phèdre" (1948–9) are in the complete Berlioz tradition.

I cannot see the finger of Berlioz in the four large symphonies of Darius Milhaud save in a very general manner; their power is of a different order. Nevertheless, the "Te Deum" forming the fourth movement of Milhaud's Third Symphony (1946) may be traced back to the similar work by Berlioz, its grandeur and dignity being well in the tradition. More can be said in this respect for Georges Migot (b. 1891) who was well under the influence of Berlioz when he wrote his remarkable "Polyphonie pour orgue principal et orchestre: La Jungle" (1928), a work whose title implies a jungle of polyphonic lines, and not an arboreal or Kiplingesque evocation. This polyphony takes Berlioz' counterpoint in the direction it might have gone had he lived until today.

Undoubtedly it is Arthur Honegger who owed most to Berlioz. Honegger was the one member of "Les Six"[1] who did not seek to condense music into mere statement and nothing else. He admired Wagner as much as Milhaud detested him, but he never followed the Wagnerian concept. The third movement of the "Symphonie Liturgique" (1945–6) might have come straight out of Berlioz' "Symphonie Fantastique." The philosophy throughout this symphony is pure Berlioz. "Jeanne d'Arc au Bûcher" (1935) is the twentieth century's complete acknowledgement of the founder of its musical thought. It is overwhelming, and completely French. From "Le Roi David" (1921, rewritten 1923) to his last big work, Honegger showed consistently that he might well be called the "twentieth-century Berlioz" without fear of contradiction, either now or in the future.

Of composers born within the present century, the authority of Berlioz is strong in the symphonies of Marc Vaubourgoin (b. 1907), Jacques Chailley (b. 1910), and Henri Dutilleux (b. 1916). It can also be found in the *mystère* "Sardanaple" (1953) by Jean-Jacques Grunenwald (b. 1911). This work is paralleled by "Lucifer" (1944) by the older Claude Delvincourt. Grunenwald and Delvincourt were as fortunate in their librettist, René Dumesnil, as Milhaud and Honegger were in Paul Claudel. The influence can be seen also in the vigour of Eugene Bozza (b. 1905) whose "Pax Triumphans" (1949) has all the elements of the Berlioz philosophy, although the ideas are somewhat inflated.

The harmonic richness of the "Symphonie Concertante" (1952) for Violin and Orchestra, by Raymond Gallois-Montbrun, himself a virtuoso violinist, ties up with the harmonic brilliance of "La Péri" and the combined mantles of Berlioz and Dukas rest convincingly on the composer's shoulders.

In these composers the Berlioz influence is general. Certain others, notably André Jolivet, reveal acknowledgment of the authority in salient details. In his splendid Concerto for Ondes Martenot[2] (1947) and

Concerto for Piano (1946–50), Jolivet uses a broad canvas. The former work represents the emergence of cosmos from chaos, for which purpose the Ondes Martenot with their wide compass and range of timbres are extremely well suited. The Piano Concerto is remarkable for its unique use of percussion, and the drum writing is a clear reflection of Berlioz' "Requiem." Here Jolivet's thought takes him to the primitive forces of nature and the idea would seem to be to trace the emergence of some kind of civilization from sheer primitivism. The "Symphonie de Danses" (1940) is a more immediately acceptable work since it propounds no problems. Jolivet, who is Musical Director at the Comédie Française, has written a magnificent Symphony (1955).

If Honegger provided the complete acknowledgment of Berlioz' greatness, Olivier Messiaen may be said to close the final chapter of the book so far as things stand today. Messiaen showed his sureness of touch early in his career. He arrived at the Paris Conservatoire for his first lesson with Dukas carrying the score of "Les Offrandes oubliées" (1930), a work even now pronounced problematical. Well may Dukas have asked, "If you can write this kind of music now, why do you come here?" From Dukas, Messiaen learnt the secrets of expressive scoring and those of using traditional harmony in a manner in keeping with the spirit of his day. Messiaen's harmonic philosophy is based on dominant discords, the line in general being taken from "La Péri."

The final upshot is, as I have said, Messiaen's "Turangalila Symphonie," which up to the present moment makes the final direct connection with Berlioz. The *cyclique* manner is used, but the themes are not taken anywhere and it must be admitted that there is too much repetition. The general effect, however, is more than intensely moving; it leaves one literally silent, overwhelmed, humbled. Unfortunately, its composer and his commentators over-emphasize the constructional processes; consequently many listeners tend to confuse the symphony's aims and objects with those of the Dodécaphonistes and miss the emotional appeal of the music. The work is utterly spontaneous and its continuity never falters. In spite of its linear qualities, it is more "sound" than "line," and in spite of the instrumental activity and the blackness of the pages, nothing is obscure. The percussion department causes Berlioz' "Requiem" to pale almost into insignificance! With all its obvious shortcomings, the "Turangalila Symphonie" stands with "Le Sacre," the Schoenberg "Variations for Orchestra" and "Jeanne d'Arc au Bûcher" as one of the greatest achievements of the twentieth century.

Messiaen's principles may be studied in his *Technique de mon langage musical* (1944). This is no mere directive for composition, no short cut. A complete knowledge of the basic technique is necessary before em-

barking upon its practice. There is nothing systematic about it and, unlike dodécaphonisme, it is first of all creative and not constructive. Whereas one dodécaphonique work sounds in effect very similar to another, Messiaen's principles encourage contrast and variety of expression. The organ works of Grunenwald and Jehann Alain (1911–40) are written in the Messiaen technique, but there is not the slightest resemblance to Messiaen's own music other than in the "look" of the page (this should not imply that if the Impressionists aimed at "sound," the "Messiaenistes" write optical music).

It is in his organ works that Messiaen's Christian mysticism is given full play, in "Les Corps Glorieux" (1939), for instance; but this mystical approach is carried to the piano—"Vingt Regards sur l'Enfant Jésus" (1953) for example—while his enormous "Quatuor pour la Fin du Temps" (1941), written in captivity, testifies to the burning faith within him. In spite of the titles, these works are not rarified and are not solely for the elect.

When Dukas told his pupils, in a general manner of speaking, to "listen to the songs of the birds," he little knew what he had set moving in the mind of Messiaen. For a long time Messiaen was to be seen, in cold and hot weather, wet and dry, standing beneath trees in the boulevards and country districts, notebook in hand, taking down what he could disentangle from the dawn chorus. These natural melodies, always strikingly beautiful, he used in his works, the aesthetic culminating in "Le Rappel des Oiseaux" (1955) for orchestra, written entirely upon the polyphonic weaving of genuine bird melodies.

This study, so rhythmic as well as melodic, led him to onomatopoeia, the result of which was the "Cinq Rechants" (1948) for twelve mixed voices, in which ordinary words are mixed with vowel sounds. This was found to be not impossible to sing: it required merely forty rehearsals lasting several hours each before it could be mastered.

Messiaen's occupation with Hindu scales and rhythms brings his work into line with that of the great *savant* Maurice Emmanuel who made similar researches into, and practical use of, Greek scales.

It is difficult to see where Messiaen will go from here. His musical language is by no means exhausted. Certain evidence suggests that he is toying with dodécaphonisme. If so, and if there is any genuinely musical feeling to be expressed with the technique, Messiaen will certainly disclose it. His is a musical mind.

III

Extreme stylization can defeat its own ends, but certain aspects of it are found to be expansible. In 1901 Vincent d'Indy produced his Great

Symphony in B flat which set the standard for later generations of French symphonists. D'Indy may have been the champion of classicism, but this amounted to no more than an insistence upon classical form, tonality, and tonal relations. Provided that the music was expressed with these in view, he was by no means against romanticism. His beautifully expressed "Jour d'Eté à la Montagne" (1905) was the answer to a challenge issued by the opponents of d'Indyisme after the production of Debussy's "La Mer," and a right good answer it was. These two works represent the points of departure for succeeding generations, and the best examples can be found in the symphonies of Albert Roussel, whose musical language was naturally more advanced than that of d'Indy. Roussel's most Berliozian work was the opera-ballet "Padmâvati" (1914–18), although Berlioz would have seen himself reflected in certain movements in "Bacchus et Ariane" (1930). The bounding qualities of the "Prélude" in the "Suite en fa" (1926) and those of the Symphonies in G minor (1929–30) and A (1934) are not Berliozian in themselves. If d'Indy heard the works written before 1931, he must have been astonished at the vehemence his principles had brought to light, and not a little delighted with it.

It has always been convenient to blame d'Indy and the Schola Cantorum for turning out composers all of one type. Positive teaching such as was delivered there, and is now at the Ecole César Franck, might be expected to have this result, but in this case, it is not so. A glance at the names of some of the most eminent pupils will show the fallacy of the theory—Albéric Magnard, Erik Satie, Albert Roussel, Déodat de Sevérac, Joseph Canteloube, and Marcel Mihalovici, while it is well to remember that Mr. Cole Porter studied orchestration under a d'Indyiste, Guy de Lioncourt, at the Ecole César Franck.

Of these composers, Sevérac and Canteloube (together with Paul Ladmirault, a pupil of Fauré), became known as *régionalistes* because they used the traditional folklore of their regions as the foundation of their musical thought rather than the sophisticated urban setting of Paris. Furthermore, they added insult to injury by preferring to spend most of their time in their regions instead of among the bright lights of the capital. These *régionaliste* composers had their own style—"Le Cour de Moulin" (1908), "Le Mas" (1911–13), and "La Prêtresse de Koridwen" (1924), respectively, are pure Gallicism through and through—and have suffered because of their traditionally rural background. They sing of the soil of France, of her legends, her blood-feuds, and of the loyalties of her sons. They are unique.

What, I wonder, did d'Indy think of his pupil Abel Decaux (1869–1943), organist at Sacré Cœur, Paris, and later Professor of Organ at

Rochester, N.Y., who in 1900 wrote some piano pieces entitled "Clairs de Lune," in serial technique, long before systematic composition was thought of by Arnold Schoenberg, or by Josef Hauer? Decaux apparently did not take himself seriously as a composer, but this anticipation of harmonies as "advanced" as any emanating later from Vienna is truly remarkable and serves to emphasize my previous comment, that French music has always been a step ahead of that written elsewhere.

Today the battles of Franckisme and d'Indyisme have been fought and won, and the principles appreciated on their true merits. As a result, French music has become universally accepted for its symphonic truths, and French composers owe allegiance to no aesthetic save that of their own "goût" and "temperament." This can be seen by the guiding light of the *chanson populaire*, whose spirit is reflected in so many works—in the "Sérénade Concertante" (1938) for Violin and Orchestra and the piano "Concerto de Mai" (1949–50) by Marcel Delannoy and the delightful "Concert d'Eté" (1946) for Piano and Strings by Grunenwald. The finales of these works are redolent of rustic junketings. Of the older composers, Milhaud's impulse has often found its source in these conditions—Second Violin Sonata (1917), "Suite Provençale" (1936), First Symphony (1939)—while the traditional clod-hopping *bourrée*, so unrelated to the courtly dances of Bach and Handel, finds its reflection in Chabrier and Roger-Ducasse. Similarly, French composers react strongly to the seasons of the year—"Nocturne de Printemps" (1915-18) by Roger-Ducasse, "Pour une Fête de Printemps" (1921) by Roussel, and "Concertino de Printemps" (1934) by Milhaud, for instance. I do not see these works as reactions to the situations in any urban setting.

Alongside this impulse runs the neo-classic style of Jean Rivier (b.1896), whose symphonies breathe a healthy atmosphere of good spirits allied to masterly craftsmanship; Rivier detests pathos and bathos. Those who regret his exuberance would do well to study the "Requiem" (1955) whose fundamentally triadic writing results in extremely moving music. Others following the same neo-classic route are Henri Martelli (b.1899), one of the few whose thought is basically contrapuntal, Henri Barraud (b.1900), an eclectic mind, and Daniel Lesur (b.1908) notable for the clarity of his finely polished textures. Jean Hubeau (b.1917) has a style which defies classification in actual terms, but is essentially French in all its qualities. His Violin Concerto (1948) fulfils everything typical of the "Gallic Goût" without being particularly distinguished; but its qualities are neither negative nor negligible.

A similar tendency to neo-classicism can be found in the symphonies

of Jean Martinon (b. 1910), whose admirers cannot determine whether he is a better conductor than composer; it does not occur to them that he might be equally good in each capacity. This refusal to look in two directions means that the repertoire suffers from the absence of Martinon's Third Symphony (1941), his excellent "Symphoniette" (1936) and, particularly, the "Psalm CXXXVI" (1940–2), composed while in captivity.

In the theatre there is an increasing attraction to the mediaeval *mystère* with everything it implies. It is curious that the *opéra-ballet* has ceased to appeal to French composers, for it is a specifically French genre. The most substantial of the French operatic composers is still Darius Milhaud whose polytonal "Les Euménides" (1917–22—produced in 1940!) has as yet no parallel. For the time being the operas of Vincent d'Indy are neglected, but I have a feeling that their revival is not far off.

Opéra comique flourishes. Works such as "Le Carosse du Saint-Sacrement" (1940) by Henri Busser, "Le Rossignol de Saint-Malo" (1942) by Paul le Flem, "La Femme à Barbe" (1954) by Claude Delvincourt, "Venitienne" (1956) by Jean Rivier, "La Véridique Histoire du Docteur" (1937) by Maurice Thiriet, and "Madame Bovary" (1951) by Emmanuel Bondeville—to mention a few at random—testify to the variety and lightness of the French temperament.

Most of the "-isms" and "-alities" which appeared first in France during the 1920's are now either outmoded or absorbed into normal everyday technique. It does not take long for a revolutionary principle to be taken for granted if it has any constructive vitality. Dodécaphonisme flourishes in certain quarters. The high priest of the cult is Réne Leibowitz (b.1913), who pursues a grim course with admirable pertinacity. The movement makes slow progress in France because its roots are not French and attempts to formulate a Gallic serial aesthetic, distinguishable from all others, have so far proved unsuccessful. A movement which has a Polish-born leader is unlikely to make headway in France.

There remains *Musique concrête*, which is admitted not to be music, its principles being founded upon rhythm and "noise," as distinct from "sound." It has its fascinating moments, but the necessary apparatus is so elaborate and complicated that for the time being it must remain a closed shop to all but the initiated. To this writer it seems a waste of time and effort.

This study has necessarily omitted chamber music and although much is being written, I do not yet see any work which appears likely to be as important as Debussy's String Quartet (1893) or Ravel's Piano Trio (1914), unless it be the Quartet by Messiaen.

French music has always been supple and one of the characteristics has been the ease with which French composers write in quintuple and septuple rhythms. I know no other culture capable of such naturalness and spontaneity in these measurings.

Whither, therefore, French music? It is too soon to prophesy, for one sees no outstandingly great men, of the calibre of Honegger, among the younger generation. It remains to be seen what position Messiaen will occupy in the near future. There is as much indifferent music being written in France as anywhere else. However, even this indifferent music has a personality of its own. The "Gallic Goût" and "French Temperament" have no occasion to go a-whoring after alien gods. Vaughan Williams constantly urges English composers to "write like Englishmen," sufficient testimony to the alien influences which insinuate themselves into the English system. French composers need no such exhortation.

To sum up: If, as I believe, French music of the future will stem from Roussel and Honegger, it looks as if the Franck-d'Indy tradition will assert itself once more, but not in an intransigeant manner. A happy union with Berlioz has been effected through Honegger and it is not difficult to guess what the forthcoming style will be like. One point which this argument has revealed is the astonishing importance of "La Péri" and this suggests that Dukas will be found to have been a greater composer than was imagined. Let us say, therefore, that Roussel will supply the vigour and significance, Dukas the colour, and Honegger the greatness and substance—and at the root, Hector Berlioz. That French music will continue in the *avant-garde* I have no doubt.

Let me conclude with a little-realized historical fact. It is often stated that the symphonic poem was "invented" by Liszt, the first such work being "Ce qu'on entend sur la montagne," composed in 1848. In the Library at the Paris Conservatoire there is the MS of a work with the same title, based upon the same poem by Victor Hugo, written in the same "form." Its date is 1845–6. Its composer, César Franck.[3]

NOTES

1 "Les Six" were a group of composers, pledged to purge French music of all impressionistic elements, who were active at the conclusion of the First World War. The coterie consisted of Auric, Durey, Honegger, Milhaud, Poulenc, and Tailleferre, and worked independently according to each individual aesthetic.

2 Ondes Martenot: an electronic instrument named after its inventor. It has a range of eight octaves and is capable of a vast variety of timbres; it is very popular among French composers, but so far has not wide appeal elsewhere.

3 Fully analysed in my *César Franck* (London, 1949).

On De Quincey's Theory of Literary Power

John W. Bilsland

De Quincey's various statements on literature of power are in many respects inconsistent, and in dealing with them one must guard against the ever present danger of finding a coherence to which they cannot rightly lay claim. Over the years from 1823 to 1848 his conception of the experience of power obviously underwent marked shifts: the essentially emotional experience described in the *Letters to a Young Man Whose Education Has Been Neglected* (1823) had assumed a decidedly ethical cast by the time De Quincey turned to it in the essay on *The Poetry of Pope* (1848). One can, however, despite such shifts, make certain tenable generalizations with regard to De Quincey's several statements, and when doing so one is struck by the fact that all depend upon the fundamental idea that in a full appreciation of a work of literature of power a reader surrenders himself—as does the mystic—to a total absorption in an immediate experience. He knows pleasurably a great stimulation of his being: emotions which ordinary life seldom calls up are both roused and organized. In the period of stimulation, too, he becomes peculiarly aware of the infinite capacities of his own spirit, capacities not only of feeling, but also of vision: he sees embodied in the work of literature ideals and truths which he has never before known. And from the revelation which he now has of life he emerges a purified, morally better and spiritually richer, human being: he not only sees the world about him with cleared eyes, responding to it with heightened sensibilities, but he also moves now with a mystical faith in values living ever beyond the bounds of ordinary life.

In arriving at this conception of power as the end of the literary activity, De Quincey of course worked from his own experiences of literature. When he wrote the *Letters to a Young Man*—in which one finds the first statement on power—he was a mature man of thirty-

seven, and his analysis there of the literary experience reflected years of wide and intensive reading. But long before he had done much of that reading, and certainly long before he ever considered expounding a theory of power, De Quincey had known what it was to feel one's entire being absorbed in a single emotional experience from which one emerged a profoundly changed person. When, in the *Letters to a Young Man*, he asks, "when I am . . . suddenly startled into a feeling of the infinity of the world within me, is this power, or what may I call it?"[1] he raises a question which he might well have asked of any of the great moments of his childhood and youth. The death of his sister Elizabeth, the Cherubini canon sung at his guardian's, his last evening at the Manchester Grammar School, Ann's sacrifice of her few precious coins to buy him wine, his first reading of the *Lyrical Ballads*, his first use of opium—all these were for De Quincey great "spots of time," moments of profound emotional and spiritual experience which were to remain with him throughout his life, moulding his thought, colouring his attitude. In her very fine little essay on De Quincey in *The Common Reader* Virginia Woolf rightly points out that although De Quincey had grave faults as an autobiographer—diffuseness, redundancy, aloofness, dreaminess, even prudery—he was still "capable of being transfixed by the mysterious solemnity of certain emotions; of realising how one moment may transcend in value fifty years. . . ."[2] And it is in his experience of these great moments of his early life that one can find the basis of De Quincey's theory that true literature has as its function the rousing of an experience of power in the reader.

As much as any critic, and more than most, De Quincey was to relate his comments and judgments on literature to life itself, substantiating them by reference to his own actual experience. Time and time again—as in the passage on Cassandra's prophetic horror in the *Agamemnon*, the analysis of the knocking at the gate in *Macbeth*, the treatment of Wordsworth's

> The cattle are grazing,
> Their heads never raising;
> There are forty feeding like one—

he was to find in life a confirmation of an individual effect in literature. In much the same way, although not explicitly and perhaps unconsciously, he was to derive from life his understanding of the total effect of literature upon the reader: his whole conception of literary power sprang from his awareness that literature offers in a purified,

idealized form experiences of a sort which life affords only in certain climactic moments, and then often at great cost.

Of all the experiences recorded in the *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* and the *Autobiographical Sketches* none are more deeply moving than those resulting from the deaths of De Quincey's two sisters, Jane and Elizabeth, and his father. All these deaths occurred within less than three years, and before De Quincey himself had reached his eighth birthday. The experiences which they brought in their train were for De Quincey of such poignancy and profundity that more than half a century later he could look back upon the time as a period in which there was "nothing on the stage but a solitary infant, and its solitary combat with grief—a mighty darkness, and a sorrow without a voice."[3]

The first death was Jane's, when De Quincey was four and a half years old, she being two years younger than he.[4] De Quincey had already had some knowledge of death: his grandmother had died, but since he had known little of her, her passing had affected him less than that of a kingfisher, which he had actually witnessed. Nor did Jane's death itself affect him deeply. He was sad, he missed her, and he hoped she would return: "Summer and winter came again—crocuses and roses; why not little Jane?"[5] But an event—or rumour—connected with her death was to have a profound effect upon his child's mind. He heard whispered accounts of a servant's harsh treatment of his sister some few days before her death.

> I believe the story never reached my mother, and possibly it was exaggerated; but upon me the effect was terrific. I did not often see the person charged with this cruelty; but, when I did, my eyes sought the ground; nor could I have borne to look her in the face; not, however, in any spirit that could be called anger. The feeling which fell upon me was a shuddering horror, as upon a first glimpse of the truth that I was in a world of evil and strife. Though born in a large town (the town of Manchester, even then among the largest of the island), I had passed the whole of my childhood, except for the few earliest weeks, in a rural seclusion. With three innocent little sisters for playmates, sleeping always amongst them, and shut up for ever in a silent garden from all knowledge of poverty, or oppression, or outrage, I had not suspected until this moment the true complexion of the world in which myself and my sisters were living. Henceforward the character of my thoughts changed greatly; for so *representative* are some acts, that one single case of the class is sufficient to throw open before you the whole theatre of possibilities in that direction. I never heard that the woman accused of this cruelty took it at all to heart, even after the event which so immediately succeeded had reflected upon it a more painful

emphasis. But for myself, that incident had a lasting revolutionary power in colouring my estimate of life.[6]

Allowing for the fact that when De Quincey wrote this he was looking back from a distance of half a century, one must still recognize that the incident did have a "terrific" effect upon the sensitive child. This effect, moreover, is important in that it is the earliest deeply emotional experience of which he has left a record, and in it one can already perceive a pattern which was to characterize later, even more profound, experiences. There is the first moment of surrender to the overwhelming emotion, the "terrific" effect; accompanying his surrender there is the complete absorption in the experience, the "shuddering horror" which took possession of him; in that period of absorption there comes the perception of a living truth—here, that man's is a "world of evil and strife"; and there is the permanent after-effect, the colouring of his entire "estimate of life."

Jane died in March, 1790. Two years later, on June 2, 1792, Elizabeth, De Quincey's favourite amongst his sisters, was to die. Her death, without any question, led to the most powerful experience of De Quincey's childhood, one which was probably equalled but twice again in his life: once with the death of little Catherine Wordsworth, and once with the death of Margaret, his wife. Apart from the emotional shock which accompanied the rumour of the nurse's mistreatment of his sister, De Quincey had known no great sorrow as a result of Jane's death. Elizabeth's death, however, was a quite different matter. With Elizabeth he had known a singularly perfect love, and now, "The peace, the rest, the central security which belong to love that is past all understanding—these could return no more."[7]

For some time during Elizabeth's last illness—she died of hydrocephalus—De Quincey knew no great concern: he was sorry that his sister was ill, and the sound of her moaning grieved him, but he had no fear that she would not recover. Then he learned the truth: a nurse "launched God's thunderbolt at my heart in the assurance that my sister MUST die."[8] The knowledge left De Quincey in an agony of spirit, and the day of Elizabeth's death—which soon came—brought him "the sorrow for which there is no consolation."[9]

In the period that followed, De Quincey's entire being was concentrated on one thing, his loss of Elizabeth. One of the finest passages he has left tells of the day after her death, when, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, he went alone to her room. Entering, he found that her bed, hitherto standing before the window, had been moved. All

that at first met his gaze was the open window through which the summer sun shone brightly. Then he saw the lifeless body. A feeling of awe came upon him as he looked down on all that remained on earth of his beloved sister:

> I stood checked for a moment; . . . and, whilst I stood, a solemn wind began to blow—the saddest that ear ever heard. It was a wind that might have swept the fields of mortality for a thousand centuries. Many times since, upon summer days, when the sun is about the hottest, I have remarked the same wind arising and uttering the same hollow, solemn, Memnonian, but saintly swell: it is in this world the one great audible symbol of eternity. . . .[10]

For a moment his eyes wandered to the rich summer beauty outside, then returned to the cold deadness of his sister's face. And now a strange thing happened to the lonely boy:

> . . . a trance fell upon me. A vault seemed to open in the zenith of the far blue sky, a shaft which ran up for ever; I, as if in spirit, rose as if on billows that also ran up the shaft for ever; and the billows seemed to pursue the throne of God; but *that* also ran before us and fled away continually. The flight and the pursuit seemed to go on for ever and ever. Frost gathering frost, some Sarsar wind of death, seemed to repel me; some mighty relation between God and death dimly struggled to evolve itself from the dreadful antagonism between them; shadowy meanings even yet continue to exercise and torment, in dreams, the deciphering oracle within me. I slept—for how long I cannot say; slowly I recovered my self-possession; and, when I woke, found myself standing, as before, close to my sister's bed.[11]

Returned to himself, De Quincey had no idea how long a time he had passed in the trance; he could only sense that "a *very* long interval had elapsed." And now, fearing discovery in Elizabeth's room, he kissed the cold lips and slipped out of the door.

The episode in Elizabeth's room was but part of a long period of sorrow for the young De Quincey. Yet to come were the funeral, with the finality of the service by the grave; the subsequent days of grieving; the moments in church when, during the litany, with its prayer on behalf of "all sick persons and young children," he silently wept and, looking up through the clear central glass of the stained windows, saw the clouds outside transformed into the beds of sick children, children to whom God stretched out His merciful arms; and those other moments when in the anthems the organ

> . . . threw its vast columns of sound, fierce yet melodious, over the voices of the choir—high in arches, when it seemed to rise, surmounting and overriding the strife of the vocal parts, and gathering by strong coercion the

total storm into unity—[and] . . . I seemed to rise and walk triumphantly upon those clouds which, but a moment before, I had looked up to as mementos of prostrate sorrow; yes, sometimes under the transfigurations of music, felt of grief itself as of a fiery chariot for mounting victoriously above the causes of grief.[12]

And overshadowing all else, was the child's first awareness of the solitary nature of life and of death:

Deep is the solitude of millions who, with hearts welling forth love, have none to love them. Deep is the solitude of those who, fighting with doubts or darkness, have none to counsel them. But deeper than the deepest of these solitudes is that which broods over childhood under the passion of sorrow—bringing before it, at intervals, the final solitude which watches for it, and is waiting for it within the gates of death.[13]

Once again, one must recognize that when he wrote of Elizabeth's death De Quincey was a mature man looking back over a good many years, and hence that what one reads is almost unavoidably coloured by his intervening life. Nevertheless, the passage does tell much of De Quincey's mental and emotional state during this period of his childhood. It will be apparent, first, that the pattern of his experience following the loss of Jane has been repeated, but now in more strongly marked colours, and with greater complexity and richness of detail. Once again there is the first moment of powerful response, the child's grief upon first hearing that his sister is to die, and the sorrow of the morning on which she actually passes away. As before, too, but more intensely, there is the absorption of the whole self in this single experience, here culminating in the mystical trance at his sister's bedside. And there is again the perception of lasting truths of life, here the essential nature of grief and of solitude, and their place in the world of men; and with that perception comes the permanent colouring of his whole attitude towards life.

So far the experience is but a repetition, in deeper tones, of his response to the frightening rumour of Jane's mistreatment. There are, however, new elements in this second great "spot of time." While he stands by his sister's bed he hears the murmur of the wind—"It was a wind that might have swept the fields of mortality for a thousand centuries"—and he finds in the sound "the one great audible symbol of eternity." He passes into his trance and feels himself rising on billows up a never ending shaft towards the throne of God; "but *that* also ran before us and fled away continually. The flight and the pursuit seemed to go on for ever and ever." And when he wakes from the trance he

has no idea how long it has lasted, but can only venture that it has taken a "*very* long interval." During the whole period by his sister's bed, therefore, he has known something very much like the mystic's awareness of infinite space and infinite time. In the immediate moment he has passed beyond the limitations of earth, and beheld the boundless and the eternal.

During this experience, furthermore, the emotion undergoes a kind of resolution not found in his response to the rumour of Jane's mistreatment. Describing the effect of the organ on him, he writes:

> . . . I seemed to rise and walk triumphantly upon those clouds which, but a moment before, I had looked up to as mementos of prostrate sorrow; yes, sometimes under the transfigurations of music, felt of grief itself as of a fiery chariot for mounting victoriously above the causes of grief.

He seems, in other words, to have surmounted his immediate preoccupation with grief simply as a personal pain, and seen it as a purgative experience through which he could pass to a clearer and wider comprehension of the nature of humanity and life, and a new feeling of strength to meet the further trials of life. Perhaps the best indication of what he has in mind here is to be found in two passages in the *Suspiria de Profundis*. The first comes from the "Vision of Life": "Either the human being must suffer and struggle, as the price of a more searching vision, or his gaze must be shallow and without intellectual revelation."[14] The second appears in "Levana and Our Ladies of Sorrow." Here the *Mater Lachrymarum* speaks first to the *Mater Suspiriorum*:

> "Lo! here is he whom in childhood I dedicated to my altars. This is he that once I made my darling. Him I led astray, him I beguiled; and from heaven I stole away his young heart to mine. Through me did he become idolatrous; and through me it was, by languishing desires, that he worshipped the worm, and prayed to the wormy grave. Holy was the grave to him; lovely was its darkness; saintly its corruption. Him, this young idolater, I have seasoned for thee, dear gentle Sister of Sighs! Do thou take him now to *thy* heart, and season him for our dreadful sister. And thou,"—turning to the *Mater Tenebrarum*, she said—"wicked sister, that temptest and hatest, do thou take him from *her*. See that thy sceptre lie heavy on his head. Suffer not woman and her tenderness to sit near him in his darkness. Banish the frailties of hope; wither the relenting of love; scorch the fountains of tears; curse him as only *thou* canst curse. So shall he be accomplished in the furnace; so shall he see the things that ought *not* to be seen, sights that are abominable, and secrets that are unutterable. So shall he read elder truths, sad truths, grand truths, fearful truths. So shall he rise again *before* he dies. And so

shall our commission be accomplished which from God we had,—to plague his heart until we had unfolded the capacities of his spirit."[15]

In his childhood experience of grief at the loss of Elizabeth, De Quincey had his first great lesson in the power of suffering to reveal these capacities of the human spirit.

The last death to provide De Quincey with the circumstances of a great childhood experience was that of his father. De Quincey was not greatly stirred by the actual loss of his father, for, as he tells us, he would not have recognized him had they met on the highway, the father having spent most of the years since his son's birth travelling abroad in a losing battle with tuberculosis. His return, however, immediately before his death, had a great effect upon his small son.

On a summer night in 1793—a year after Elizabeth had died—the children and servants gathered on the lawn before Greenhay, the family dwelling outside Manchester, to welcome their father and master, who was returning home to die. (Mrs. De Quincey had met his ship from the West Indies, and was making the final coach journey home with him.) The little group waited expectantly for the sound of coach wheels on the lane leading from Greenhay to the Rusholme Road, but the evening wore on and no sound came. At last, at nearly midnight, the party moved out into the lane, hoping to meet the coach. They were not disappointed. There they saw the coach, moving so slowly that the horses' hooves were not to be heard:

> The first notice of the approach was the sudden emerging of horses' heads from the deep gloom of the shady lane; the next was the mass of white pillows against which the dying patient was reclining. The hearse-like pace at which the carriage moved recalled the overwhelming spectacle of that funeral which had so lately formed part in the most memorable event of my life. But these elements of awe, that might at any rate have struck forcibly upon the mind of a child, were for me, in my condition of morbid nervousness, raised into abiding grandeur by the antecedent experiences of that particular summer night. The listening for hours to the sounds from horses' hoofs upon distant roads, rising and falling, caught and lost, upon the gentle undulation of such fitful airs as might be stirring—the peculiar solemnity of the hours succeeding to sunset—the glory of the dying day—the gorgeousness which, by description, so well I knew of sunset in those West Indian islands from which my father was returning—the knowledge that he returned only to die—the almighty pomp in which this great idea of Death apparelled itself to my young sorrowing heart—the corresponding pomp in which the antagonistic idea, not less mysterious, of life, rose, as if on wings, amidst tropic glories and floral pageantries, that seemed even *more* solemn and pathetic than the vapoury plumes and trophies of mortality

—all this chorus of restless images, or of suggestive thoughts, gave to my father's return, which else had been fitted only to interpose one transitory red-letter day in the calendar of a child, the shadowy power of an ineffaceable agency among my dreams.[16]

There is no need to work through the pattern of this experience. In all important respects it reveals the same form as the responses to the deaths of Jane and Elizabeth: the initial powerful stimulus, the absorption in the emotion, the moment of revelation, and the permanent after-effect. The passage is particularly significant, however, in its revelation of De Quincey's early sensibility to the complex nature of experience: already he could intuitively recognize the parts forming the whole of his experience, their relationship one to the other, the effect of each on the other, and the way in which they all became "bound up into unity"[17] so that he responded to the many as to a one. There is the long wait in the growing darkness, the sudden appearance of the horses, the head lying back on the white pillows, and the sharp recollection of the funeral of Elizabeth the previous summer; and all these elements are brought into a dramatic juxtaposition with what he had heard of the gorgeousness of sunsets in the West Indies, so that the whole becomes a great weaving and interweaving of images and ideas of life and death, each intensifying and heightening his awareness of the others, and he grasps the two great abstractions in all their solemnity and pathos.

In the De Quincey of these three responses to death, one sees, therefore, a human being who, born with keen sensibilities, came as a child to know the force of intense emotional experience. When still in the nursery he knew what it was to surrender to an overwhelming emotion, to feel his entire being caught up in the excitement of the immediate moment, to find in that moment a heightened consciousness in which some hitherto-unperceived truth came to light, and to find as a later result of the experience a colouring of his whole attitude towards life. In the most powerful of such experiences, moreover, he found himself passing into a mystical union with something lying beyond the physical world about him. He knew, too, something of the way in which the elements of human experience act and react, one upon the other, so that they form a single, unified effect in the human organism. And he knew that of all human experiences suffering was the most powerful and the most lasting.

In the years following the death of his father De Quincey was to find frequent confirmation of the knowledge and understanding gained from

these three experiences. Life was not to deal very kindly with him, and in moments like those of his flight from the Manchester Grammar School, his dwelling with Mr. Brunell and the pathetic child in Greek Street, and his loss of Ann, he was to learn again and again how truly the *Mater Lachrymarum* spoke: only through suffering could the capacities of man's spirit be unfolded. But nothing in his later life was to teach him this more clearly than his addiction to opium. When, on a rainy Sunday afternoon in 1804, he entered the chemist's shop in Oxford Street to buy his first bottle of laudanum he took his first step on the path which was to lead to undreamed-of bliss, but also to the most terrible suffering. The opium which at first was to bring a wholly pleasurable quickening and harmony of all his faculties was later to bring moments of pain and horror in which he gazed on the tragedy of life with the same clarity of vision he had known as he stood at Elizabeth's bedside.

But recognition of the value inherent in the deepest experiences of life does not necessarily bring with it an understanding of the essential value of literature. Something more than a response to life was necessary before De Quincey could arrive at the concept of literary power, and for De Quincey that something more was found in both music and his early reading. From the time he was a small child he was acutely sensitive to the sounds of music. In the *Autobiographical Sketches* he tells of boyhood visits to the home of one of his guardians, Thomas Belcher, where he heard the music of Corelli, Cimarosa, and Jomelli, and particularly—as he vividly remembered forty years later—a canon of Cherubini's: "It was sung by four male voices, and rose into a region of thrilling passion, such as my heart had always dimly craved and hungered after, but which now first interpreted itself, as a physical possibility to my ear."[18] As a result of revelations like this of the possible effect of music, of its capacity to lift him into a world of "thrilling passion," De Quincey came to have a great need for it in his daily life. No reader of the *Confessions* and the *Autobiographical Sketches* can fail to be struck by the frequency and the enthusiasm of De Quincey's references to music. And the joy he found in it is not surprising, for here was a means of achieving pleasurably the emotional stimulation and spiritual vision which life usually provided only in moments of pain.

There is no clearer indication of the value which De Quincey found in music than a passage in the *Confessions* in which he writes:

> . . . a chorus . . . of elaborate harmony displayed before me, as in a piece of arras-work, the whole of my past life—not as if recalled by an act of

memory, but as if present and incarnated in the music; no longer painful to dwell upon, but the detail of its incidents removed, or blended in some hazy abstraction, and its passions exalted, spiritualised, and sublimed.[19]

At first it may seem that all that De Quincey has done here is impose an entirely personal pattern on the music: the sounds of the "chorus of elaborate harmony" have simply associated themselves with certain episodes of his life. But one must notice carefully what De Quincey says of this experience: he saw the *whole* of his past life; it was *incarnated* in the music; some of its details were *removed*, and others were *blended*, and none was *painful*; and its passions were *exalted*, *spiritualised*, and *sublimed*. The profound feelings which life had given him remained, but purged now of all that had previously caused him distress. His life, in other words, had assumed an artistically satisfying unity and significance. He had not merely been moved to remember single moments, and from the memory to draw an emotional response unrelated to the music itself. Rather, under the influence of the music he had moved to an harmonious inner state in which he perceived the essential unity, form, and beauty of life.

De Quincey's was not a casual liking for music. He found music actually necessary for his well-being: it satisfied a need within him for stimulation of his deepest feelings. It provided him painlessly with experiences as profound and illuminating as those which life gave only in suffering. He could surrender himself to the effect of *Don Giovanni* or *Fidelio* or the *Sonata Pathétique*, and know happily an absorption in experience in which his whole existence became clarified, whereas in life he had to pay for such an experience with the loss of a sister, or the sight of a dying father. With Coleridge he knew full well that in music, "WE FEEL OURSELVES moved so deeply as no object in mortal life can move us except by anguish, and here it is present with Joy. It is in all its forms still Joy."[20]

And in his early reading he was to find the same value. As a child playing in the nursery at Greenhay, he knew the thrillingly mysterious effect of the *Arabian Nights*; as a boy of eight he shed the first tears he was to owe to a book, over an abridged version of the *Iliad* in Russell's *Ancient Europe*; Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Thomson, Collins were the "companions" of his childhood; while yet a boy he read Chaucer and Chatterton, and found keen pleasure in the mediaeval metrical romances; and some time soon after 1798 he found his way to Wordsworth and Coleridge and the *Lyrical Ballads*, the reading of which was for him "the greatest event in the unfolding of my own mind."[21] From

all this reading he emerged convinced that the great value of literature—as of music—was that it roused in a man a deeply felt experience from which he emerged permanently enriched. And here, too, as in music, the emotional excitement and the resulting enrichment were to be known not only without pain, and without loss, but robed in joy.

By birth De Quincey was a creature of keen sensibility. Life gave him a firm belief in the inherent value of human experience; a knowledge that under certain strong stimuli man can achieve a state of perfect order in which all that is discordant in his nature is brought into the concord of a master harmony; and a conviction that in moments of overwhelming emotional excitement man can know intuitively what lies beyond the discursive and analytic powers of the understanding. In music and literature he found the gateway to experience of a peculiarly keen and pleasurable sort, experience in which he could know the same benefits as he found in the experiences of life, but without having to pay the price which life often exacted. On this personal basis De Quincey the critic was to erect his theory of power as the end of true literature.

NOTES

1 *The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey*, ed. Masson (Edinburgh, 1889), X, 49. All subsequent references to De Quincey's works are to this edition, hereafter cited as *Writings*.
2 *The Common Reader, Second Series* (London, 1932), 138.
3 *Autobiography*, *Writings*, I, 9.
4 According to De Quincey's account he was but one and a half years old, and Jane three, but cf. Masson's note, *Writings*, I, 33, n. 1.
5 *Autobiography*, *Writings*, I, 35.
6 *Ibid.*, 34–35.
7 *Ibid.*, 29.
8 *Ibid.*, 38.
9 *Ibid.*
10 *Ibid.*, 41–42.
11 *Ibid.*, 42.
12 *Ibid.*, 47–48.
13 *Ibid.*, 48–49.
14 *Writings*, XIII, 351.
15 *Ibid.*, 368–369.
16 *Autobiography*, *Writings*, I, 57–58.
17 *Ibid.*, 50.
18 *Ibid.*, 109–110.
19 *Confessions*, *Writings*, III, 391.
20 *The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Coburn (London, 1949), 168.
21 "Samuel Taylor Coleridge," *Literary and Lake Reminiscences*, *Writings*, II, 138.

The University and Business

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The Rôle of the University — *V. W. Bladen*

"Men are men before they are lawyers or physicians or manufacturers; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians." This statement of John Stuart Mill, which might have ended with a reference to manufacturers or businessmen, ought to be carefully considered by university administrators and by business leaders. In these days of pressure for education *in* business administration, it is well to consider whether the university in performing its ancient function of liberal education may not in fact provide a better education *for* business than can be provided by some of the newfangled courses in Business Administration. I shall argue that modern business needs to recruit educated men and should not worry about what they are educated in. But while business needs educated men it also needs trained men: some of this training is properly the function of the technical institutes (e.g., Ryerson), or of the business itself; but some of it is properly undertaken in the university. This I shall argue should be more "education" than "training" if it is to justify a place in the university alongside the other and older professional faculties. I believe such education should be undertaken with mature students in the Graduate School, or in special "development" courses for experienced executives on the model of the "staff colleges" of the armed services.

While arguing in general I am, of course, presenting a justification of the policy of the University of Toronto in maintaining the liberal arts character of its Commerce course and in developing a professional course in Business Administration in the Graduate School. I shall not claim that our Commerce course could not be better (we are always seeking to improve it), but I do argue that it should not become less liberal and more professional. I shall not claim that the graduate course in Business Administration could not be improved: the University recognized this part of its responsibility too late (1938), made much too little provision for its work in the first twelve years after its estab-

lishment, and has not yet made adequate provision. But the principles upon which it operates are, I believe, sound; the concern continues to be with education for, rather than training in, business.

Men are men before they are businessmen; and even if it did not contribute directly to improved business management, university education would be of infinite value. For what the university seeks (or should seek) to provide is a stimulating environment in which the potentiality for growth of those who come to it can be most fully realized. It must be recognized that an environment of scholarly endeavour and research is not one in which everyone can grow best; indeed it may inhibit growth in some. It is of very great importance, therefore, to devise means of selecting those who are most likely to grow in the university and to ensure for them an opportunity to attend; it is also of great importance that alternative opportunities for growth should be provided for those for whom the university is inappropriate. It is to be deplored if social pressure, and particularly the routine requirement of a university degree for the better jobs in business, tends to push too many of the wrong students into the university: they would grow better outside and their presence in the university may well interfere with the well-being of those who can grow there. Let us all recognize, and not least the recruiting officers of business firms, that what we want are mature individuals, who have developed not only their intellectual capacity but also their imagination and their sense of values, rather than individuals who happen to have acquired a university degree and who may or may not have acquired in the process a university education. Let us not stunt the growth of any individual; but let us not assume that all individuals grow equally and in the same direction. Let us recognize, too, the danger of warping when we strive to stimulate; and let us, the teachers, be thankful that the force of growth in those students who can grow in a university is so great that warping is difficult.

This is not the place to develop a well-rounded philosophy of education, nor am I the person to do it, but something more should be said about the university before I turn to business. First let me emphasize the importance and value of the specialized honour courses which are the glory of the University of Toronto, as of many other Canadian universities. The value of these courses is that they provide the environment for growth, not that they make specialists; the honour course in Classics, it is argued, is not just for the man who wants to teach in later life, but equally for the man who may want to be a banker or an industrial relations manager. The case for the "general education" value of

the specialized course has been put most effectively by Professor A. S. P. Woodhouse in *University College, 1853–1953*, and I cannot resist the opportunity to quote it and to give his words wider currency.

> Here, then, is a striking example of the way in which University College, through the work and influence of Hutton, gave direction to the aims and methods of the Arts course at the honour level. For honour Classics, as we have observed, furnished a model and set the pace for other honour courses in the Humanities. The special marks of these honour courses at Toronto are: the selection of a sufficiently important and productive area of concentration—the Classics, it may be, or the ancient Semitic world, or English, or two of the other languages of modern Europe—an area with its own internal relations and its recognizable contribution to life today; the systematic exploration of this area as supplying the principal content and the focus of a four-year course; the insistence on the command of texts as the basis of the whole effort—the reading of the books themselves, not the acquisition of mere information about them; the generous conception of literature, which extends beyond *belles-lettres* to include the literature of ideas, but studied always as literature addressed to the general reader; the placing of these texts in their historical setting, with the result of illuminating the texts and of gradually giving to the student such command of the history of his area as no series of survey courses ever achieved, and finally as the outcome of it all, possession not only of a considerable body of the world's best knowledge, but of a habit of mind and a point of view which might also be a starting point for further exploration. Classics was the first course effectively to demonstrate in Canada the grand aim of the honour system, general education by means of judicious specialization. But the description attempted above will apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to all the rest.

Let the student coming to the university choose the course in which he is most likely to grow—the course which is most likely to excite and stimulate him. At that stage he should not be asking if this course will train him for a profession, or whether the recruiting officers of business will pay any serious attention to graduates of it.

This belief that the specialized honour course has value in providing general education and that the object of university education is to promote growth rather than the acquisition of knowledge, leads to some views about the character of university teaching. Nowhere have I seen these better stated than in an unpublished memorandum by Professor Pigou. I hope I shall be forgiven for quoting a part of it. Professor Pigou was protesting against the views of some teachers of economics of "their young men as a set of sausage skins, to be appropriately stuffed, with the ends neatly tied up in preparation for the grand assize of the Tripos! The meat, to be really satisfactory, must contain the very latest facts,

and, for Part II, the very latest bits of theoretical apparatus. . . . The young men are to be taught economics; told that this question possesses that answer." This he admitted was an exaggeration, even a caricature, but it provided a foil for his thesis. "According to my notions," he said, "undergraduates ought not to be regarded as sausage skins. They are human beings to be educated, or better still, to be allowed to educate themselves. . . . Having failed myself to 'master' Economics in 40 years I am less optimistic than some of my colleagues that ordinary undergraduates can master it in one year or even in three. But they *can* be interested and stimulated and helped to some growth of mind. . . . I would never 'teach' them Economics. Marshall did not 'teach' us: he talked to us in an interesting way about interesting things, and, by that means, developed in us some rudiments of intelligence. . . . What these young men need is cooperation, not spoon-feeding: the University touch, not the crammers'." This memorandum I re-read yearly in the hope that I can attain the "University touch," in spite of my own failings and the fact that I am responsible for hundreds of students rather than the tens that the claims of real education would dictate.

This is no new doctrine, that a really liberal education is not only valuable in the development of men as whole men, but in preparation for their development as businessmen; Sir Daniel Wilson preached it before the Legislature of the Province of Ontario in 1890. "I am persuaded," he said, "that no training is better qualified to fit men for many practical duties than the persistent diligence of systematized study in any of the departments of university Honour work. . . . Our aim in the Faculty of Arts is high culture in its truest sense, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and wholly independent of mere professional requirements. But if a result of such training is to secure able and scholarly teachers for our schools, for our bankers men of clearer insight into the principles on which the wealth of nations depend, for lawyers and judges men of cultivated intellect trained in wide fields of philosophic speculation . . . and for physicians men who have advanced beyond the stage of clinical instruction and as scientific experts can render a reason for the courses they pursue; surely this is a public gain." And Stephen Leacock many years ago addressing a meeting of businessmen in Montreal said: "Education is a peculiar process. You aim at one thing and you hit another. You set out to look for ultimate truth and you don't find it but incidentally you have acquired a cultivated mind. You pursue studies that you think will be of use in your business. They are not. But by the time you are done with them you yourself are

a better man for your business or for any other business. . . . If you pursue your studies with too directly practical an aim you miss the mark. The worst influence that bears on our present day education is the exaggerated demand that it should be practical. It ought only to be practical by accident." And well do I remember Professor C. R. Fay in the early twenties reporting to a group of Toronto businessmen that Anglo-Persian Oil had recruited the winner of the prize for Greek verse at Cambridge as a result of their search for men of "high saturation value," men who could quickly learn the business and develop executive talent. Finally I find my colleague Professor Ashley in a memorandum to Dr. Cody in 1937 arguing against the professionalization of our Commerce and Finance course: its object, he said, is "to turn out graduates who can expect to apply themselves with success to the task of learning a business quickly, of becoming good citizens, and of living a full life."

Though I direct the attention of the recruiting officer for business to the writer of Greek verse, or the graduate in Philosophy, I do not intend in any way to distract his attention from our graduates in Commerce and Finance. They too have a liberal education, primarily in economics and economic history; they are more likely to be seeking a business career; and we are not quite so pure and consistent that some "practical" studies have not crept in. It is a tribute to business and its recruiting officers that the inclusion of such practical subjects in a man's programme does not increase the demand for him. Their inclusion does sometimes help a student to find himself; and in the atmosphere of the honour course these practical subjects tend to become philosophical, educational.

II

Let me turn for a moment to business. There has been evident for some years an increasing interest on the part of business in university education, an increasing recognition of its value, an increasing demand for university graduates. This has not been entirely because of the need for more and more highly trained scientists: the problem of the training, or rather education, of pure and practical scientists, is of vital importance to us all, but it is a problem which I am not competent to discuss. I confine myself to the increasing demand for university graduates for "management," or "administration." I should like to discuss briefly why, in my opinion, this demand for graduates in the liberal arts (in-

cluding Commerce and Finance) should increase, why business should be interested in supporting this essential core of higher education. I shall not attempt to estimate why the demand has increased, or to determine how far business has been motivated by the three reasons I propose to give. (The first is probably the most important explanation of this increase, but I am conscious of a growing awareness of the second and third reasons, though there may be very different ways of expressing them.) First, the increasing difficulty of business management, resulting from size, complexity, and technological and social change, has made it more and more necessary to acquire for each corporation and for business as a whole an adequate and increasing share of the very limited supply of potential administrative talent, of the potential leaders. Second, the new status of business leaders in an industrial or "business" civilization imposes obligations of social leadership which involve an understanding not only of business but of society too. Third (a corollary of the second), the new status of business leaders imposes on them an obligation to represent the "values" of our society, moral and aesthetic. These last two reasons, of course, derive from the fact that businessmen have become the new aristocracy and they must learn—as indeed many have learnt—that *noblesse oblige*, whether the *noblesse* is conferred by the sovereign or earned by business achievement.

But it is also becoming clear that these qualities, intellectual and moral, are needed for the solution of what I believe to be the most serious problem of business administration in the next generation—the problem of securing real co-operation on the part of most of those involved in the economic process. Again I am out of my depth, having available only a paragraph in which to develop a point requiring a book and a more competent author. But I believe that a solution of this problem is vital not only to our success in production but to the viability of our civilization. If by my words I can interest even a few people in the search for understanding of these problems, and particularly if I can interest a few scholars and businessmen in working together on these problems, I shall feel that my effort has been amply rewarded. And if this point of view is accepted it has important implications for part III of this paper, in which I shall return to the university and its work in business administration.

Perhaps what I should do is simply to say—read Elton Mayo's books, *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* and *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*. They do not contain the solution to these problems, but they are, I believe, most persuasive; and after reading

them one is more likely to be asking the right questions. But let me raise five points to explain my interest in stimulating the interest of businessmen in these problems of "human relations in administration."

First, as an economist, I am concerned with the increase of wealth and conscious of how far we are from an "economy of plenty." Of immediate interest is the productivity necessary to sustain our defence effort, to meet our increased demand for leisure, and yet to improve the standard of living of the vast majority of the people. Can we in such circumstances neglect the possibility of increased production through improved co-operation? Professor E. H. Phelps Brown put it this way in his inaugural address at London University:

> Let me now consider how this growing insight into human nature affects our view of the prospects of labour. A point of great practical importance presents itself immediately. There is a reason to believe that our national product can to-day be substantially increased, without installing any more equipment, if men who are now working only reluctantly and listlessly, who "couldn't care less," could come to work willingly and with interest. The possibility of such an increase is not a matter of conjecture, but is established by known differences between the results obtained by different firms in the same trade or by the same group of workers at different times. The increase does not come from speeding up, nor even from the worker being willing to put more effort into the job. It comes about without increased exertion, through the liberation of human energies that occurs when inner conflicts are resolved and social frustrations are removed. When interest succeeds boredom, and pride in achievement takes the place of indifference, when we work with a common purpose instead of at cross purposes, then we can get more done in a day without being any more tired at the end of it.

In these days of "full employment" we have no more "manpower" but we have not used up our reserve of "willpower."

Second, we have relied too much, in the past, on pecuniary incentives and the fear of unemployment. Now it is clear that fear never did succeed in releasing the potential of human achievement; at best it guaranteed a certain minimum performance. But even if fear were more effective than I suggest we have surely to rule it out. On the lowest level one can say that its use is no longer politically feasible (the politically tolerable level of unemployment is now very low, perhaps too low for adequate flexibility and mobility). On a higher level, such a solution is in conflict with the values of liberal democracy, of the way of life we claim to be defending. If we dismiss "fear" can we likewise dismiss pecuniary incentives? This is a more difficult question, but I have argued elsewhere that you cannot "buy co-operation." This is not to rule out

the effectiveness of pecuniary incentives in general but to argue that they are only effective in a "good society." Professor T. N. Whitehead put the same point in his *Leadership in a Free Society*: "A wage system designed to evoke high motivation is apt to increase the force of the motives already in being. If they are favourable to the policies of management well and good; but if they be otherwise, the more the employees are motivated the more they will resist their nominal leaders." Or again: "If the group is reacting against the purposes of its management, then it is likely that the added incentives may be taken as one more proof of management's attempt to drive its workers."

Third, the difficulty of management in securing co-operation is made much greater by the speed of technological change. Everyone fears change. To tap the reserve of willpower in face of this fear of, and resistance to, change, and to secure the tremendous productive (and defence) advantages of this rapid development of technology, constitutes one of the greatest problems for, and challenges to, the business leaders of the future. Social scientists have learnt something about this problem, but not nearly enough; and some businessmen have applied some of this knowledge, but only too few.

Fourth, as an economist of the old school I am concerned not only with production but also with "real cost," the wear and tear of human tissue, and not least of nervous tissue: and as a citizen I am worried about what production does to men. Again let me quote Professor Phelps Brown:

> With all our present problems, there is little left of the poverty which was systematic and endemic forty years ago. What then is the way forward now? To yet higher levels of real income, from the European to the American factory-worker's standard of consumption, and on again beyond that? perhaps so; yet what are refrigerators and radios and cars, if they come with more personal instability, more broken homes, more insecure and inwardly-tormented children? Even to-day, which causes more suffering among wage-earners, lack of the things which can be bought, or the anxieties, frustrations, and conflicts of neurosis?

I would add that there is a positive aspect as well as a negative one: there is the possibility of an "income" of satisfaction from doing the work itself.

Finally, I suggest that a new problem for management arises from the progressive achievement of political and social democracy. This is not to suggest that "authority" is unnecessary: it is to suggest that "authoritarianism" (an insistence on authority for its own sake, an arbi-

trary authority or, as Mary Parker Follett put it, an insistence on the authority of "mere position" rather than of "function") is dangerous. It is to suggest that leaders have to earn real authority and cannot have it conferred upon them from above.

I end this section with a quotation from Professor O. H. Taylor's book *Economics and Liberalism*, a book which I have been commending to many of my friends in business for its fine statement of the values which I believe to be implicit in their adherence to free enterprise:

"I cannot believe that—within this country or any of the relatively prosperous truly liberal capitalist countries—the main causes of wide prevalence and high intensities of extreme oppositional or obstructive attitudes threatening and hampering liberal capitalism lie at all in its economic imperfections. . . . For all its faults, liberal capitalism or the system of free enterprise, wherever it really exists and has a chance to function, is on the whole unmistakably a very excellent economic system with respect to its service to the economic welfare of the people generally—by far the best in this respect that the world has ever known or knows today. . . . It is not in the economic respect but in other respects, primarily, that our capitalist economic and general society as it is, but need not remain with no modifications, has traits and a mode of operation tending to engender widespread emotional attitudes and views and forms of behavior inimical to it. . . . My suggestion is that there lies behind all this something else beyond or beneath peoples' economic interests. . . . The fundamental causes lie, I suspect, in excessive frustrations of peoples' non-economic and non-rational but inevitable natural, human, and legitimate emotional needs; for sufficient, tolerable degrees of relative stability, continuity, and security, not of their incomes alone but of their local, personal, family, and group and community ways of life. . . . Frustration of emotional needs of this sort produces a dim sense of living in an ugly, greedy, quarrelsome, hostile world; and the hatred produced by fear is directed at capitalism, the competitive system, big business."

If this is a sound diagnosis, and I believe it to be sound enough to take very seriously, the future of liberal society depends very much on the success of businessmen (amongst whom I include trade-union leaders) in finding ways of making efficient production consistent with the "good life." Political change may help, but almost certainly cannot solve the problem. Indeed it is possible that the viability of even the Soviet system is dependent on a solution of this administrative problem! In the search for solutions economists and teachers and practitioners of

business administration must collaborate with anthropologists (particularly the new "applied" variety), sociologists, social psychologists, and psychiatrists in order to learn, in Professor Taylor's words, "what conditions of life are required for tolerable emotional health and contentment or serenity, and how prevailing practices in free economic society might better provide and permit such conditions without undue interference with economic requirements."

III

It remains to consider the relevance of all this to the rôle of the university in education in business administration, to the rôle in this University of its Institute of Business Administration. A few general propositions seem to follow from what has been said so far. First, the Institute should insist that its function is education, not training. It should therefore resist the pressure of special groups to provide specific training for particular jobs. The object of university work in industrial relations, for example, is to turn out men "suitable to become" rather than "made" industrial relations officers. They may be less useful immediately than better trained and less well-educated men, but I believe that they will be more useful ultimately. Specific training for the job must be done on the job. Indeed, not only the training, but the education of the next generation of managers is a vital function of the managers of this generation. The university can help. But it cannot perform this task. Nor can a staff training department. Education of his subordinates should be recognized as a vital function of the executive; the master-apprentice relationship has to be established in management; the "coaching" of the junior by his senior is the surest source of education and executive development.

More important than the problem of what to teach is the problem of how to teach. The staff in any university department or school of business administration should ponder Professor Pigou's memorandum. They should not "teach" business administration; they must retain the "University touch"; their job is to help students to educate themselves, to help them to grow. This is not easy. Nor is it easy to estimate success in achieving education. But I am confident that the staff in Business Administration in this University accept this as their end, strive earnestly to achieve it, and do largely achieve it. Like their colleagues in other departments they are not satisfied with their achievement and are constantly seeking to do a better job of education.

Perhaps the selection of the teachers is more important than anything else; perhaps the real question is not what should be taught, or how it should be taught, but by whom the teaching should be done. Selection is not easy, and proof that selection has been good is even more difficult to find. We need humane men, men with a basic education in some of the social sciences, men ready to get out into the firing line occasionally as consultants, but also ready to devote a fair proportion of time and energy to independent research of a fundamental character. I emphasize here research not in terms of the responsibility of the university to contribute to the extension of the boundaries of knowledge (though I recognize such responsibility) but in terms of the necessity for continuous activity in research as a condition for effective university "teaching." Without continuous research and scholarly activity the university teacher begins to "teach" his subject; the "University touch" is lost. But all the research that should be undertaken, and, above all, the research in human problems of administration which, I have argued, is so urgent, cannot be undertaken as a by-product of teaching: funds are required to provide from time to time partial or complete freedom from teaching duties for a year or so in order that members of the teaching staff may undertake bigger research projects than are compatible with a normal teaching load, and to provide research associates capable of directing their own research and research assistants to work under direction. The programme of research in "human relations" initiated ten years ago by the Institute of Industrial Relations, and continued by the Institute of Business Administration in co-operation with the Department of Psychiatry, has petered out. Its revival is, I consider, urgent. This does not mean I think that the old programme was perfect and merely needs to be revived; it needs new tough thinking. But I am confident that there are good men anxious to do that thinking and to undertake that research when funds become available and an academic "entrepreneur" appears or is found.

The programme of evening classes for part-time candidates for the degree of Master of Commerce calls for some special comment. It is in my opinion of very great value, and of my part in its initiation I am inordinately proud, though I recognize that it is a cause of many raised academic eyebrows. I can testify that it is a very stimulating experience to conduct a class in business administration with mature students who have what Mayo called "knowledge of acquaintance" of, or experience in, the area under discussion. True, the students arrive tired; true, they miss the other elements in university life. But they are graduates who

have enjoyed these other things, they are mature, they are highly motivated. Provision of these classes has been of real service to these men, to their companies, to the community: and their presence has contributed to the life of the Institute and thereby to the quality of the work done with full-time students by day. There is only one qualification to make: the numbers enrolled on this part-time basis have put a severe strain on a staff limited in size, and some of the potential good that could have been done has been lost because of this undue pressure on the staff.

What has been said of the value of evening work for the degree can be repeated with reference to the various programmes for executive development. Their value to the community and to the University is great, and the danger of neutralizing the stimulating effects on the staff by over-extension is also great. In my third Annual Report as Director of the Institute of Industrial Relations (1949) I discussed this problem and I feel that what I then said is still relevant:

> Out of our experience of the last three years I have developed a profound belief that the University has a responsibility to provide some help to mature and experienced executives both business and union. In part this means providing advanced extra-mural instruction in subjects taught at the University which have become relevant to the developing duties of the executive. More important, however, I believe, is the creation by the University staff of an opportunity for such people to think about their problems in company with others having similar problems in an atmosphere conducive to free exploration and frank exchange of experience and viewpoint.

I went on to urge the importance in such executive development programmes of attention to "human relations." This I still believe to be of prime importance, but I should now like the University to explore the possibilities of an indirect approach through a return to a study of the humanities rather than through "case" studies in the various fields of business management, finance, marketing, production, human relations, etc. My confidence in the first part of this paper is increased when I learn about the new programmes of humane studies for senior executives of some imaginative companies in the United States in collaboration with some equally imaginative universities.

Let me conclude with a quotation from Dean David of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, experienced in business and education. His consideration of the qualities required for business leadership is highly relevant to the discussion of the proper education of such leaders: it certainly reinforces the plea for education rather than training for business.

In my observation, those businessmen who have been most effective in public affairs—those who, in a word, have been true business leaders in this complex world—all share certain attitudes and characteristics in addition to competence. First and foremost, these men exhibit what I like to call "tough-minded humility." The tough-mindedness is essential to competent handling of these complex problems and flows from that training and experience in calculated risk taking and decisive judgment which I have stressed. But the humility is of equal importance. It flows from a recognition of the complexities of the problems and the fact that many diverse backgrounds and talents must be brought to bear upon their solution. I am convinced that the public over a period of time does not respond to an intolerant, dogmatic, imperious, or cocky leadership in politics, in labor, or in business.

Another aspect of this tough-minded humility is the ability to respond intelligently to criticism. . . . The natural human reaction to such criticism is to be defensive, resentful, and unfortunately many a businessman—just like his critics—personalizes what are in fact great social forces. . . . The most effective business leaders I know have developed a self-restraint to handle such criticism in a positive fashion and are able to recognize constructive and justifiable criticism and to profit from it. Intelligent response to both fair and unfair criticism is essential.

Finally, there are certain characteristics which perhaps should be so obvious as not to require mention. I do mention them, however, because of some of my own recent experiences. Some of you may know that for some time I have been expounding on behalf of the Harvard Business School the doctrine of business responsibility. In trying to see what was involved I have talked with many, many people to find out what they thought. Not infrequently the words "integrity," "sincerity," and "courage" have emerged as central concepts. It goes without saying that these qualities are basic essentials. But too often we forget those things which can "go without saying." And I have reiterated the need for such qualities because of the deep concern, almost a ferment, in the minds of many—especially businessmen themselves—regarding the moral and ethical foundations of our industrial civilization.

In the war of ideas, the democracies can well use the special skills and experience which the competent businessman has so well developed in managing his own affairs. Given the other characteristics I have mentioned—and I should like, once again, to stress the attitude of tough-minded humility—the "competent businessman" can become "the responsible business leader." And I am convinced, such a responsible business leader will play a major role in helping to guide our civilization through this uncertain peace.

From the Board Room Window

W. E. Phillips

When Winston Churchill said: "The University is a place where the future of the nation is at stake," he stated a little-recognized truth that should serve as our slogan in these challenging days. At the University of Toronto we have been conscious for several years of approaching problems which, if not resolved in time, might determine the usefulness of the University. If, in Churchill's phrase, the future of the nation is here at stake, the importance of those problems is evident. There is no mystery about their general nature. They are common to all the universities of the Western world. No two universities, however, are exactly alike, and each requires the measures appropriate to the local situation.

There are at least two specific issues which give rise to our general concern about the future. First, greatly increased numbers of young people will be seeking admission to all Canadian universities. The statistical inevitability of this conclusion is now widely accepted. The conclusion is based on the well-known studies of Dr. E. F. Sheffield of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, in which he took into account the birth-rate figures combined with the trend towards an annual increase in the proportion of the college age group who will, in the future, seek admission to the universities. The population studies suggest that the total student enrolment in Canadian universities will rise from 71,000 in 1955–6 to 83,000 in 1960–1, and to 128,000 in 1965–6. Putting it in general terms, the student population in Canadian universities will be approximately doubled by 1965–6.

In the case of the University of Toronto, Professor B. A. Griffith has made a forecast of the student population we may expect. He projects a possible enrolment of from 14,000 to 17,000 in 1960–1, and from 18,000 to 26,000 in 1965–6. We have had experience in dealing with greatly increased numbers. Ten years ago the enrolment in Canadian

universities reached a record total of 83,150, of whom 19.3 per cent were enrolled in the University of Toronto. We are not now, however, confronted by any temporary bulge in the student population, as was the case in 1947. The statisticians predict that, with rapidly increasing numbers in this part of Canada, the proportion attending the University of Toronto will rise. Certainly it is obvious that Toronto must shoulder a large share of the projected Canadian increase.

The second specific issue confronting us is the growing demand for substantially increased numbers of university graduates, particularly those with scientific and technical training.

That there is a serious shortage of scientifically and technically trained manpower in Canada is now generally recognized. That this constitutes a potential danger to national prosperity is agreed. What is not so widely understood, however, is that this problem is much more than a mere question of numbers. As Dr. J. R. Killian, the President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recently put it so well: "The nature of the present dearth of scientists and engineers is not simply a shortage of men. Firstly, it is a shortage of intellectual talent adequately educated in the right place. Secondly, it is more a shortage of specific talents and skills adaptable to specific areas than a general shortage of numbers."

The broad recognition of these problems has awakened a new and lively interest in the universities—"where the future of the nation is at stake." It has led to a widespread desire on the part of industry and the public generally to assist the universities in finding practical solutions.

Robert M. Hutchins has pointed out that education is a practical matter. The final results of any educational system depend upon what you want and what you can do. What you want depends upon finding an acceptable philosophy of education, and what you can do depends upon your circumstances—that is, in most cases, upon the financial support you can obtain.

As I read the history of the University of Toronto, its continued growth from the beginning has depended upon the ability of those responsible for its governance to resolve the frequent crises which, from time to time, appeared to threaten its very existence. Those crises, some of which might seem trivial today, arose with embarrassing frequency, and their resolution seems to me to have involved in each case a reappraisal of the fundamental purpose of the University in relation to the conditions then existing. If we are to avoid the temptation to find easy *ad hoc* solutions to some of our more pressing problems, we must, I am convinced, clarify in our minds the over-all fundamental objectives

of the University. We must re-state and re-affirm the purpose to which this University is dedicated, and, having done that, seek detailed solutions to our problems within the limits of the definition of such purpose, and, obviously, within our financial circumstances.

*

Few will dispute the fact that the role of the university has radically changed since the day that Henry VIII felt entitled to submit the question of the validity of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon to all the great universities of Europe, including Oxford and Cambridge, some of which, wise perhaps in their own generation, gave an interpretation favourable to the interests of that monstrous monarch.

During the past twenty years there has been literally a ferment of thinking, talking, and writing about universities, their strengths and their weaknesses, their rôle in, and their responsibility to, the communities in which they exist and the societies they have helped to shape. Sir Richard Livingstone, Alfred North Whitehead, "Bruce Truscot," Sir Walter Moberly, Robert M. Hutchins, Arthur Bestor, and Hilda Neatby have all discussed, under various titles, "the crisis in the university." But, using "crisis" in the sense of a turning point, the greatest crisis in higher education occurred in the nineteenth century.

Before the changes caused by the Industrial Revolution in England were fully effective, the ancient universities were largely dominated by the idea enunciated by John Henry Newman in 1852—the idea of an aristocratic community of scholars eager in the pursuit of truth, perhaps more concerned with the accumulation of knowledge than its dissemination. Newman's voice was that of the great conservative forces within the universities that intuitively resisted change. He might be said to represent a backward-looking concept of the university. On the other hand, to Thomas Henry Huxley, perhaps more than to any other individual, we owe the idea of the modern university as we now understand it.

Huxley was a vigorous and effective advocate of a more democratic concept of the university. Fully recognizing the historic traditions of the universities and the value of their essential spirit, he was deeply conscious of the changes demanded by a changing society. He recognized the ancient supremacy of the Faculty of Arts as the coping stone to the education of the citizen, but he sought a more thorough development of scientific and professional education.

In his rectorial address at Aberdeen in 1874, Huxley spoke of his ideal of all universities,

> which, as I conceive, should be places in which thought is free from all fetters; and in which all sources of knowledge, and all aids to learning, should be accessible to all comers, without distinction of creed or country, riches or poverty. . . .
>
> In an ideal University, as I conceive it, a man should be able to obtain instruction in all forms of knowledge, and discipline in the use of all the methods by which knowledge is obtained. In such a University, the force of living example should fire the student with a noble ambition to emulate the learning of learned men, and to follow in the footsteps of the explorers of new fields of knowledge. And the very air he breathes should be charged with that enthusiasm for truth, that fanaticism of veracity, which is a greater possession than much learning; a nobler gift than the power of increasing knowledge; by so much greater and nobler than these, as the moral nature of man is greater than the intellectual; for veracity is the heart of morality.

This is a clear statement of the trust of which we are stewards, the ideal to which we must remain true.

Let us say, then, that the purpose of the university is to provide every facility for launching young minds on a voyage of independent and creative thought. The practical problem, of course, is how to accomplish this purpose. If we agree with Hutchins' conclusions as expressed in his Marfleet Lectures delivered here in 1952, the major misfortunes in the American educational system may be traced to the enormous growth in technical schooling, free from any serious discipline of the liberal arts, or, as he puts it, "schooling without education." We are fortunate in that, historically, the University of Toronto developed from King's College as a veritable fortress of the Arts, and has emerged, after long struggles, as one of the great guardians of the traditional disciplines of the liberal arts in Canada. In the main, our professional schools—certainly the Engineering school—were born of popular demand or necessity. In their earlier stages at least, they grew up under the influence of the intimate physical contacts with the brilliant individuals who were shaping the Arts Colleges. This influence has waxed and waned, and at times has been difficult to trace. In the time of Loudon and Galbraith—two leaders who served their own times and the University well—I know that a student could spend three years in the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering and still be blissfully ignorant of the true liberal aims of the University. Yet over the years the Faculty of Arts has infused a spirit and maintained a standard of excellence which have profoundly affected the professional schools, and we have just cause to be proud of them.

Now we must expand them, the Engineering school in particular, if we are to discharge our responsibility to community and nation. Already we are three years too late; we have been compelled to restrict admission in several faculties for the coming year, and that is unfortunate in view of the shortages that I have already mentioned. If we followed the popular demand, we would devote at once a large part of our available funds to the creation of new Engineering buildings and the addition of more Engineering staff. To many, this would appear to be the proper course of action; and, indeed, it is obvious that if we are to produce more Engineering graduates we must expand the facilities for teaching them in many ways. But "excellence" must be the constant standard of Engineering and of all other professional schools, and that standard must be set by the academic conscience of the whole University, not by one school alone, and certainly not by any outside accrediting agency or pressure group.

There is a widespread feeling that specialists cannot be well educated, that the nature of their training prevents them from being intellectually curious, imaginative, and interested in the work of others. This view is untenable: nearly all well-educated persons are, in the last analysis, specialists. Specialism so narrow as to exclude all interest in other disciplines is no preparation for democratic citizenship. In seeking the highly desirable goal of better qualified professional graduates, we must not forget that the scientific and technical field, vital though it be if we are to maintain our own industrial growth, is yet but one field of human activity.

Current discussions on the subject of the better educated engineer or technologist often end at cross-purposes, chiefly because of the failure to agree on a precise definition of the terms involved. (If I mention engineers repeatedly, it is not because they have any exclusive or preponderant importance. The same could be said of other professional graduates. But the shortage of Engineering graduates has the chief place in the public mind at the moment.) In the United Kingdom, three terms are usually employed: engineer, technologist, and technician. A recent White Paper on technical education defines a technician as one who is qualified to work under the general direction of a technologist. The technologist, however, is qualified for membership in a professional institution, and he is able to initiate practical developments in industry and to push forward the boundaries of knowledge. The engineer, we are left to assume, is a better educated technologist who has graduated from one of the established universities.

These definitions would be largely meaningless to us in Canada. We might well, however, give currency and status to the term "technologist" for those trained in institutes of technology, which are much needed and will no doubt be established in greater numbers. In the United Kingdom eight colleges of advanced technology have already been established, involving very large financial contributions by the government. There is still, I gather, a subtle distinction between the graduate from a British university and the graduate from a technological college, even as the engineer from one of the older universities is still a different type of individual from the graduate of one of the "red brick" universities. In each case the difference seems to be that one is better educated than the other.

Following the meeting of atomic scientists at Geneva a few years ago, we were permitted an insight into the startling progress the Russians were making in the training of large numbers of scientists, engineers, and technologists. We are frequently reminded of the superior scale upon which their programme is established, and it would be unwise to assume that the quality of their graduates is not good. Nevertheless there is evidence that the Russians are producing specialists in the narrow sense, force-feeding them with technology to the neglect of the arts. Moreover, the efficiency of their methods rests on a denial of individual freedom of choice. Here, committed as we are to the philosophy that education is for everyone, it still remains true that education is for the individual, and in our free society, as yet, the state does not own the individual. We must steadfastly safeguard the right of the individual to obtain the education he desires, provided that he is capable of absorbing it; and we must ensure that, as far as the universities are concerned, our professional graduates are educated for freedom—well educated.

To be well educated means different things to different people. I am certain that it must involve, as a minimum, knowledge of our language, of literature, of philosophy, of history, and, above all, some sense of moral and spiritual values.

Whether we like it or not, we are living here in an industrial society, and if our physical security alone is to be preserved, our industrial society will inevitably increase in its extent and complexity, will inevitably govern our thinking and actions for a long time to come. Surely there are few who can see in this prospect alone a salvation for our troubled world. Any reasoned judgment would justify the prayer that there might be a few more philosophers as well as more engineers.

We may well agree that, in one way or another, the development of

our human resources is a matter of paramount concern to the nation as a whole, with special emphasis on the immediate need for a greatly increased number of scientifically and technically trained graduates. In accepting this as an immediate responsibility of the University, we must avoid at all costs the tendency to become merely a larger group of larger professional schools. The pressures in this direction are real and the forces at work substantial. They must be resisted. Our policy, then, will be to expand all our professional schools, where the necessity is demonstrated, to the limit of our circumstances. But that expansion must be kept in balance with the expansion of the University as a whole. It must be an expansion with and within the University.

Our aim must be to produce in larger numbers what, for lack of a better term, might be described as better educated individuals. What methods are we to adopt to achieve this purpose? This problem is one for the academic authorities, who know that no mere shuffling of curricula, no casual contacts with the teaching in the Faculty of Arts, will suffice.

The problem is common to all universities having professional schools. John Pilley, Professor of Education in the University of Edinburgh, states it in clear terms in his article in the February, 1957, *Universities Quarterly*:

> The teaching that is needed is the kind that will give students the power of interpreting the texts they study, and of comprehending what sort of an activity they are entering into in each of their studies and how these differ from one another. If we could teach all students to read in this sense we should have done a good deal to further their education: unless we can teach our technologists to do it we shall not be doing what we should towards making them either good technologists or educated citizens.
>
> If we are to produce technologists who are educated men we must look not only to what can be done in the universities but also to what can and should be done in the schools. If young people's schooling be effectively liberal it will have given them some experience of what it is to augment their knowledge of themselves and the excitement that goes with it. Specialisation contributes to this end if the specialisation is begun in the way a good sixth form teacher seeks to do it. What is to-day working to prevent the schools from teaching their pupils the art of independent study is the ever earlier, and ever more intense, unreflective specialisation which is required of them. This transforms what should be humanising studies into the learning of subject matter and forces increasingly the adoption of cramming methods. A large part of the blame for this anti-educational development lies with the universities, all too many of whose members share [the] opinion that the school is the place where you obediently learn the facts, and that you only begin to think about them when you get to a university. Until the universities

recognise the mischievousness of this view and adopt entrance requirements that give the schools a great deal more enlightened help than they now give in laying the foundations of their pupils' liberal education, no endeavour of [the universities] to produce technologists who are "like any other well educated person" is likely to have any great success.

This, I believe, has some application to our situation. It is not impossible that the adoption of a common first year for all the professional schools might have much to recommend it. There would be advantages in economy, not only in money but in the utilization of space; if, as some would contend, a common first year provides advantages for the development of better educated individuals, it should be seriously considered.

I find myself so much in agreement with Dr. Sidney Smith's address, "The Unity of Knowledge," given before the Royal Canadian Institute on February 23, 1952, that I feel it could well set the direction of academic policy in this respect. Dr. Smith illustrated his plea for the unity of knowledge by quoting from Sir Robert Falconer, who appreciated clearly the different approaches of humanist and scientist, and whose grasp of the new dimension added to higher education by science, and of what Huxley calls "the divine dipsomania of the original investigator," was firm and sure.

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We are fortunate indeed that the structure of the University of Toronto as it stands today creates no obstacle to the accomplishment of our purposes. Too little credit has been given to the Royal Commission of 1906. This Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir Joseph Flavelle, was charged with an examination of the affairs of the University, and it is from its wise recommendations that the present University Act has evolved.

This Act imposes upon the Board of Governors the task of governing the University, and, at the same time, the responsibility for the appointment of the President of the University. The President, with his academic colleagues, is wholly responsible for the academic affairs of the University. The responsibility of the Chairman of the Board relates to the control of money. This makes possible the maximum flexibility in both the administrative and the academic organization. The President, with his colleagues and the Senate, develops and applies the agreed academic policies, with the certain knowledge that the selection of academic staff is, in the last analysis, his exclusive prerogative. The principle of federa-

tion adds strength to the whole and to the constituent parts. The federated colleges have contributed greatly to the spirit of the University. A deep and growing understanding continues to strengthen our common purpose. Looking back over some thirteen years during which I have been officially associated with the University, there is no change in the University Act that I can think of which would better equip us to face the problems of the immediate future.

The question of what the size of the University should be has several facets: How many students will seek admission? Where does size begin to affect the quality of teaching? What is an economical maximum number of students from the viewpoint of overhead and administrative costs? The forecasts that now guide our planning suggest that we will be asked to deal with 22,000 to 25,000 students by 1965 or 1967. It is true that these forecasts do not envisage any relief that might be forthcoming if many more technological institutes were established. Nor do they make allowance for the possibility of changing the standards of university admission.

The Board of Governors must take into account all matters that affect the long-term policy of the University, but must, perforce, confine their active detailed planning to shorter periods concerning which they have reasonably accurate information. In 1950, after the post-war bulge, we concluded that we were again in a position to set student-staff ratios that entitled us to feel that the quality of teaching had been restored to a satisfactory level. With this establishment, we are enabled to deal with 10,000 to 11,000 students and maintain the required high quality of teaching. A satisfactory student-staff ratio must govern the establishment of the future.

For several years, we have considered in what direction the University should acquire new land areas. The decision to procure some 26 acres of residential land west of St. George Street and north of College Street was based, in the first instance, on purely administrative economics. It was considered that the administrative and maintenance facilities were located centrally in relation to this area, and were of adequate capacity to serve any new facilities erected thereon. The area becomes, in reality, a part of the present campus, involving a shifting to the westward of the centre of gravity of the University property. The President has concluded that with new facilities in this area the academic staff can meet the challenge of expansion. Under these circumstances, we may well find ourselves dealing, by 1965 or 1967, with a student population of between 22,000 and 25,000, if that be necessary. Though I share to the

full the feeling of my academic colleagues that any university can very easily become too large, I do not view the prospect of 25,000 students with dismay.

Besides examining what we want to do, we must determine what we can do. As I have stated earlier, that will depend upon our circumstances, upon the financial support we can obtain. We must look for that support in several directions. Costs are steadily increasing in every phase of the operation of the University, and we have no private loophole of escape from those increasing costs, nor is there any indication that this trend is likely to change.

Income from student fees has declined as a percentage of our total income, while government grants for current expenditures have substantially increased. Education cannot be deferred, and, on current expenditures account, the annual short fall must be made good by government grants. We are indeed fortunate that up to the present time the balance has actually been achieved, and we have been able to keep our heads above water at the present levels of enrolment. That is all we have done: the increased expenditures of the past ten years are not reflected in any great enrichment of what we can offer to the students, either in studies or in amenities.

Our financial survival has so far been the result of a series of happy accidents, rather than of any special policy or design. This past history has elevated thriftiness to the level of a working principle. We have given splendid value for every dollar received, and I for one pray that this sense of thrift will long remain with us.

It is important, however, to distinguish true thrift from false economy, and this must concern us deeply when we consider the salaries of the teaching staff. Academic salaries have for many years lagged behind those of the general community. The quality of the University is merely a reflection of the quality of the academic staff. To hold the present staff and to secure good additional staff is the first duty of the President, and in order to enable him to do this better, we have recently established a new, substantially higher scale of academic salaries. Expenditures on account of salaries in 1957 will be over $7,000,000.

Expansion of the University, prudent and carefully controlled though it must be, will bring with it considerable increases in current expenditures, of which the increased staff salaries are the foremost example. Governments, both provincial and federal, have increased their grants to a marked degree. It may be necessary to increase the students' fees, though any benefit to be found there could easily be offset by the loss

of brilliant student material which higher fees might exclude from the University. The indications are that we must lean more and more on the modern patron of the universities—the taxpayer.

At the same time, the demands for capital expenditure will be greatly augmented, and the question that concerns us particularly at this moment is where we shall seek the monies for this capital programme. Government assistance alone would be insufficient. The generous private donor, whose gifts have done so much for us in the past, is becoming, for reasons we all understand, rarer and rarer. We shall need, in addition, the help of industry, of the graduate body, and of the general public.

In seeking public support, this University appears to labour under the very serious handicap of being regarded in some quarters as a state university, tax supported, and therefore in no dire need. In reality, our objectives and our position are not a whit different from those of the other Canadian universities except in scale and potential.

There is a widespread feeling that the University is idle for five or six months each year, and that the staff enjoy a long and carefree holiday. Many suggest that the term could be lengthened by a month or two. Indeed, there are some who think the University staff could well teach eleven months in every year, thus apparently doubling the output of the University. This hopelessly unrealistic view is based on a complete misunderstanding of how the University functions. It is absolutely necessary for the staff to have time for attendance at meetings, writing and research, if they are to continue to be good teachers.

When the expansion is upon us we must be prepared to accept drastic changes in many of our established customs. We may well have to adapt old existing buildings. New buildings must be less costly than many of the present ones. Indeed, such buildings as are now in the planning stage are designed to combine the efficiency of factory buildings with some improvement in appearance. The spacious dignity of Oxford and Cambridge colleges is simply out of our reach. More effective use must be made of our facilities. In the past, our buildings have, in a sense, belonged to a particular faculty or department. In future there will be a more common and more constant use of these traditionally private lecture rooms, laboratories, and auditoriums. Many plans are under way to improve substantially the utilization of our facilities, and more will be heard of these in the days to come.

With every measure of economy that we can devise, the cost of expansion will still be heavy. I have said, and I am convinced, that we must

look for money in several directions. We could ask the government to pay for it all; but in the first place it is highly unlikely that they would do so; and in the second place it would be a very dangerous action for the present Board of Governors to impose upon a historically independent university a legacy of complete dependence on the government of the day. The financing of universities by the state creates unique problems. Despite our happy circumstances here, it would be folly to ignore the possibility of the state's seeking to follow its money and exert influence upon the teaching in the University. It has happened before; indeed, it appears to be happening today in South Africa. Academic freedom is vital to the life of any university, and we must be concerned with anything that appears to threaten it. On the other hand, to refuse state support altogether would mean, under today's conditions, the disappearance of the University. There are many who would prefer to be a live mouse rather than a dead lion. We have to attempt to be a live lion.

The best guarantee against undesirable government interference is to be found in the existence of a wide constituency of loyal graduates interested in the University. Although we have some 69,000 living graduates, it is recognized that much remains to be done to awaken them to the necessity of taking an increased interest in the welfare of their Alma Mater. There is an obvious need to improve our communications with our graduates, as well as with business (whose need for future graduates involves a vital interest in the health of the University), and with the public generally.

University administration is, to some extent, a routine task. It is, however, a task of some magnitude. It carries the responsibility for supervising and controlling the disbursement of some $20,000,000 in academic and non-academic expenditures during each year. It is not an end in itself. It exists only to service and support the academic undertakings. The Board must make the final decisions; they must face the fact that there will never be enough money to give every academic division everything that is needed. After getting the best advice and considering as wisely as they are able, they must be the final arbiter of financial questions—they are the ones who must say Yes, or Partly, or Perhaps, or No.

The view of the future, as I see it from the Board Room window, is full of interest and challenge. While there is now wide agreement as to the general direction of our road, there will be many differences of opinion and much debate on matters of detail.

The Value of the Humanities — *M. St.A. Woodside*

It is comforting for a humanist to reflect upon the well-known words of John Wilson, alias Christopher North, "Animosities are mortal, but the Humanities live forever." A few extremists may urge that there is more of the darkness of night than of the warmth of Ambrose's tavern in the remark, but humanists who have had experience of concentrated attacks on certain areas of their domain will cling to the promise of a day when hostility will vanish and the value of the Humanities will not be questioned. The immortality claimed for the Humanities in *Noctes Ambrosianae* is not open to doubt unless human nature suffers in the future a change such as has not occurred during the centuries of evolution and revolution known to history. It is perhaps safe to assume that until such a radical change does occur, men and women will find their understanding widened and their spirit deepened by Aeschylus, Shakespeare, and Goethe, by Rembrandt and Beethoven; they will reflect upon the meaning of "right" and of "good," of "freedom" and of "truth," and will profit by the reflections of the truly great thinkers of the past and present; they will be intrigued by the processes which have led to social success and failure, to the development of "higher religions," and to the building of the imposing structure of modern science both in its pure and in its applied aspects. Even in the mid-twentieth century, when shorter working hours and rapidity of transportation and communication seem to have had the effect of setting a high premium on leisure, serious novels are published; great playwrights, including Shakespeare and Sophocles, enjoy success; Toynbee's *Study of History* is not only talked about but read; and the philosophers are regarded as worthy companions, especially if one is formally introduced to them by a Will Durant or some other mutual friend. Admittedly it is a minority which displays this interest in the Humanities. Figures are not available, and probably never will be available, to show whether the minority is, proportionately, shrinking or growing; indeed, it is impossible to *measure* the extent, in breadth and

depth, of interest in the Humanities. It is reasonable to assert, however, that they still have a very significant place in "our way of life" and that their immortality is not as yet in jeopardy.

What, then, of the "plight of the Humanities"? What is the meaning of the phrase which has, at least until very recently, been almost a *cliché* in discussions about education and about culture generally? It is true that society through various agencies has been willing to provide funds for scientific study and research on a comparatively large scale and that increasingly large numbers of students have been adopting science as their field of study. It is true, also, that today everyone is aware of the critical shortage of teachers of science and not nearly so conscious of the growing shortage in other disciplines. The present situation might well have been foreseen by a moderately gifted prophet. The exhilarating progress of science and the exciting opportunities for scientists have naturally attracted young men and women. A society which is more and more supported by science must stimulate the production of scientists and the development of science. The magnitude of the need and the tremendous speed with which it has grown have naturally created shortages. It would, of course, be quite wrong to assert that a mathematician or a chemist or an engineer or an economic theorist who has received no formal courses in humanistic disciplines at school or university will normally be devoid of any real interest in the Humanities or of any true concern for what they stand for. The bridge-building barbarian and the illiterate industrialist are, it would seem, rare creatures in 1957. The danger is, to put it in extreme terms, that outside pressures, created by a desire for immediate returns, may deprive the student of an opportunity to realize the humanistic interests which he possesses, at least potentially, may cause him to stifle such interests as they begin to develop, and may encourage him to regard any exploitation of such interests as of third-rate importance. Whether or not this now hypothetical danger is to become real depends first on the demands which the Humanities are to be allowed to make on a student's time and energy while he is being educated, and second, on the kind of education which that area of society in which he is to find employment and live his life is to demand of him. Unless these demands are sound, our society takes the risk of cutting itself off from its roots and from any understanding of human values. It thus takes the risk of commiting suicide. An attempt is made in part II which follows to analyse some important aspects of the Humanities; and in part III, to suggest the significance of the Humanities for the modern business world.

II

So much has been written and spoken about the Humanities that it is rash in the extreme to believe that something new and fresh and significant can be said of them. Nevertheless anyone who has the hardihood to essay the almost impossible task must begin by providing some kind of definition or description. The word "Humanities" itself (going back to the Latin "humanitas") has had so long a history, and has been used to convey so many meanings, that no single definition would be universally acceptable. Consequently, for the sake of clarity, anyone who uses the term in debate must state as convincingly as possible the meaning which is attached to it.

Exactly what Cicero himself meant by "humanitas" is not yet clear and perhaps for present purposes it does not matter much. Only a thoroughly convinced humanist would accept the light from so remote a past as an illumination of present discussion. The humanistic movement of the fifteenth century (in Western Europe) "broke through the mediaeval traditions of scholastic theology and philosophy and devoted itself exclusively to the rediscovery and direct study of the ancient classics. This movement was essentially a revolt against intellectual, and especially ecclesiastical, authority and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual, scientific or social." Any physical or social scientist who will accept a judgment embedded in an unsigned article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* will recognize that, historically, it was the humanists who gave him his freedom. At the same time it should be noted that scholastic philosophy and religion (or at any rate the history of religion) are now accepted as component parts of the "Humanities." Somewhat later, in the Battle of the Books, there was a struggle between the ancient classics, that is, the Humanities *par excellence*, and modern works written in vernacular languages. That struggle has ended and both ancient and modern books will be found without distinction in the libraries of undoubted humanists. These two examples —and that is all they are—taken from the history of the "Humanities" will serve to indicate that the Humanities do not represent a body of fixed and unchanging dogma. On the contrary, it is characteristic of them not to be restricted by "laws." They have had the capacity to grow as society and its interests have grown and to develop both by absorbing old enemies and by accepting antagonists as allies. Rightly considered, they are dynamic rather than static, and accretive rather than exclusive. The Greek and Latin classics still belong to the Humanities, but a

Renaissance humanist would be surprised, and perhaps shocked, to discover how much else has been added to their strength.

It is perhaps true to say that one of the causes, or indeed the main cause, of the flexibility and "progressiveness" which mark the Humanities properly considered is the fact that the disciplines which are grouped under the broad term are largely subjective. In the realm of the Humanities subjectivity is paradoxically the glory and strength of the student and at the same time his weakness. It is not his purpose to arrive at "laws," convenient though it may be from time to time to use the term, but to produce judgments based on rational arguments. He must strive, therefore, to beware of any perversion of his argument and of any warping of his judgment by personal idiosyncrasies. At the same time he must recognize that he lacks and probably always will lack the means of the scientist to make accurate measurements and to test hypotheses experimentally. Ultimately he must depend upon himself, with such help as he can obtain from colleagues—that is, from others interested in the same subject-matter—and even when help is provided by colleagues, he alone can judge the validity of what they are able to offer. The "research team," whatever success it may or may not have had in other areas, can produce only limited results in humanistic investigation. This is true of literature, philosophy, and history in all its branches. To take history as a specific example, there is no set of purely objective facts which the student may and must accept. All that exists is "historical evidence," the marks on paper or stone or canvas, the objects, and the oral tradition which the past has left behind. The historian does the best he can with the evidence, but all he can do is to provide others with his inevitably subjective experience in studying this fragmentary and principally dumb material. Consequently, the serious reader of history cannot, if he is wise, accept uncritically and make his own, for example, the judgment, "Napoleon was a blight on Europe," just because an historian of note has made it. He must come to his own conclusion by whatever routes are available to him. Similarly, although religion and philosophy may give invaluable stimulus, each human individual must reach his own explanation of "right" and "wrong." The subjectivity of the Humanities has two important results. First, it ensures the timelessness of the great humanistic productions. The scientist cannot profit scientifically by studying Greek science of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. because science has objective standards and the science of that age is out of date. But Thucydides and Shakespeare and Kant are not out of date because in their works the perennial problems of human beings are

analysed by men of outstanding genius and, in the cases of Thucydides and Shakespeare, with consummate art. The problems attacked by science can be solved with at least some measure of finality; the large problems in which humanists as such are interested have not yet been solved except in so far as individuals have solved them for themselves, but they have been clearly established and brilliantly attacked by a succession of great and lucid minds. And second, the student of the Humanities, whether professional or not, will, unless he is totally cut off from the contemporary world, reflect in his interests and in his choice of subject-matter the interests of his age. Thus the specific subject-matter adopted by the humanist changes from age to age. Examples are not far to seek. The Humanities today include the literatures, history, and philosophies of the Middle and Far East; the history and philosophy of science are investigated; the original humanists, the classicists, are studying the economic life of the ancient world for the first time.

How is it possible accurately to define or describe this flexible and apparently almost elusive group of disciplines? One must resort to qualification and ultimately to arbitrariness. "All recorded signs of what man has found in himself and in the world about him are brought within the disciplines of the Humanities to be given form by scholars and teachers for use by all men in present and in future times," writes David H. Stevens in *The Changing Humanities*. This able definition (or description) would seem to include among the Humanities science, mathematics, and the social sciences, and even, from the other pole, quackery and superstition. In limited measure its inclusiveness is quite proper. "The Humanities deal with *all* those aspects and achievements of man which make him man as distinguished from the animals or from God." In the "Report of a Special Committee on the Humanities Appointed by the President of the University of Toronto" (1954) this point is developed: the Humanities "rightly involve the study of man's environment for man cannot be divorced from his physical, social and spiritual surroundings. But the emphasis is laid upon man rather than upon the environment. Man is at the centre; the environment is his setting, his challenge, his stimulus, one of his problems." If man, reacting to the challenge of his environment, develops science or theology or a complicated social and economic structure or even superstition, the humanist must be interested in the process. In modern academic terms, the history of science and of religion, economic history and social history, the history of alchemy and of witchcraft belong to the Humanities, while science, theology, economics, and witchcraft, purely considered, do not.

As has been suggested above, it is difficult to draw a definite boundary line. Part of the difficulty is due to the fact that most, if not all, scientists, social scientists, and applied scientists are humanists as well as scientists, whether or not they have "taken courses" in humanistic subjects, and that it is practically impossible to divide their activities as scientists and as humanists into water-tight compartments. (The same may, of course, be said of men in walks of life other than the sciences, but the common academic divisions of Science, Social Science, and Humanities are at present convenient.) This blurring of boundaries extends to disciplines as well as to individuals. Anthropology, political science, and sociology, all social sciences, are in some aspects closely akin to history, a humanity; while political science in its theoretical aspects is essentially philosophy. History itself is sometimes numbered among the Humanities, sometimes among the Social Sciences. However, as the "Report" says, "All the sciences are neutral with regard to values. Judgments on values are characteristic of the Humanities." The sciences limit themselves to saying, "This is so." The Humanities freely say, "This is good"; or "This is ugly." It is sometimes urged that the sciences are vitally concerned with one value, namely truth. But truth is the guiding star of all disciplines, subjective or objective. Without it there would be no disciplines. All disciplines live in the atmosphere of truth. And it is a special task of philosophy, one of the Humanities, to examine the nature of truth itself. It is possible to go further and point out that certain subjects of study commonly included among the Humanities have no real affinities with them. Some aspects of pure linguistic study do not seem properly to belong. Textual criticism, epigraphy, and papyrology in certain of their phases seem remote. They are all valid forms of scholarly activity, but humanities only in so far as they serve the needs of the humanist proper.

The disciplines which will be assigned by present arbitrary disposal to the Humanities are undoubtedly already apparent: Language as a medium of human communication and expression, Literature, Art and Music, Philosophy, History, including the history of science, the history of art, the history of religion, and economic history. They are all somehow concerned with man's inner needs, his problems, his aspirations, his successes, and his failures; in short, with the amazingly incalculable human spirit. At their best, within the area which is theirs, they offer a broadening of the understanding and a fortification of the spirit.

Are they always at their best? It would be odd if they were because they are of necessity in the charge of men and women and live only within the confines of human minds. One fancies that the prestige and

the usefulness of the Humanities have often suffered through wilful or careless mistreatment which makes the Humanities appear to be other than they are. Three examples may be cited, one from each of three levels in our educational system.

(*a*) The Greek and Latin classics, and the languages in which they are written, have borne the brunt of most attacks based on the alleged uselessness of the Humanities. The correct defence is that the Greek and Roman civilization produced a body of humanistic literature second to none in quantity and quality and superior to most, and that the men of genius who created this literature discussed with clarity, and often with great art, every major human problem. The Greek and Latin languages are studied to give us access to this magnificent literature; translations are a poor second best because the process of translation at its most skilful replaces the art of the author by the quite different art of the translator, destroys the flavour of the original, and often reduces its delicate precision. (The age of electronics promises us translating-machines. Whatever machines may do for a technical article on physics, one shudders to think of the murder they would commit on a speech by Thucydides or an ode of Horace.) The defence established, another attack is delivered. "High school students are unable to read Greek and Latin fluently enough for the classics when they leave school; they never really gain access to this wonderful body of literature; their time has been wasted." The defenders of the garrison are dismayed by this counter-attack. Instead of saying, "We have given the rudiments of the subject to these students; they are capable, if they have the will and the taste, of pursuing these studies further, either formally or informally, and of shortly entering the realm to which we have given them the passport," they take refuge in what are for the public unconvincing arguments. Latin and Greek improve one's English. Latin and Greek help one to understand words. Latin and Greek have a beneficial effect on one's logical processes. It is perfectly true that a study of Latin and Greek can have these effects. But they are *by-products*, not the reason for a study of Latin and Greek, and the public is thoroughly aware of it. Unfortunately for the classicists the public does not attack, for example, Mathematics in the same way although Mathematics is equally vulnerable. The present writer never *used* his Grade XIII Mathematics until his son encountered minor mathematical difficulties at high school. He enjoyed it for what it was to him, profited by the by-products, and rejoiced that he had proceeded a short distance to a kingdom which he would probably never enter. The public is inconsistent. Mathematics,

it says, is useful and Classics is not. But it has jockeyed the classicists into a position where they are obliged to stress the *minutiae* of language, to fix their eyes on the means rather than the end. The universities share a measure of blame with the public. They naturally expect that students from the schools who propose to embark on a formal study of Greek and Latin literature should have done a great deal of the donkey-work in grammar and vocabulary before they reach the universities. For the sake of the few who do proceed formally with classical studies, their influence, gentle though it may be, forces the majority to accept a means as an end. Is it not possible, within four or five years, to come closer to providing a high-school student with a *reading* knowledge of Latin and Greek and at the same time to introduce him to a great humanistic document in its entirety—the *Iliad*, for example, or the *Aeneid*? If I were an employer and were obliged to make a highly difficult choice, I would be inclined to accept an applicant who had an understanding of the *Odyssey* as a whole rather than one who had read Book IX in Greek, could transpose all the queer Homeric forms into their Attic counterparts, and had never heard of the remaining twenty-three books. Fortunately it is at least possible that such a choice may be avoided. With encouragement from the universities and from society, a high-school student might at the same time be given a start on a reading knowledge of Latin, devoid of any major claim to philological erudition, and at the same time an appreciation appropriate to an adolescent (and that is high appreciation: the writer has over a period of nearly thirty years read the *Odyssey* in Butcher and Lang's or E. V. Rieu's translation to a large number of boys and girls varying in age from seven to fourteen years, including his own hypercritical sons; the enthusiasm and appreciation have been extraordinary) of at least one great humanistic document created by the Greeks and Romans. To be fair to the universities it must be stated that their undergraduate departments are also under pressure. A. N. Whitehead has somewhere said that classical teaching "is obsessed with the formation of finished classical scholars." In some measure the classicists have forgotten the Bachelor of Arts who proposes to invest his life in commerce or one of the learned professions exclusive of teaching, and have used as a criterion in establishing courses of study, the demands of faculties of graduate studies.

(*b*) English Language and Literature is taken as the second example, this time of the undergraduate level. In the professional faculties of many universities, English Literature (with or without Composition) is accepted as a required discipline. The humanist's heart is encouraged

and he lifts up his downcast eyes. However, if he discreetly probes within a given faculty, he may discover, at least from some members, that Chaucer and Milton and Shaw (Shakespeare enjoying immunity from criticism by virtue of extraordinary prestige) are not really what is desired. The essays of Bacon and Hazlitt are not much better. "English" has been included in the curriculum because students are unable to write cogent and well-organized reports. But Milton and Hazlitt are so remote from modern speech and their subject-matter is so unattractive that they are not really practical. The social sciences are in the same case. Psychology, or a short course therein, is included because professional people usually have dealings with human beings; political science, because professional people often come in contact with government. What seems to be required is not wisdom or depth of understanding or an illumination of the soul, but a kind of technical proficiency. This is not too bad if in fact the great pieces of English literature are used as the means to the end because in this case the means may, with skilful treatment, become the end. But there is evidence enough to show that often humane studies are regarded as technical training. Try to persuade the members of a professional faculty to accept, let us say, the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus, an incredibly great trilogy of tragedies, as a course for their students and the exact meaning of the present argument will probably become apparent.

(*c*) The final example is taken from the high level of postgraduate teaching and research. A discipline with widespread boundaries, especially in an age of expanding scholarship, is characterized by specialization, and specialization has been carried to the usual length in the Humanities. For example, each of the Cambridge *Histories*, which form one of the great monuments of modern scholarship, is not really a *history* at all, but a collection of monographs by specialists arranged chronologically and bound together in a number of volumes. In the universities there is pressure on professors to publish, and on graduate students to write Ph.D. theses. The result has been a tendency to look for raw material which has not been exploited and to work up small portions of it for publication. This is not improper activity and, given existing circumstances, it is almost inevitable. Theoretically, great works of synthesis will appear from time to time and the relevance of the short articles on comparatively small points will be made plain. Works of synthesis, however, are rare. And the interested and intelligent layman conceives the opinion that professional humanists are more interested in what has not

been done than in what ought to be done, and can be done with humanistic profit. The interpretation of a chorus by Sophocles surely has more relevance, humanistically speaking, than the elucidation of a fragmentary commercial contract on papyrus from an Egyptian rubbish heap. In fact both kinds of investigation should be undertaken. A quick survey of the learned journals devoted to the Humanities will suggest that much more time and energy is being given to individual leaves on individual branches than to the trees or to the forest itself.

The criticism of the Humanities in practice, offered above, should not mislead the reader into a belief that the present writer doubts their great value. If he were entering the University again, he would again elect the study of the Humanities and more specifically, the study of the Greek and Latin classics. The criticism is that of a husband who regards his wife as the most wonderful of God's creations and who criticizes her choice in hats and dresses, not because they make her any less wonderful in fact, but because they give the public the impression that she is not as wonderful as she really is.

III

One of the important facts about the twentieth century is that within its first fifty years the businessman, in the widest meaning of the term, has become the heir of all ancient aristocracies, challenged for pride of place only by the professional athlete and the professional entertainer, and challenged by them only in very small degree. Within his own community, whether it be small or large, he is at once the prop and stay of almost everything, and the leader in almost every worthy enterprise. National governments and international organizations seek his advice and his support. He is the modern patron of art, music, and the drama. Without him scientific research would languish. And in addition to all this, the physical and social welfare of millions of individual human beings depends on his knowledge, his wisdom, and his judgment. Whether or not he has sought it, history has assigned to him a role of tremendous responsibility. Every thinking member of society is vitally interested in the capacities of the businessman and the means by which his capacities have been developed.

Nobody would deny in A.D. 1957 that an educated man should have at least some understanding of the methods and principles and limitations of the Sciences and of the Social Sciences. A senior officer of a large Canadian corporation recently suggested publicly that it is just as im-

portant for a cultivated man to have some knowledge of the working of a modern joint-stock company as of the Greek city-state. With this no true humanist would disagree. But whereas it is customary to accept, as important, the claims of physics or economics on the attention of the would-be educated man, it is not unusual to hear the claims of literature and philosophy denied. Is there any justifiable place, in the education of the businessman, for the subjects termed "Humanities"?

A businessman is, in addition to being an executive officer, or a manager, or a promoter, or anything else, a human being, and as such he is the victim or the product of essentially human needs and aspirations. He is not a hermit. On the contrary he is in hourly contact with colleagues, assistants, technical experts, foremen, employees, and secretaries, each of whom is, at least in theory, *homo sapiens*, even before he is *homo mechanicus*, *homo economicus*, or *homo quidlibet*, and each of whom has the same human needs and aspirations as the businessman *par excellence*. Can it be said that a knowledge and understanding of needs, aspirations, and values are unimportant or impractical? Is it possible to delegate such knowledge and understanding to personnel officers and public relations experts without loss? The great difficulty, of course, is that it is absolutely impossible to measure, even in rough terms, the advantage accruing to a businessman through a grasp of the Humanities, to compute the value of self-knowledge, of knowledge of the common measure of all human beings.

In recent times university placement officers and others have reported a desire on the part of commerce and industry to recruit university graduates with a "general degree" and have hinted that there is a demand for men and women with a broad educational background. Since businessmen have apparently adopted this attitude themselves, it is doubtless derived from experience, and one guesses that it is in some measure a recognition of the desirability of a basic education which can be valid in a variety of specific situations. There is here no suggestion at all that disciplines other than the Humanities are not broad and basic. Economics and political science, for example, can be broad and basic, whereas specific training for one kind of commerce or industry is not and tends towards technical training. The contention is that the Humanities rightly regarded and rightly pursued can produce a flexibility of mind and an understanding which should enable an individual, even when he has only himself to depend on, to attack a problem involving human beings in a reasonably effective manner.

At the moment there is serious apprehension that we shall be unable

to defend our "way of life" against an attack of some kind supported by the growing scientific and technological proficiency of others who do not accept this way. Apprehension leads to a profound worry that our scientific and technological growth is lagging behind that of our opponents and from time to time one can detect in some quarters a disposition somehow to channel our human resources into applied science and technology and if necessary to sacrifice study in other areas. What is this "way of life" which is so precious? It is a complex tangle of values resulting from a long and complicated historical process. It is easy to make phrases about it and to juggle the *clichés*. All known disciplines are required for a full and clear understanding of it, but without the humanistic disciplines success is impossible. The very terms "democracy" and "freedom" admit of no simple definition or description; what the terms stand for must be earned daily by the fortunate possessors, and can be effectively defended, without grave damage to themselves, only by those who understand them. Is there any profit in trying to protect our "way of life" if the means which we adopt bring it into jeopardy? We must try to understand ourselves. Furthermore, we must try to understand others. The well-advertised shrinking of the world has brought us into close contact with millions of fellow-humans whose "way of life" is not ours and who look upon us with suspicion occasionally tinged with jealousy of our material (not our spiritual) resources. They are potentially our collaborators in the construction of a finer world society; they are also potentially our enemies. Our great weakness is an almost total lack of understanding of them and their values. We cannot speak their language either literally or figuratively. There is no short-cut to this priceless understanding. The peoples of Southeast Asia, or of the Middle East, or of the Slavic-speaking world are beyond the reach of our understanding until we understand their literatures, their history, and their philosophies. This is one of the large modern tasks of the Humanities, and it is one in which the businessman as well as all other members of our Western community must participate in some measure. Success will be good for business; it will also be good for human society. Eventually we will learn, perhaps painfully, that friendship cannot be bought. It is won, and it is won by friendly understanding.

It is hoped that for their own sake, as well as for that of the community which they lead, the new aristocrats—the businessmen—will be able, while of necessity keeping an eye on present problems, to take the responsibility of adopting a long view. *Quidquid agas, prudenter agas et respice finem.*

Universities and the Making of Businessmen

Sir Arnold Plant

Universities are the home of vocational education. Throughout the greater part of their history, the task of the most ancient of them was to educate men for the ecclesiastical profession, including the public and civil offices to which clerics then expected as of right to be nominated. I recall the impression made upon me by a passage in a paper delivered in 1921 by the late Sir William Ashley, then Professor of Commerce and Vice-Principal of the University of Birmingham, to the Second Conference of Universities of the Empire assembled at Oxford. "It may be doubted," he said, "whether general mental culture was ever maintained to be the prime *raison d'être* of a university until Oxford and Cambridge, some sixty or seventy years ago, began to acquire a body of resident lay tutors. In encouraging what we may even call 'vocational' studies, the modern university is but reverting to its age-long traditions." As I had myself a year earlier interrupted (as I then imagined) my career as a business manager to study at a university in preparation for more responsible administrative work, it was reassuring to learn that in preferring the economics and commerce degree curricula at London to the best alternatives which, as it seemed to my untutored mind, the older universities then had to offer, I had probably chosen even better than I knew. I was already finding my capacities more than sufficiently extended by my studies and the calls of student life in London. Vocational subjects directly and obviously appropriate to a business career were handled in a way which developed and exercised the reasoning faculty, providing the mental discipline and mental enlargement which merits the name of a university education.

So at any rate it has seemed to me. I cannot of course know whether the path I chose was in fact the best then open to me. I know only that

I went through the anxieties of mental torment. The process is familiar enough to those who have been privileged to pursue any well-organized course of study in one of the real universities of the world. I remember first one's consternation at being unable to see that intellectual problems and difficulties existed which clearly worried fellow students and teachers whom one had already learned to respect. Then came the flash of realization, the effort to define a problem, once perceived, in terms which pinned it down, and the baffling failure to find a satisfying path towards its solution. Occasionally there followed the infuriating assistance from a book or a teacher which revealed one's stupidity. More often than not the chase had to be adjourned at the stage when one knew little more than what were the fallacious or sterile approaches to the solution, and realized that a great deal more reading, research, and reflection had to be undertaken before one could hope to make a confident step forward. My vocational course of study was exquisite torture, culminating in a self-imposed life sentence of hard intellectual labour.

The fact that the development of new specialist schools of learning in response to changing social and industrial needs came more quickly in England in the universities of the metropolis and the growing provincial centres than in the older universities was due at least as much to their special interest in opportunist experimentation as to any sure conviction that what they proposed to offer was intellectually more suitable for the more able students or more satisfying to every teacher. After all, the newer universities had of necessity in the early stages of their development to attract their own teachers from the ancient centres, and these men knew that a curriculum which failed to impart a general mental culture had no place in a university. The older universities continued to develop their schools and triposes along the old and well-tested lines which most surely achieved that main purpose. The college fellows concentrated on teaching what they understood, building on the subjects traditionally taught in the famous schools from which they themselves were largely drawn and to which they looked for their most typical students. It was a self-perpetuating sequence in which the art of thought was transmitted by scholar-teachers to scholar-pupils, some of who hoped to remain as teachers, or at worst to become teachers elsewhere. The rest went out into a somewhat remote and strange world to apply their trained minds to mundane affairs, confident if they were good scholars that, like lawyers who accept briefs relating to intricate

patent litigation, they could quickly call for, assemble, and master the significant data and apprehend and apply the basic principles of the relevant technologies to any problem that came to hand.

To such scholars at the older universities a century ago, and indeed more recently, suggestions that they should extend their teaching interests to the creation of new "subjects," catering even in a tentative and experimental way for the emergent needs of the new applied sciences and technologies, or for the specialist applications of formal logic and philosophical reasoning in the field of economic analysis and the social sciences, were entertained with caution. A Greats teacher might find it a diverting intellectual exercise to write a paper or a treatise on the principles of political economy, a mathematician might amuse himself on an excursion into the less precise field of statistical probability, a natural scientist into bio-chemistry or strength of materials, and so on. The announcement of a course of special lectures, perhaps in a university extension programme, would provide the necessary stimulus to writing and the opportunity to try out a manuscript before publication. A specialist course of lectures which aroused sufficient interest among the student body and controversy between dons might be repeated with appropriate embellishments. But the young ambitious Fellow who wished to concentrate on developing a new "subject" in his college and university would have to weigh the odds very carefully. He would have to turn aside from one of the main streams of scholarly interest and support: his college might object to his withdrawal from traditional teaching duties. He might negotiate an outside endowment to finance a special post, in the hope that the university authority could be prevailed upon to accept it and that he himself might be so fortunate in due course as to be elected to occupy it. He could then specialize in his research; but to be sure of good students, he would need to get the new subject recognized by the university for inclusion as an optional paper in a traditional degree examination, and if the new field of learning was capable of being adequately developed by nothing less than a group of specialized subjects comprising an entirely new degree school or tripos he might well find himself engaged in a life-long and fierce intellectual controversy at the highest level of university politics.

To ambitious young specialist dons, the developing new universities offered a welcome short-cut to the life of specialized research and teaching which they sought. They hoped to take with them the aims and ideals but not the shackles of the traditions in which they had been nurtured, and the governing bodies of the new universities had, as I have

said, their own special reasons for providing the opportunities which the migrant scholars required. The metropolis and the rapidly growing provincial centres of population needed their own university colleges, certainly, to cater in the traditional subjects of higher education for students who, for reasons of intellectual quality or financial circumstance or other limitations which have ceased to be relevant, were unable to gain admission to the older universities. But that in itself offered a not very exciting future. On the other hand, each centre had its own new and clamant needs. The rapid progress of scientific discovery and its exploitation by the new technologies, the industrial revolution, the transport development which extended so rapidly the search for new materials and the demand for competent linguists, the need for more and more specialized staff in expanding business, and social and civil needs for school teachers, doctors, hospital specialists and government officials: these and similar demands presented to the new universities an exciting opportunity for pioneer development accompanied by offers of conditional financial support and special endowment. In response to these frankly utilitarian demands, specialist chairs and lectureships were established, new subjects added to the curricula, and new faculties and degree courses created. Not all of the demands and offers of financial support were of the kind that could properly be entertained by a university, but it is noteworthy that comparatively few mistakes were made, and today there are, I imagine, not many scholars left in the university world who would deny that a curriculum aiming directly at utility in the choice of fields of study can, if the subjects are taught in the right way, provide the general mental discipline and enlargement which it is the purpose of a university to impart to its students.

Today the differences in scope which until recently distinguished the curricula of the older and the newer universities have largely disappeared. As new faculties established their claim to permanence, parallel developments were introduced in their own way by Oxford and Cambridge. For instance, Greats scholars were sent elsewhere to study economics, to teach the subject in Oxford on their return, and the economics school was strengthened by recruitment from the newer universities. Today it is one of the leading centres of economics teaching. Once a wider diversification of intellectual endeavour had been secured, the resistance to innovation was weakened, and there is now a healthy rivalry to introduce new academic disciplines in all centres. It is, however, noteworthy that in neither Oxford nor Cambridge has provision yet been made in the economics faculties for teaching in accounting, a field of

study in which unsettled economic problems of great intellectual interest abound. Statistics as a subject is better served.

II

It is high time that I turned to the place which universities now occupy, and in which as I see it they are destined to play an increasingly important role, in education and training for careers in business.

I am concerned here with those who transact business and manage concerns, in both the private and the public sectors of the economy, and not with the technological staffs employed by business, except in so far as they participate in business administration. As the universities broadened and intensified their research and teaching activities in the natural and applied sciences, engineering, industrial chemistry, and the various fields of technology, they became at once an indispensable, and by and large the main, source from which industry draws the technologists whose specialization stems from a sound education and training in fundamental scientific principles and research. (In this context I ignore the constitutional demarcations which in some parts of Europe allocate these fields of "university" work to Polytechnics, technische Hochschulen, and the like.) Professional institutes also have developed their own systems of examination for membership side by side with, and sometimes in advance of, the universities, but on the whole a close co-operation and collaboration has been maintained. Their activities are complementary and not seriously disturbed by fundamental conflict or controversy.

In the fields of business in which specialization has in practice assumed a professional or quasi-professional character, evolution has followed a somewhat similar pattern. Banking, insurance (particularly in the actuarial and financial fields), accountancy, commercial law, and company secretarial practice are outstanding instances. Encouraged by employers, institutes have been established to develop examination systems leading to special professional qualifications. The provision of education in preparation for examination is not normally, however, among their objects, and in the United Kingdom the universities have not taken the lead in offering comprehensive courses of study designed to cover these professional requirements. That has been for a number of reasons. In the first place, the examinations are designed primarily for persons already in full-time employment, while even the newer universities cater primarily for full-time students. Second, the conditions for membership of the institutes normally require a minimum period of

practical experience in professional duties, if not articled pupilship. Third, the examinations frequently test knowledge of techniques, working rules, and professional practices which, however necessary for practitioners, are not in themselves suitable material on which to organize a course of study which provides a university education. In the result, the great majority of candidates preparing for these examinations have hitherto taken correspondence courses, and the remainder have mostly gone to technical and commercial colleges. The course of events has, however, started a new movement which has already brought the universities and some of these professional bodies into collaboration in ways which will be explained later. The last reason is that until recently the businessmen who employ these professional specialists have not themselves for the most part had personal experience of, or acquaintance with universities and, with some outstanding exceptions, have not expected university graduates as such to be generally employable in their field of business.

Most self-made men are still human, and their complacency easily takes the form of assuming that the way they got on, with little organized education to help them, has much if not everything to be said for it. Early in life they learned the hard way that punctual attendance, short holidays, the cheerful acceptance of menial routine, and the long fatiguing days which made a mockery of leisure hours were the common lot of conscientious young businessmen. They learned later on that, apart from good luck, success depends upon stamina, nerve, and judgment; upon willingness to take big risks, skill in hard-headed buying and selling negotiations, foresight in constructing and equipping production plants, and leadership and human understanding in labour relations. They could hardly be blamed if they imagined that the products of the universities were fastidious young gentlemen, cast in a very different mould and destined by education and training for more sheltered vocations than business management. Certainly many of the sons of self-made men who went to universities preferred afterwards to enter one of the learned professions, rather than their father's or anyone else's business.

During my own adult life two important circumstances have brought about a marked change of attitude in the United Kingdom. One is the proliferation of scholarships and maintenance grants for university students, and the other the Second World War which threw university teachers, businessmen, and civil servants together as never before.

The narrow path from school to university, formerly trodden by the

more fortunate of the exceptionally talented youth of the country, has widened into a broad highway for all who can show reasonable capacity to profit from a university education. In consequence, the former methods of recruitment of staff for business concerns and of entrants into the business professions have become obsolete. The state scholarships and grants for university courses of study skim most of the cream of the schools, and more besides. Hitherto an employer who recruited his junior staff direct from school could normally expect, if his methods of selection were reasonably efficient, to catch in his net a fair cross-section of the country's young people, including a good proportion who were deserving of special encouragement and showed promise of fitness for promotion to maintain the succession of efficient management, even in a rapidly expanding business. Now (to revert to the former metaphor) he is liable by such methods to get mainly skimmed milk. The businessman realizes today that had he been born a generation later he would almost certainly himself have gone to a university, and that unless special steps were taken to make a business career at least as attractive as the others open to university men he would have been lost to the business world. There can no longer be any general expectation of maintaining the present level of managerial ability in the hierarchy of a concern by continuing recruitment through the former channels.

Moreover, the need has changed. The general industrial manager today strives to keep abreast of scientific and technological change, to strengthen by new techniques, wider understanding, and improved communication that morale inside his business on which the high productivity of team work depends, and above all to discern and interpret the rapidly changing pattern of the economic and political framework which determines his access to markets and to productive resources, his receipts and outgoings, his profits and his losses. The young manager of our time requires a much wider and higher attainment in general education than was available to his predecessors if he is to grapple successfully with these new complexities. The universities aim to provide what is wanted, and it is in the universities that the more promising of young people are now being educated. Reluctant to do so though some of them may still be, businessmen today look to the universities for most of their successors, and in the search for the talent and qualities they require they are negotiating as never before with the university authorities and teachers.

The post-war years have been highly propitious for planning a

combined operation, for war experience has made collaboration easier, more agreeable and rewarding. Until war-time duties threw them together, many of the more able and influential men on both sides knew little from personal contact of the calibre of their new associates. The task of mobilizing the war effort of the country fell upon the departments of government. The administrative civil servants, themselves university men, turned for help partly to their university friends and teachers and partly to leading and experienced practical men of affairs who could organize the production and supply arrangements of the country's business. Both sides emerged richer for the experience, each with a far better opinion of members of the other side as persons and a new respect for their callings and aspirations. Since the war, though businessmen and university dons were at first necessarily preoccupied with the task of getting their former places of work into good running order in new and difficult circumstances, contacts have been maintained. They collaborated in the urgent duty of helping returned service-men to settle into their life's work, and they learned much from that rewarding exercise. Continuing governmental calls upon businessmen and their younger colleagues have afforded ample opportunities for maintaining and extending constructive team work.

At a more formal level, the Federation of British Industries, in conjunction with the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals, has promoted in recent years a series of national and regional conferences of industrialists and university men with the express purpose of thinking out the kind of relationships which could best be developed between them in the years to come. These efforts at collaboration have, it is true, borne earlier and better fruit in the context of the education and training of industrial scientists and technologists than in that of making better supply and training arrangements for potential business administrators and department managers. The reason lies in the difference in the nature of the two problems. In the first case, the university product has some immediate and employable utility. In the second, even the best feed-stock must be matured in the right conditions before it has real fitness for purpose, and time and investment alone reveal which of the feed-stock deserves further maturing and which, like some quite respectable and potable wine, is better segregated for earlier consumption at the more modest tables. Where and how the maturing or training process for potential administrators is best arranged is the interesting question.

III

In a paper submitted five years ago to the Nottingham Conference on Industry and the Universities (the report of the Conference was published by the Federation of British Industries), an industrial administrator who was himself a university graduate, Sir Edward Herbert, welcomed happily the fact that the future leaders of industry must largely be drawn from the university students of today. "In these future leaders," he said, "industry will seek a combination of three main categories of ability. The first of these is a man's particular aspect of his firm's business in which he is engaged, so that he may speak, advise and act with genuine authority. . . . It is essential that he shall have studied deeply and successfully during his time at the university. If he has once studied deeply in the early formative years of his life, he has the equipment to do so again. Therefore, I would emphasise the importance of a high academic standard, of a good degree, above all else . . . the tougher and more exact the subject the better." The second ability is to "be able to relate his own specialist function to the conduct of the business as a whole and . . . to keep abreast of current thought in the whole field of management techniques. . . . He must never become so immersed in the problems of his own job, or of his own industry, as to lose sight of the world outside. . . . This capacity to specialise without becoming narrow is always a test of the good administrator." A university course should therefore encourage a man to seek "to extend his awareness of the world in general" and to acquire "some knowledge, at least, of subjects other than its own. . . . Moreover, the student must, somehow, absorb and develop those critical standards of judgement by which he will afterwards avoid magnifying his own personal problems, or the problems which confront him in his job. He will need to learn that men have always been vain, capricious and unwise and that there is nothing in the least surprising in their being so in this twentieth century, however technical, complicated and logical the daily work they do." The task of acquiring perspective can in part be achieved by his cultivating the widest possible range of interests during his time at the university. The third ability required is "that necessary to bear the moral burden of responsibility. He should be ever eager for responsibility and, indeed, somewhat impatient for it . . . he should be prepared in mind and spirit to assume it gladly and without strain. . . . It may be that a man's essential character so governs this question, that his ultimate fitness for responsibility can be revealed only by the long tests of time and opportunity. There are,

however, two things that a university ought to do towards forming a man's character in the right mould: it should be able to foster in him a lasting regard for other human beings; and it should strive to instil in him the conceptions of duty and service."

I make no apology for quoting at some length from this, to me, unexceptionable statement. What guidance does it give on the question of the appropriate curricula and organization for university education?

It is, I believe, important to distinguish two streams of university entrants, both of equally high intellectual calibre and promise. One stream is identified by the fact that the students have all set their minds and ambitions on careers as businessmen. The other is made up of those who wish to pursue a particular academic course of study, but are doubtful or quite undecided as to their ultimate vocation.

Many of the students in the former category will wish, and will be well advised, to select a degree curriculum which is specifically designed to cater on sound academic lines for their special interest. In the United Kingdom, the various universities have by now settled down to a broadly similar pattern of first degree in the faculties concerned at an honours level with the social sciences, although the nomenclature differs—B.Sc.Econ., B.Com.(Birmingham), B.A.(Com.), P.P.E.(Modern Greats), and so on. The London B.Sc.Econ. curriculum is not untypical: a Part I which embraces the four main basic fields of economics, history, politics, and possibly law, followed by Part II in which a student may concentrate on industry and trade, or accounting, or on one of a dozen other fields of academic specialization. The great majority of the students who intend to enter business are eager on graduation to obtain immediate appointments as "management trainees" in businesses large enough to require a steady stream of recruits and consequently to maintain an adequate scheme of all-round initiation followed by assignment to a specialized field. As regards the business professions, such as accounting, reference was made in part II of this paper to a new movement which has brought the universities into collaboration with the professional institutes. Accountants have now found that their former recruitment channels for articled pupils direct from the schools no longer bring forward a sufficient number of youths of the right calibre. On the other hand several of the universities today offer degree courses in which accounting, commercial and company law, and the application of economic principles to business finance are studied as fully developed academic subjects. In consequence university graduates who have specialized in these fields are accepted for practical training for reduced periods of articled service, and

exemptions are granted from appropriate parts of the professional examinations.

The other stream of students falls again into two categories, sufficiently distinct to call for separate consideration. A significant number of them are attracted to the natural sciences and to engineering, and at the outset are undecided whether their ultimate interest will lie in academic research or in industry, and if in industry whether they will prefer research or other professional work on the one hand or works management and general administration on the other. During their university studies, a number of them will be attracted to the more human side of factory or general management. In London, an inter-collegiate arrangement has been made under which undergraduates in the science and engineering faculties may elect in the later stages of their degree course to combine the study of economics, law, accounting, and administration at the London School of Economics with continuing work in their main faculty and college. The scheme has proved attractive and is working well. Graduate students inform me that they have profited by a somewhat similar provision in the University of Toronto.

It is the other branch of the second stream of university students who present the main problem: those who pursue a particular academic course of study for its own sake, and who find more than enough in it to fire their imagination, discipline their minds, and maintain and develop their intellectual vigour and interest. The field of learning may be classics, philosophy, history, philology, a natural science, mathematics, archaeology, or what you will. The university honours graduate has a wider choice of careers open to him, and more understanding of their relative attractions, than the school-leaver, and as likely as not he will begin by being a little fastidious. The timeless quest for truth which, despite the looming spectre of the final examinations, the English university system aims to encourage during the middle period of a first degree course, is a world of intellectual paradise which, once enjoyed, a good scholar may be reluctant to abandon. The mundane discipline of the business life, the constant eye on the clock which efficient team work demands, do not always offer an immediately attractive prospect to the most highly trained intellects. Yet these are the type of leader that modern business needs, and the problems are how to attract them, and how to arrange the transition to the best advantage for both sides.

When this type of graduate considers the sort of life that business has to offer him, he may still be green enough in worldly experience to imagine that academic honours entitle him to privileged treatment, and

the first test will come when he is disillusioned; but he will at least need to be assured that what his education has done to his mind will not have been done in vain. He will need, and expect, proper and efficient training, including the opportunity to learn fairly quickly what the firm does, how it does it, and why it is organized as it is. He will be impatient to know what new things he will need to study, in order to make the most of his opportunity and his training, and he will expect to be given reasonable assistance in going about that study. In short, he will assume that his employers will show an interest in his development and in capturing his interest and loyalty. He must not be allowed to develop a sense of frustration.

A really large concern will have the resources to organize its training with these aims in view, and the top-level positions of great responsibility in which vacancies have to be filled will usually offer a sufficient bait to attract the most ambitious beginner. It will need to offer nothing more than a full opportunity for advancement; and a declared policy of ruthlessly weeding out recruits who, given full opportunity, fail to merit retention and advancement will strengthen the appeal to the really good men, rather than deter them.

On the other hand, many of the best university graduates, whose studies do not happen to have ranged over the fields of economics, the organization of industry, and the specialization of business activity, will rightly hesitate to commit themselves to a business career, or to one type of enterprise rather than another, until they know more about the kind of life businessmen enjoy, the kind of issues and problems which have to be resolved, and the various alternatives offered by different kinds of business. Moreover, the sudden transition from student life to the status of an employee in a firm can be somewhat overwhelming in prospect. Even the good man who has decided to try his luck in business may well prefer to undergo some preliminary special study and training before attaching himself to, and beginning to show his paces in, the trainee group of a particular firm. A transitional university graduate course, designed to present to trained minds a balanced introduction to the various facets of business administration and to tune them up for their new field of activity, can prepare their digestions for the better assimilation of the practical training and experience which follow. The student will join the concern of his choice with greater confidence in the soundness of his decision, and with a clearer understanding of the place which the concern occupies in the general economy.

That, I imagine, is one aspect of the strength of the case for the

graduate schools of business in the universities of the United States of America. It was certainly one of the prime purposes for establishing a generation ago at the London School of Economics in the University of London the graduate course in Business Administration, which extends over one academic year of full-time study, or two years if undertaken as part of the course for a M.Sc.Econ. degree in the special field of business administration. Because the seminar method of discussion, under the chairmanship of senior specialist professors and readers, is mainly employed, with full and continuous organized contribution by the students, the number admitted each year is limited to about twenty-five. In selecting the students, a balance is maintained of scientists, engineers, lawyers, and graduates in the humanities, and of graduates from the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth, Western Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world. Punctuality and regularity of attendance are insisted upon at all meetings. Not all professors conduct their seminars on identical lines; but in a typical case members of the course are trained to come prepared, to define at the outset the eternal questions which have to be given a quick provisional answer, to concentrate their attention on the matters which are relevant to the specific problem under discussion and for the elucidation of which the data have been brought to hand, and to reach their conclusions, subject to the comment and criticism of the instructor, before the seminar breaks up. By the time the course has ended, the participants have gained a fair idea of how business has to be conducted in most of the main types of commercial, financial, and industrial concerns. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, very few of them have difficulty in finding the type of business opening they prefer, and all reports suggest that the same is true of those who come from and return to other parts of the world.

University courses of this character have other advantages. Because of their breadth of scope, they are complementary to the training schemes conducted within even the largest concerns, enabling the firms to concentrate more upon their own special needs. A large team of specialized teachers, experienced in the conduct of seminars, cannot really be assembled and maintained, with full academic freedom and opportunity for individual research, except in the conditions of detachment from special interests which universities and similar institutions provide. For the medium-sized and smaller concerns, which cannot afford to maintain training facilities continuously and with adequate strength, these university graduate courses are a special boon. They supply recruits to meet

sporadic requirements, and the recruits come more widely trained than these concerns could arrange for from their own facilities.

What are the defects in the arrangement? The chief objection raised is that a graduate course of this character should be preceded by a period of practical experience. The suggestion has indeed been made that business concerns should organize their management-trainee schemes to extend over three years, the first to be devoted to giving the new graduate an over-all view of the activities of the business, the second to be spent in the university graduate school, and the third in further specialist training in the business in the field which the concern and the trainee agree is the most appropriate for his subsequent first period of responsible employment. The idea is excellent, and no university which maintains a graduate course would do other than welcome students who entered on such a basis. So far, however, it has not materialized. The difficulty is partly financial: the concern would have to pay the cost of maintaining the student attending the university course, with no guarantee that he would subsequently stay with them. Moreover, in conditions of full employment, concerns are short of staff, and do not look with favour on more prolonged periods of preliminary training. The best is the enemy of the good, and in prevailing conditions firms are so anxious to secure as many good men as they can that they are prepared to dispense with preliminary training altogether, and offer attractive starting salaries to new graduates. In special cases where the financial difficulty has been overcome by other means, the idea of preceding the year's attendance at a graduate course by a year's practical training has worked well. A good example is the Athlone Fellowship scheme under which Canadian engineering graduates spend two years in the United Kingdom. A number of these graduates have devoted the first year of their Fellowship to a course of training in an English factory and have followed it by full-time attendance in the graduate course in Business Administration at the London School of Economics. Several Toronto engineers have chosen to do this in recent years, and have then returned to Canada to enter manufacturing concerns.

Another objection to the timing of graduate courses is that they would be far more beneficial if the conditions of admission required *several years* of approved practical experience subsequent to graduation, so that the course could be designed to meet the needs of business executives with a background of really responsible administrative experience. Once again this is an excellent theory, but it rarely becomes practice and is

unlikely to do so quickly on a significant scale. Not many concerns are likely to be prepared to second a really valuable executive for as long a period as a year, nor will the average executive respond eagerly to a suggestion that he should absent himself for so long, for fear of finding on his return that the concern has managed successfully without him and is somewhat embarrassed by the problem of arranging for his immediate reinstatement on terms satisfactory to both parties. Shorter courses are limited in scope and character in order to serve very different purposes.

A final criticism of graduate courses of the type I have described is their small output. If they are to maintain the quality of their service, the students are inevitably limited in each course to the number who can be brought individually and continuously into personal contact with senior specialist teachers in group discussions. By the adoption of other methods of teaching, involving mass lecture courses by the professors, supplemented by small-group tuition by numbers of junior instructors, far larger numbers could be accommodated, but the results would not be the same. These graduate courses depend for their success on teachers with a rare combination of knowledge, experience, and specialist teaching ability. In London the fact that the course is conducted in the London School of Economics, by teachers drawn from many large specialist departments of the social sciences, is mainly responsible for the success it has had, but nevertheless the expansion of its scale of operation is prevented by the lack of staff. Similar courses elsewhere will also continue to be confined to large university centres which can attract and afford the many specialists required.

The universities are under pressure to shorten their courses, and in particular to offer short vacation schools for the employees of firms seconded for the purpose. Such arrangements can clearly meet various needs: a weekend, a full week, a month can all be put to profitable use, but the provision of a graduate course conceived on the lines of that offered in London is not one of them. It is to be hoped that the pressure to attempt to do so will be resisted. If short-cuts of that kind could produce the same results, these obvious expedients would have been adopted long ago. And there is a further important consideration, the force of which is not so generally appreciated. University teachers have other uses to which to put their vacations. They need themselves to concentrate on the five R's, rehabilitation, reflection, research, relaxation, and, if time and strength permit, a little recreation.

Education for Business

Stanley F. Teele
John F. Chapman

The wave of economic and social change that has swept the United States and much of the world since World War II has already made it clear that the practice of management, if it is to be effectively carried on in the years ahead of us, is bound to undergo profound alteration. The explosive growth of population with its dramatic repercussions on our way of living, the breathtaking speed and scope of technological change, and now the inevitable swing to automation with all of its complex requirements for precise, long-range planning: these demand of tomorrow's executive a different type of background and skills than those to which we are accustomed. But what kind of background? And what skills? Who is prepared now to write the job description for the president of a steel mill in 1975? Or for the marketing director of a shoe factory? What will he need to know? What will he need to be able to do? What new concepts must he have in order to grasp the vastly enlarged scope of his business?

No one, either in the academic or in the business world, has precise answers to these questions yet, but the acute awareness of the problem in recent years is responsible for the feverish attention paid to the subject. Frederick Lewis Allen, writing in *Life* in 1953, stated neatly the complicated nature of the new executive requirements which need urgently to be recognized:

> The corporation executive today must be the captain of a smooth-working team of people who can decide whether the time has come to build a new polymerization plant, what the answer is to the unsatisfactory employee relations in a given unit of the business, how to cope with a new government regulation, how to achieve a mutually respectful understanding with union representatives and what position to take on price increases in order to maintain the good-will of the public. In short, he is confronted with so many questions which require knowledge, intellectual subtlety, political insight and human flexibility that he desperately needs a mental equipment of the sort that the old-time tycoon could do without.

The challenge posed by Mr. Allen has already been acknowledged by both the business and the academic worlds.

Throughout the business community, there is widespread recognition that tomorrow's executive must be able to move surely from policy to action in situations that will be different from anything any generation has experienced before. He must be able in quick succession to reach sound decisions relating to a new scientific development, a problem in government relations, and a new pricing programme. He must be able, as Crawford H. Greenewalt, president of du Pont, has observed, "to create a harmonious whole out of what the academic world calls dissimilar disciplines."

Other industrial leaders have spelled out in more detail what Mr. Greenewalt only hinted at. Perhaps the best statement of all these opinions is provided by Gilbert W. Chapman, president of the Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company and one of the most thoughtful analysts of the problem of our future managers. In a recent talk to Goddard College students, he declared:

> To meet the challenge of industry's new responsibility in the world of today requires a cultivation of mind and outlook that must come from the educational institutions of our land. My undergraduate days were spent in a school of engineering. After four years of this highly specialized training, I immediately began my business career in an American corporation. Since that time, it has become increasingly apparent to me that the problems of an executive become less specialized and more general or basic as the man advances toward the top. The specialist cannot function effectively at the top level of management if all he brings to it is his specialty. At that level, the daily problems call for broad general knowledge, open-mindedness, an understanding of human nature, an insight into human frailties, a fairness of mind, a clarity of thought—all these beyond the ordinary knowledge of a complex business problem. There must be an intellectual cultivation through which an individual views the main current of the life around him.

And then Mr. Chapman makes an important observation, one that is as significant to the academic world as it is to managers.

> The specialist is not excluded from a career in top management; it would be a little ridiculous for an engineer to suggest that. My contention is that the specialty alone, which thrives so well in the laboratory or research center, is in itself not sufficient qualification for top executive responsibility. Let the specialist extend his knowledge into the broader fields of general learning; then he, too, can move ahead—perhaps even more rapidly than others.

Leaders of thought in the field of business administration have developed some provocative observations concerning basic educational

patterns for the business schools of the future. Looking ahead, they foresee that the number of facts—the body of knowledge—available to be learned by the business manager or prospective business manager seems likely to multiply tremendously. People who keep even moderately abreast of current business books and magazines cannot but be impressed by the proliferation of knowledge; indeed everyone in the field of university education for business is hard at work trying to add to this knowledge. The development of new mathematical and statistical theories and techniques, social science insights applicable to business, operations research, and long-range planning are all opening up whole new areas of importance to executives.

To such new areas as these, a manager must add the technical, economic, and social and political factors peculiar to his industry. On top of this is the specific information needed in a man's own company. Most university schools of business have pretty clearly and completely ruled out this last area of knowledge. Very few schools, if any, try to equip their graduates with knowledge at the individual company level. Many, moreover, have concluded that it is not possible to provide their graduates with much knowledge about particular industries. To this point, of course, there are notable exceptions. A good many schools, for instance, will provide a student with an immense amount of knowledge in concentrated courses about a particular subject such as insurance or real estate. Some direct their graduates to certain industries, such as petroleum, or are so located as to have the market for their graduates limited to only two or three industries.

Most schools, however, have focused on knowledge useful to the business administrator in such functions as accounting, marketing, and the like. The question then becomes: Is this *now* the proper emphasis? And with a steady, rapid increase in the available knowledge, will it be the proper emphasis *in the future*? The question deserves careful thought because it is one which plagues all professional education and indeed all education.

A number of round table discussions have been held recently with representative leaders in education for medicine, law, engineering, and so on. The most striking features of these conferences have been the extent to which representatives of each profession were expressing the same basic ideas, each in his way. In effect the medical people were saying: 'The body of medical knowledge is now so great that we can't possibly hope to teach it to a man; instead, we should try to teach a man to think like a doctor.' The lawyers were saying: 'The body of knowledge

about the law is now so great that we can't possibly teach it to a man; the most we can do is to teach him to think like a lawyer.' Even the engineers have moved in this direction.

The thinking at the Harvard Business School has been along the same lines, and the School has been working to give form to these ideas for a good many years. As a result of the experience acquired to date, the administration at the School believes that both a knowledge of facts and wisdom—or the capacity for judging soundly and dealing broadly with facts—are important for the business manager, but that wisdom is vastly the more important of the two. Furthermore, the Harvard Business School has arrived at the conviction that knowledge—facts about a specific industry or a specific company—can most effectively be acquired in the later years. At Harvard the major educational emphasis has been on finding ways to help men develop the capacity of judging soundly and dealing broadly with facts, rather than on the teaching of the facts themselves. Whatever success the School has had over the years derives more from this continuing attempt than from any other.

Clarence Randall, in his recent lectures at Harvard, epitomized what educators in the field of business administration are coming to recognize as basic in planning for the future:

> I fear that as a nation we Americans are in danger of yielding to technical hypnosis. We behave at times as though we believe that all problems can be resolved by the process of physical research and the application of engineering methods. The lesson of my own business experience is that this is not so, and that the art of management, even in an industry that rests for its success on the achievements of the scientist and engineer requires a broadly cultivated mind.

Because the Harvard Business School has long been concerned with the problem of a sound liberal education for prospective managers, the *Harvard Business Review* has carried several articles relating to the subject. In one of the most popular, Frederic E. Pamp, Jr., writing on "Liberal Arts as Training for Business," summarizes the direct applicability of the liberal arts and social sciences to the *process of decision* of the manager by demonstrating that three kinds of disciplines prepare people directly for the skills and qualities needed by the administrator:

> 1. The executive must distinguish and define the possible lines of action among which a choice can be made. This requires imagination, the ability to catch at ideas, shape them into concrete form, and present them in terms appropriate to the problem.
> 2. He must analyse the consequences of taking each line of action. Here the computer and operations research techniques can do much, but the

executive must set the framework for the problems from his experience and his imagination, and work with his own sensitivity and knowledge in the area of human beings where statistics and scientific prediction are highly fallible guides.

3. Then in the decision he must have the grasp to know its implications in all areas of an organism which is itself far from being absolutely predictable; the company, the market, the economy, and the society.

Important strides have been made by both industry and business to meet this need for a new type of manager.

Universities in the United States have offered special programmes in the field of Business Administration ever since the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce was founded in 1881 as an undergraduate school at the University of Pennsylvania, but the number of such schools remained small up to World War II, and no standard pattern dominated them.

Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration, now the country's largest, was founded in 1908, and has from the first been a graduate school offering a two-year programme leading to the degree of Master of Business Administration. In contrast, the Amos Tuck School at Dartmouth, which also grants a Master of Business Administration degree, is based on a five-year combination undergraduate and graduate programme, the first two years of which are devoted to liberal arts. The bulk of the courses in business administration are taught in the last three years. Currently there are 74 schools in the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, the central accrediting organization for the whole country of all schools offering degrees in Business Administration at either the undergraduate or graduate level.

The educational programme which seems to come closest to preparing the ideal executives for the future, at least according to the standards now emerging, is apparently one which provides an undergraduate degree in liberal arts or engineering, and a graduate course in business administration in one of the schools featuring the rounded background demanded by such men as Gilbert Chapman and Frederic Pamp. Actually, the number of graduates from such courses in the United States now is small. The Harvard Business School, with the largest single group, graduates about 600 men each year.

Undergraduate training of the men in these courses varies. At Harvard, approximately one quarter of most entering classes since World War II hold an engineering degree. Of the liberal arts graduates, about 20 per cent have majored in business administration, 25 per cent in the

social sciences, 16 per cent in the humanities, and 3 per cent in government.

All of the major schools are attempting to meet the demand for broader gauge executives in the future by stressing problems of labour relations and human relations, and by offering courses in administrative practices which stress the human factor in management. At Harvard, one of the most popular courses is Business Responsibilities in the American Society, where problems of government and community relations are explored, and where basic ethical values are considered as a part of the decision-making process.

Another way in which students are trained for group action in several of the graduate schools where the case method of teaching is used and report writing is an integral part of the programme, is to train the students in groups. Harvard deliberately organizes the students into fairly large classes so that there can be a wide diversity of points of view brought to bear on each case that is studied. But to provide a maximum of discussion, classes are divided into study groups of eight or ten to explore in advance all aspects of the problem presented in the case. After this first distillation, handled informally by the smaller student groups, the class can quickly dig into the basic points as each group has lined them up in its preliminary discussion. In this way, potential executives are taught to work as a team in exploring a situation with each man making a contribution for the group to weigh. Similarly, when the time comes for field research on a specific problem, groups of students undertake the assignment, and the final report is a joint effort on which the grade of each member of the group is determined.

While this programme, with four years of undergraduate work in engineering or liberal arts followed by two years of specialization in business administration, seems to come closest to providing the ideal candidate for tomorrow's management positions, not all students are able to afford the cost or spend the six years that are required to complete the programme. For this group, two basic types of four-year programmes are offered—both approved by the A.A.C.S.B.

The first calls for two years of regular liberal arts courses at the beginning of the college programme, followed by two years of specialized training in business administration. The University of Kansas is typical of the Schools which have developed this kind of programme. Advocates claim that the main advantage of this system is the opportunity it provides for students to mature in the first two formative years out of high school and to be exposed to the subjects which are believed to be

most effective in training people to do original thinking. With this foundation they are expected to grapple more effectively with the business subjects in their last two years.

The Wharton School, on the other hand, has worked during the entire seventy-five years of its existence on the premise that a business programme is most effective when spread over the entire four years, with liberal arts subjects included each year.

There is no agreement at the moment among educational leaders as to which system is preferable, and as long as a minimum number of business courses are included, there is likely to be no attempt to alter local patterns. It is significant, however, that among 74 schools which are members of the A.A.C.S.B., 40 per cent of the subject-hours taught are in non-business subjects. While leaders in the group are inclined to stress the need for more intensive teaching of English, and possibly of the social sciences, there is no tendency yet to demand more hours of work in either field.

It is in the liberal arts colleges, however, that one of the most striking developments is taking place. Confronted with the local demand that has persisted now for more than thirty years to provide courses in business administration, some so-called liberal arts colleges are actually offering a wider variety of subjects in the field than the business schools offer. A part of this demand has come from local industry which has sought the aid of local schools in interesting students in their field. Fourteen universities in the United States, for example, offer courses in ceramics.

What is ahead for the liberal arts college in the face of the soaring demand for people trained in business and, at the same time, the demand from scores of successful executives that more attention be devoted to the humanities as a sound foundation for executive training? The fact that industry itself is turning to the colleges for help in broadening the background of its executives at the middle and advanced management levels may well revive the popularity of courses in literature, history, the arts, and mathematics. Certainly, several recent moves by industry have revived the prestige of classical professors at a number of Eastern colleges.

This unusual precedent was established as long ago as 1953 by the Bell system when it set up a ten-month Institute of Humanistic Studies, to be conducted by the University of Pennsylvania. Executives of the system devoted the entire year to the study of literature, art, history, languages, or any subject of their choice, and the experiment was suffi-

ciently successful for Bell later to authorize eight-week summer courses at Dartmouth and Williams Colleges, each with 40 men enrolled, and one of 14 weeks at Swarthmore when 20 managers from 14 companies in the Bell system participated.

It is significant, however, that there has been no all-out swing—by Bell or by other companies with vigorous executive training programmes—to this highly specialized form of liberalizing and broadening the backgrounds of specialists among their managers. While more special courses of this kind may be offered for men who failed to receive a truly liberal education during their college years, the major trend is to provide prospective managers in their training for business with the kind of interchange of thought between faculty and student, or even student and student, which rounds their background at the same time that it teaches them to think. For this purpose the case method is being widely used throughout industry in its management training programmes. Properly applied, it provides the stimulation and the interchange which seems to do most to create broad and logical thinking among the trainees.

Educators, seeking to find the ideal programme of education to provide business with men of the calibre to take over management roles in the complex economy in which we must operate in the future, plot a three-part programme:

1. Four years of undergraduate study in a liberal arts programme in which heavy emphasis is placed on English, mathematics, the natural sciences, history, and philosophy or psychology. Ideal objectives of this period in a prospective manager's education might be:

(*a*) To develop an understanding of the social, political, and economic changes—both national and international—which will influence the problems of corporate management to an increasingly greater degree in the future. This might be defined as developing a breadth of outlook, looking towards future "statesmanship" in business.

(*b*) To indicate the importance, impact, and use of history, science, philosophy, and the arts in the world today, particularly as they influence large groups of people, such as employees, customers, and stockholders.

(*c*) To motivate the participants in the programme to accept the concept that intellectual activity is a never-ending process to be continued throughout their lives.

(*d*) To balance with a humanistic background the almost complete attention generally given by younger men to the acquiring of technical knowledge and competence as a result of working in an atmosphere of intense competition with other individuals.

(*e*) To offset a tendency to over-conformity, which is bound to occur in a business which is highly specialized and which promotes almost entirely from within the organization.

In addition to this mind-stretching experience, today's educators recommend a planned series of summer vacations. These might include travel, an experiment in living with a family in a foreign country, or work in specific fields which would help to focus the interests of the student. The objective, as in the case of the college courses themselves, is to broaden the horizons of the individual and make him increasingly aware of the wonders and the problems in the world around him.

2. Two to four years of business experience following graduation from college. Educators attach special significance to this period during which the student attempts to apply what he has learned to the specific problems of business, and to gain a realistic insight into the way the economy works.

3. A two-year programme in a graduate school of business administration. Here the emphasis would be almost entirely on the development of the skills of an administrator. Equipped with a sound basic education and matured by two or more years in business, the student should be ready to get the most out of a programme which has been designed to focus all his background and experience onto the solution of problems as they have developed in actual business situations.

Even as they make these recommendations, educators know that they represent an ideal which few students can afford, and many do not yet seek. What encourages them to think in this direction, however, is the increasing tendency of management in the most progressive companies to plan and finance advanced training for promising men in the middle management group, or in the advanced group, who need all the skills they can command to cope with the problems of the next ten to twenty years. If men at these ages are going to come back to professional business schools after five to twenty years on the job, then it becomes increasingly important that they come with the broadest possible educational backgrounds. Otherwise, they may lack the breadth of interest and mental flexibility to permit them to profit from belated specialized training in making decisions.

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While the preparation of men for business administration is by all odds the greatest single relationship between the universities and business, there are other ways in which the two co-operate.

From the time the Harvard Business School was founded it has aggressively sought out businesses with unsolved administrative problems. Some of these have been incorporated into cases as the basis for classroom discussion, which the managers of the company involved can attend. In other situations, the Business School's Division of Research has undertaken major studies of administrative problems, with interested companies sometimes helping to defray costs. But the largest field of research is that initiated by the faculty or the School in areas where management may know that a problem is developing but has not been able to detach itself from the day-to-day operations long enough to pinpoint it and initiate research to solve it. It is in this broad area that the business schools are making some of their most valuable contributions to business. At the present time, 46 research projects are under way at Harvard, and approximately 50 present or past members of the senior faculty are actively participating in them. The projects range from a study of "Management and Automation," "A Case of Organizational Change," and "Managing Decentralized Companies," to a five-year study of the "Effectiveness of Executive Development Programmes," and a long-range study on "Consumer Motivation Research and Related Management Problems."

Through these studies and the research that goes into them the Harvard Business School faculty maintains a close contact with industry and its day-to-day problems, and provides inquiring managements with suggestions about the ways in which some of their most pressing problems can be solved. In addition, faculty members in most schools of business are encouraged to undertake a limited number of consulting assignments with industries which are aggressively tackling basic business problems. In this way, industry benefits from some of the best independent thinking and research that is being done at the theoretical level, and faculty members maintain contact with managements and the new problems that arise every week.

Business schools also work with major foundations on problems which are basic to all industries. One such project currently under way at Harvard is the conducting of a summer seminar for deans of business schools and professors of business administration. Financed by the Ford Foundation, the summer seminars are designed to help meet the pressing demands for more and better teachers of business administration by sharing with them in concentrated form the experience which Harvard has developed in fifty years of teaching by the case method.

Even before this project developed, the Harvard Business School had

stepped up its programme of teacher development in anticipation of the demand that the great bulge in the national birth-rate in the last fifteen years will soon bring increased college enrolments. The children who will be of college age in the 1960's are already inundating the elementary and secondary schools, and, while no one knows how many will actually attend college, estimates range from a 100 to a 400 per cent increase above present totals. Either prediction poses acute problems.

The doctoral programme at the Harvard Business School has for some time been an important link between the need and the fulfilment of the demand for well-qualified teachers of business administration. As long as five years ago the Business School, foreseeing the growing need for teachers of business administration, initiated a committee study of its doctoral programme and, following receipt of the results of this study, revamped the entire programme and planned its enlargement.

From a rate of three doctoral degrees a year during the first twenty-five years of the programme, the tempo has now been stepped up to twenty a year. Emphasis has been placed on attracting more men who have done graduate work elsewhere, and who want now to concentrate on the teaching system in the field of business education as it has developed at Harvard.

The new programme, besides offering doctoral candidates more intensive and special training under the direct guidance of five or six faculty members who handle this project as their principal assignment, provides specific training in research methods appropriate to research in business administration, and a seminar in teaching by the case method. Thus, in this revamping of its programme, the Harvard Business School has both refined its training techniques for prospective teachers of business administration and increased its capacity to help meet the critical needs for teachers in the years ahead.

In its effort to meet the new conditions which currently confront business leaders, Harvard has pioneered in new areas which it feels may have an important bearing on business education in the future. One such project, now entering its second year, is the summer seminar on "Religion and Ethics in Business Policy Decisions." Sponsored by the Danforth Foundation, the seminar is designed to meet constructively the growing awareness among many executives that the deepest religious and ethical, as well as technical, insights are required of them and the increasing realization by teachers of the role that religious and ethical values should play in their responsibilities both in and outside the classroom.

Harvard, like some other business schools, has also developed close working relations with a group of industries known as Associates. These industries contribute annually to the continuing research projects at the Business School, pose problems on which they seek help, and share ahead of general release in all of the findings of the Division of Research. Through the Associates, members of the faculty are able to carry out many of their on-the-spot surveys and analyses, and through the School the Associates acquire a management research arm to supplement their own internal organization.

Finally, to share with the whole business community the best of current thinking on administrative problems, the School publishes the *Harvard Business Review*. Though designed originally to bring to a far larger audience than the student body the results of all research conducted at the Business School, the publication long ago opened its pages to outstanding research reports from other schools and from industry, and over the thirty-five years since it was established has helped to provide a bridge between the academic world and the world of business.

What the world of business needs in order to meet tomorrow's challenge is a steady stream of creative men with a broad knowledge and a capacity for independent thinking. This calls for men who will pursue ideas, who will seek to solve problems, although they may have nothing to do with the immediate problems before them—men whose thinking does not end with the business day and who, through their education, have learned that one of the greatest joys in life is to be able to think for one's self.

The United States can produce through its schools men of the calibre and vision to meet tomorrow's challenge to management, but it will produce them in sufficient quantity and with sufficient speed only if the business and the academic worlds see the problem clearly and join forces to solve it.

Reviews

In Defence of Feeling

A work of literary criticism gains enormously in value when it comes from a mature personality and an intellect keenly aware of what problems are engaging the attention of the most distinguished minds. Dr. Hermann Boeschenstein's book (*Deutsche Gefühlskultur*: Band I, *Die Grundlagen 1770–1830*. Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1954, pp. 379, SFr 17.80) is of this type, and it cannot fail to make an impact, not only on those especially concerned with German literature, but also on all those who are concerned with the general state of our culture. Particularly so since it is written in a fresh and vigorous style, far from jargon, which is a pleasure to read. The book is a reconsideration of German literature since Goethe, but it is written in the lively consciousness that this past needs to be regained—"Goethe and Jean Paul still lie before us." Its theme—the emergence of feeling as a natural right of the personality—takes at times a deliberately polemical form in relation to our contemporary world, in which writers often view feeling with distaste and suspicion, or even consider *Angst* to be the touchstone of spiritual distinction. It is a challenging, even at times provocative book which, if it sometimes fails to win our acquiescence, rarely fails to engage us in animated discussion.

With full justification Dr. Boeschenstein establishes as the great German achievement, alongside philosophy and historical science, what he calls "Gefühlskultur." Everyone knows of the liberation of thought that took place in the Enlightenment; but Dr. Boeschenstein rightly asserts that the complementary and contemporary liberation of feeling was as important for the development of personal life and social relations. I myself think that the Enlightenment was still inhibited, and that it was the young Herder and Goethe who decisively set as their purpose the liberation of feeling as well as thought, and their integration with activity. It is a theme which goes beyond the confines of literature. While one ought not to complain that German music is not discussed, it is a fault, I believe, that the non-literary sources of "Gefühlskultur" are not included—for instance, the quality of domestic life, or more obviously religious movements like pietism or the re-awakening of Catholic religious feeling in the Münster circle at the end of the eighteenth century. It is perhaps an oversight that nothing is said about K. P. Moritz's autobiographical psychological novel, *Anton Reiser*,

which gives a shattering analysis of the perversion of natural feeling by narrow circumstances and misguided educators.

Nevertheless, there is a particular reason why Dr. Boeschenstein could restrict himself to the consideration of outstanding writers. They felt it, often enough, to be their peculiar task to find utterance for feelings in their works and room for feeling in personal and social life. Fullness of feeling seemed to them to be a condition for fullness of personality, for a "worthy life." Goethe naturally has a decisive place in Dr. Boeschenstein's work, not only because no poet has made such claims for love—in his youth, and again in his old age, in "Selige Sehnsucht" and "Die Marienbader Elegie" for instance—but also because no one has so subtly examined the complex relations of feeling to thought and activity, and so determinedly sought "an active life of feeling," a synthesis of feeling, thought, and action. No one has so worshipped feeling and at the same time been so aware of its pitfalls, from *Werther* and *Tasso* to the *Wanderjahre* and *Faust Part 2*. "Poetry—a mature nature": the Goethe aphorism may stand as the principle of this book. It is the principle also of characters like Heinrich von Kleist, torn and unbalanced as he was, yet always seeking a synthesis, the union of the "liebliche Gefühle" with law as the basis of a society, or demonstrating the tragedy of the disunity of feeling and reality, as in that sad "Ach" of Alkmene's.

Feeling does not mean sentimentality, nor even that resigned bliss that often appears in German authors. It is refreshing to read Dr. Boeschenstein's sturdy criticism of the "homely warmth" of Claudius, a feeling that is timid and intellectually obstructed: in an aside he detects the same fault in Storm. The feeling he values is that which fertilizes, and is fertilized by, the full engagement of the personality in thought and life. It is partly a result of this that the centre of gravity of the book is the Swiss literary tradition, and not Goethe—a confession of faith in Switzerland that actually carries Dr. Boeschenstein far beyond the limits indicated in his sub-title. In Pestalozzi, Gotthelf, and Keller there is a sturdy and harmonious relationship of thought and feeling and social activity that gives Swiss literature of the nineteenth century a character all its own. Dr. Boeschenstein is right, I believe, in attributing this achievement largely to the peculiar character of Swiss religious life. While in Germany literature and the Church moved further and further apart, in Switzerland the Church remained for long the natural framework for humane aspirations. "Without openness to the world, belief in life, confidence in the natural realm, and a high esteem for man, this Swiss Christianity would soon have gone bankrupt." This is most evidently true for Gotthelf, but I think we can agree with Dr. Boeschenstein that Keller, though as a materialist he rejected Christian dogma, yet was sustained by a belief in feeling and a trust in life that were "religiously founded."

The central position accorded the Swiss raises, however, a question that obstinately crops up throughout the book. If they make so profound a contribution to "Gefühlskultur," does this mean that their aesthetic qualities

more than ready to believe that a poet has a peculiar responsibility towards "Gefühlskultur"; but I should feel myself bound to be more circumspect than Dr. Boeschenstein in my judgment, for instance, of Kafka, who is an instance of signal failure in feeling, and yet no less an impressive artist. Novalis is one of several authors who fall short by Dr. Boeschenstein's reckoning and seem to demand a different approach. In the case of Hölderlin there is a further and allied danger inherent in the method. If one uses a non-aesthetic criterion of judgment, one is liable to treat poetic statements as if they were rational, prosaic statements, and in so doing Dr. Boeschenstein seems to me to fail to do justice to Hölderlin. Or again, as in the case of Gotthelf and Jean Paul, one can over-estimate them through concentrating on what is intellectually intended by the poet instead of on what is imaginatively realized in the work. I believe all the best critics have worked upon non-aesthetic principles, but the point I would make is that the relationship between artistic utterance and life is usually much more intricate and complex than Dr. Boeschenstein always allows for.

Behind this lies another problem, which could be fully discussed only when we have Dr. Boeschenstein's second volume. Already in Goethe, the "problematic" of "Gefühlskultur" is more complex and baffling than in the Swiss writers. Does he not go deeper than they?—and Kleist too? The richness of European literature of the last hundred and fifty years is more closely connected with questionings than with affirmations. Can the artist ignore these questionings, or always resolve them positively, when they belong to our modern society, the world of our experience? Towards the end of his book Dr. Boeschenstein writes: "Perhaps the climax of 'Gefühlskultur' only lasts so long as it is possible to make reverence for the world, wherever it springs from, the basis of life and activity." I think he is right. But when this "cosmic optimism" has been replaced by "cosmic uncertainty," can the poets ignore it? Or better, might it not be a sign of their loyalty to "Gefühlskultur" if in these circumstances they seem to succumb to despair? German literature has been very rich in its response to the spiritual and social realities of the modern world, and its achievement is extremely difficult to treat systematically. I believe that Dr. Boeschenstein's concept of "Gefühlskultur," handled with the skill and insight he shows, is an admirable instrument for this task; and his second volume will be awaited with impatience.

ROY PASCAL

Miss Neatby and the "Heights"

The publication of Professor Hilda Neatby's *So Little for the Mind* in October 1953 resulted in a year-long debate on the content of Canadian education. Miss Neatby's concern was with the curriculum—with what subjects were being taught in what schools and, in so far as form is indistinguishable from matter, with how those subjects were being taught in those schools. The curriculum continued to occupy her attention in her two subsequent publications, *The Debt of Our Reason* and *A Temperate Dispute*,

which appeared, respectively, in April and October, 1954; and the curriculum remained the centre of attention for her supporters and opponents so long as her book remained the focal point of Canadian educational thought.

Though education is clearly a more prominent issue in 1957 than in 1953 or 1954, we have heard little recently about content. Now the emphasis has shifted to the problems of supply and demand. How can we ensure that we will have twice as many engineering graduates in 1967 as we had in 1957? How can we be sure that no Canadian student of high intelligence is prevented from proceeding to university? How can we persuade government, industry, the wealthy citizen to provide the funds needed to educate the greatly increased number of students who are expected to matriculate in the 1960's? How, in short, can we arrange for the Canadian universities to accommodate a doubled enrolment within a decade? These are the questions that have been the subject of public educational debate for the past two years, specifically since the day in June, 1955, when Dr. E. F. Sheffield, Director of the Educational Division of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, read a paper to the National Conference of Canadian Universities in which he defined the dimensions of the enrolment problem for the period 1956–1965. It was Dr. Sheffield who, quite unwittingly, closed the Neatby debate. Obviously it must be reopened. Twice as many badly trained engineers can hardly be described as a satisfactory solution to the problem posed.

In resuming the debate after a two-year pause, it will be necessary to begin by reminding ourselves of the basic questions which we were discussing. This we can do, conveniently and refreshingly, by examining three recent publications. Two of them present Miss Neatby's position: Robert M. Hutchins' *Some Observations on American Education* (Cambridge University Press, pp. xiii, 112, $3.00) and Arthur Bestor's *The Restoration of Learning* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd.], pp. xviii, 459, xi, $6.75); both authors are traditionalists, to use Miss Neatby's phrase, who believe that the primary purpose of education is to develop the mind and that the mind can and should receive primary attention in the American school and university. The third book to be considered is *Crestwood Heights*, by John R. Seeley, R. Alexander Sim and Elizabeth W. Loosley (University of Toronto Press, pp. viii, 505, $6.00); its relevance is of a different order.

Almost all the readers of *So Little for the Mind* construed Miss Neatby's intention as an attack on the professional educators—the administrators of the Departments of Education, the deans and professors of the Teachers Colleges, the principals and professors of the Normal Schools, the principals and guidance officers of the collegiates and high schools. Granted Miss Neatby's caustic style and the nature of her subtitle ("An Indictment of Canadian Education") this was a plausible reading. But to ridicule the educators was not the author's intention. At the beginning of her concluding chapter she stated clearly that the weaknesses she had exposed were an outgrowth of the Canadian way of life:

> As everyone who knows them will agree, those who pass as experts in Canadian education are, as a class, conscientious, hard-working and devoted, struggling patiently and hopefully to satisfy varied and exacting demands by means, both

human and material, which may be entirely inadequate. Educators, like the rest of us, are the products, and may be the victims of the society in which they live. They are also, in a sense, the slaves of our social defects. For all our talk of educators moulding the future, it is equally true, sometimes it is more true that they are completely in the grip of the follies and vices of the past and of the immediate present. It is strange, indeed, that educators unite in glorifying democracy, for it is the democratic nature of society itself which holds them in bondage.

Educators, in other words, reflect the reigning culture. Because the reigning Canadian culture is the subject studied in *Crestwood Heights*, an examination of its findings may help us to assess the responsibility of Canadian educators and of ourselves for the weaknesses which Miss Neatby exposed.

Robert Hutchins' *Observations* is based on lectures delivered to various British university audiences and is at once an introduction to the phenomenon of higher education in the United States and an argument that its unquestionable weaknesses are accidental rather than fundamental. The weaknesses are frankly admitted (credit system, inadequate admission standards, intercollegiate athletics, etc.), and their root-cause is identified as the inability of the American people to decide what kind of man the country wants to produce. Because the term *success* remains philosophically and pragmatically undefined, because *success* can mean no more than "getting along with people," undergraduate studies possess neither substance nor direction. But current practice does not invalidate the bright ideal: "The conception of a people all devoting the earliest years of their lives to study with a view to attaining the maximum development of their highest powers is surely one of the grandest that history can show" (p. 22). Education for all need not lead to the deterioration and disappearance of standards. This is Hutchins' thesis, and, in a concisely but vigorously reasoned book, he develops it most convincingly.

Arthur Bestor has much in common with Miss Neatby. Also a historian (at the University of Illinois) he published in 1953 a book called *Educational Wastelands*, the general argument of which paralleled Miss Neatby's in an almost uncanny fashion. One was reminded of Darwin and Wallace. The chief difference lay in the assignment of blame. As we have seen, Miss Neatby indicted the Canadian people; all Bestor's shafts were aimed at the professional educators. Like Miss Neatby, Bestor was subjected to violent attack by the educators: like her he was accused of being unscholarly, of being uninformed about actual school conditions, of being merely negative in his criticism. At this point the authors parted company. Miss Neatby rushed to the podium (and subsequently into print) with two brief and rather mystical supplements—the positive side of her doctrine. Professor Bestor, in contrast, sat down and, after spending a year gathering further ammunition, rewrote his book. *The Restoration of Learning* is the result.

The result is an admirable book and, since I have every intention of stating my judgment emphatically, I shall say at the outset that in my opinion it should be read by everyone concerned with education in Canada. As a writer and as a lawyer arguing a case, Professor Bestor has a number of defects, but he has all the important virtues. He is lucid, he is enthusiastic, he has

evidence to support his statements, and he has an abundance of new ideas to propose.

His basic argument can be quickly summarized. "The thesis of this book is that schools exist to teach *something*, and that this something is the power to think" (p. 110). This power is not being developed in the high school classrooms of the United States because a curriculum is offered which lacks intellectual substance. Every American student, whether bound for university or not, has the right to solid instruction in the basic subjects: English, mathematics, science, history, and a foreign language. An adequate curriculum is not offered because the educationists control teacher training, certification, and curriculum planning. By insisting that prospective teachers enrol in endless hours of pedagogy, the educationists saturate the schools with teachers who know how to teach but who do not know their subject. The remedy is to return scholarship to its proper place as the all-important requirement of the teacher. The empire of the educationists must be disbanded. Educational Psychology must be taught by the Department of Psychology, Philosophy of Education by the Department of Philosophy, History of Education by the Department of History, Educational Administration by the Department of Business Administration. Finally,

> The basic defect [in the organization and structure of our educational system] . . . is the division that has been created—especially as concerns curriculum and ultimate purpose—between the public-school world and the world of scholarship, science, and the professions. The heart of the problem is the schism that exists in institutions of higher learning between the professors of pedagogy (or, to use the misleading title they prefer, professors of education) and all the other faculties, both liberal and professional. (p. 156)

This schism must be ended.

This is a familiar thesis to the reader of *So Little for the Mind*. Why, then, particularly since Bestor is dealing with education in the United States, is it required reading for Canadians? There are three reasons. The first is that Bestor has the space and the evidence to pursue the thesis to its ultimate conclusion. His is a fat book, triple the size of Miss Neatby's, and at no point does the reader sense an air of tentativeness. Bestor may be wrong, but he is always definite; and, since he is both systematic and dogged, the reader who wishes to prove him wrong consistently finds himself facing a mass of embarrassing evidence. It was possible with Miss Neatby's book to remain neutral. It is not possible with Bestor's.

Secondly, the book is rich in suggestive ideas which do not depend on the validity of the central thesis. Here are some examples. He proposes an entirely new grade system to accommodate the slow learner, the gifted child, and three or four intervening categories. He argues that government grants should be devoted solely to matters which concern the state (for example, the intellectual training of the citizen) and that all matters of purely local concern (for example, the football team) should be financed by the community. Or to cite a matter of detail:

> If every institution of higher learning billed every student for the actual cost of instruction . . ., and in the same bill credited each student's account with the

difference between the present fee and the new one, labeling it "scholarship assistance," there would be no change whatever in the charges actually collected . . . but there would be an important change in the way in which the student and his family looked upon the privilege of receiving a higher education.

The third reason is the most important. Bestor believes that the only solution for the ills he finds is for the scholar to replace the educationist as the dominating influence. This means that the Faculty of Arts and Science must assume *direct* responsibility for the training of teachers, and that individual departments must maintain continual contact with teachers of their subject. It means many other things as well—Bestor makes this only too clear. For most scholars the prospect will be horrifying.

Crestwood Heights, however, suggests that Miss Neatby's alternative solution—a miraculous discovery by the Canadian people that the world of the mind and of the spirit is more important than the world of Cadillacs, picture windows, and Norman Vincent Peale—is not likely to occur. Horrifying as the prospect may be to the individual scholar, Bestor's solution may be the only alternative to the present system.

In *Crestwood Heights* we see the present system operating under particularly—in Canada perhaps uniquely—favourable conditions. The Crestwood school system is famous; it is constantly being visited by principals and trustees from other Canadian and American cities. The several schools are physically attractive, efficiently designed, beautifully equipped. The teachers are happy. The Director (Superintendent) of Education has a more than adequate staff—including a school psychologist. There are few drop-outs among the students; the percentage bound for university is well above average. Nowhere is the Home and School Association more active.

None of this is surprising when we know that the community is a wealthy one (upper middle class) and that "child rearing is the major industry in Crestwood Heights." The school, it appears, is the central building, both geographically and in the minds of parents and children alike. The hopes of the parents are centred on their children's futures, and, unsure of themselves, they rely on the experts to see that these hopes are realized. The children, sure of nothing but that they must be a success, know that the steadiest path to this unknown leads through school and university.

One scours the pages of *Crestwood Heights* in vain, however, for evidence that anyone in the community—Director, teacher, student, parent—worships intellect for its own sake. No one says with Hutchins that education "is worth while for its own sake, even if it never led to earning of a penny." No one insists with Bestor that "schools exist to teach *something*, and that something is the power to think." Subjects are studied conscientiously, but the motive is to pass, to get on to the next stepping stone, to have achieved momentary success. *Crestwood Heights* is full of references to school and education, but the word *library* is missing from its index.

Crestwood Heights is not, needless to say, an isolated community in the city of Toronto. It is "the type of community becoming dominant in Western civilization." It is a community which, in effect if not by intention, is oriented to the present and the immediate future; it has, therefore, no respect for the

past and the cultural heritage. It is a community which, being oriented to the material, has relegated religion to the sidelines; the churches and synagogues are on the geographic and figurative periphery. Finally it is a community which is oriented to achievement rather than to self-development; if it is not anti-intellectual, it is in a state of neutrality. Miss Neatby's specific charges against the progressive education which dominated our classrooms were that it was anti-cultural, amoral, and anti-intellectual.

ROBIN S. HARRIS

The German Novel

With *The German Novel* (University of Toronto Press, 1956, pp. x, 334, $4.50) Professor Roy Pascal is filling a long-felt gap in English criticism of German literature, as he did only recently with his study of *The German Sturm und Drang* (1953). Fortunately he has not aimed this time at a comprehensive survey of the field, but has concentrated on those novels which he holds to be of the highest value. Few, if any, would disagree with his choice of novelists in the nineteenth century—Goethe, Keller, Gotthelf, Stifter, Raabe, and Fontane—while for the twentieth century he has chosen Thomas Mann and Kafka, who can reasonably be held to have found the widest international acclaim.

Any critic who is bent on acquainting a foreign public with the German novel, and especially with the German novel of the nineteenth century, has the major task of introducing his audience to a type of novel which grew under specific conditions and developed characteristics which, in a large perspective, distinguished it from the French, English, or Russian novel. Technically, the German novelist was for one reason or another little troubled about the demands of plot, which was a major concern of his English and French colleagues. More important still, and again unlike the others, he dwells very little on the social scene, and impresses us as being strangely indifferent to it. There was an excellent reason for this. For the greater part of the nineteenth century there was no public life in Germany to compare with that of England, France, or even Russia. It was not until 1870, when the former thirty-six states were united into one state with a single capital city, that there came into being for the German writer a centre comparable with Paris, London, Petrograd, or Moscow, in which many currents crossed, many roads ended, and which to some extent was representative of the whole country. It took exactly one generation before this new opportunity began to be fully used, by writers like Heinrich Mann, Wassermann, Döblin, Plievier, Fallada, Brehm, Musil, Arnold Zweig, and others. Mr. Pascal refers to some of these in his Foreword.

If, as Balzac maintained, the portrayal of contemporary society is the stuff of which novels are made, it will be agreed that the German novelist of the nineteenth century found himself at a disadvantage. Yet he was able to turn this disadvantage to account by developing a type of novel, the *Bildungsroman*, which concentrated on the development and character of an indi-

vidual, a theme which in a stable society would almost invariably turn into a theme of rebellion, but which the German novelist reconciled with a full acceptance of society—the society, that is to say, which, for lack of a real one, he sometimes invented in terms of his own philosophy. This concentration on the problems and experiments, struggles and experiences of an individual in his quest for the most fruitful development of his personality has instilled into the best German novels of the last century a wisdom the equal of which is not easily found elsewhere in fiction.

Yet for Mr. Pascal it is the problem of the individual's interrelation with society that looms large, especially in his analytical synopses. This involves him in a criterion that is fully justified and indeed appropriate to German novels of the twentieth century but, except perhaps for the Swiss novelists, seems out of place in a discussion of many of the earlier German novels. Out of place because in default of a modern, that is a unified society, it has no real meaning inside the German literary orbit of the nineteenth century; it is a criterion applied wholly from the outside, and consequently it does not lead us into the creative world of these writers, but rather away from it. Mr. Pascal's approach is highly questionable in cases like those of Fontane or Raabe who, while they were slowly moving towards a portrayal of society, yet were content for the most part to describe only segments of it. This preoccupation with the importance of the social scene—and also his insistence on plot and structure, as found in the English novel—leads Mr. Pascal to put Fontane's *Effi Briest* above *Der Stechlin*, a judgment difficult to maintain. Many discriminating critics regard *Der Stechlin* as Fontane's masterpiece, and it is certainly an infinitely wiser book. If this insistence on the social aspects is injurious to Fontane, it is fatal to Raabe. Raabe was a novelist who believed that one could experience life, the whole world, in one's own room; he was convinced that the experience of the most important elements in life was independent of events or of a socially integrated life. He felt that those who moved about in the world in quest of experiences were apt to lose sight of those issues which he valued most. *Stopfkuchen* and *Die Akten des Vogelsangs*, along with other Raabe novels, have this as their underlying theme, which sometimes is voiced quite directly.

If Mr. Pascal's preoccupation leads him to a not quite acceptable presentation of Fontane and Raabe, his sense of the importance of plot betrays him into measuring Goethe's admittedly unorganized *Wilhelm Meister* by the technical "maturity" of Jane Austen. There is little use in comparing a tree to a flower. Furthermore, the slight emphasis that the majority of German novelists place on plot gives them an enviable freedom, which good writers use to advantage, while the poorer ones drown, as it were, in the limitlessness of the sea. Insistence on a well worked-out plot in the English sense closes the door on the German novel rather than opens it. Mr. Pascal's tendency to measure German novels by English standards is strongest in the concluding chapter of the book. Here we come back to the question of criteria. To measure another literature by one's own is the surest way to distort the appreciation, sometimes even the understanding, of it. And in Mr. Pascal's case it has produced some untenable generalizations, such as the one about the reading habits of Germans: "Our 'classic' novels are read by English

children with passion; bothered parents have to forbid too much of it and tell them to get on with their 'work.' Later on, they get seized by the French and Russians in the same way. But even for Germans, to read the great German novel is mostly a 'cultural task'—infinitely rewarding, I believe, but never likely to become a dangerous passion in the reader!"

Mr. Pascal's criteria may not always fit the writers of the nineteenth century, but they prove very stimulating in the cases of Mann and Kafka. His analysis of Kafka's *Castle* is extremely illuminating, and here one could only wish that he had gone further than he did in his conclusions about its symbolism. As for Mann, Mr. Pascal's analysis is one of the best discussions of him that one could desire.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mr. Pascal's investigation is to be found in his remarks on the irrational or "romantic" and the rational or "realistic" elements which play such an important part in German culture, and not only in its culture. The view that "The great German novel is the outcome of a perpetually renewed struggle with Romanticism" underlies the analysis of each of the novels under discussion, and it helps a great deal in clarifying the spiritual world from which many of them emerged.

In dealing with the novels he has chosen for discussion, Mr. Pascal has followed one method throughout, leading off with a synopsis of plot and following with aesthetic and other observations. The result is an unusually informative book for the newcomer to German literature, and one that will also prove of interest to those acquainted with the field. Yet to this reviewer, it is a question whether it will put the reader into a frame of mind that makes him look forward to a new experience in reading. This is not so much because he has put his criticisms "very sharply, too sharply, of course," but rather because he tends to underrate those elements in German fiction which, for many people, and not only for Germans, have made the reading of it an "infinitely rewarding" and an enjoyable experience.

LAURA HOFRICHTER

In "Being's Centre"

Anyone who reads the rich volumes of Mr. Johnson's edition of *The Poems of Emily Dickinson* is likely to emerge with a humble sense that he has hardly appreciated that poetry before. (*The Poems of Emily Dickinson, including variant readings critically compared with all known manuscripts*, edited by Thomas H. Johnson, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1955, 3 vols.) It is not merely that all her known poems, 1775 of them, are now at last gathered up before us, instead of lying dispersed in two rival volumes, to say nothing of the other poems scattered about in biographical volumes, collections of letters, and sundry magazines. The sheer bulk is impressive, surely: it shows the profusion and resourcefulness of a major creative energy sustained for thirty years; although the valuable chronological arrangement here shows that the chief demonstration of this power occurred within the years 1858–65. What we feel, viewing the whole, is a

lifetime's intense dedication to the poetic art, evidenced particularly by the thousands of variant readings and the frequent recensions of entire poems, now skilfully recorded for the first time. Emily Dickinson's craftsmanship, her canny, persistent search for the just word, has often left us here with the pleasant task of creating our own preferred text out of a dozen or more good readings within a single poem. All this is testimony to a bountiful gift and in itself would be enough to make this edition one of the great literary events of our century. Yet something more important lies beyond: the new poems that here meet us, and the renewed, refreshed impact of poems that have been familiar and yet have not been truly known until now.

Mr. Johnson has been modest in counting up the poems here published for the first time: he counts forty-one "known to be unpublished in whole or in part." Yet the detailed textual notes that follow every poem make it clear that, from a broader view, the number of poems that we properly meet here for the first time, at least in book form, could fairly be counted in the hundreds. It has long been known that scores of the poems in the old standard edition were published with massive flaws: two poems may be run together as one, or several stanzas may be missing from a given poem. Mrs. Bingham printed complete versions of a few of these faulty pieces in her *Ancestors' Brocades* (1945), and many more in the *New England Quarterly* (1947), where she gave corrected texts of fifty-six poems; a few other corrections of this kind have appeared elsewhere. All of these are now presented to the general public, in a form much closer to the manuscripts than the modernized texts given by Mrs. Bingham; along with them are many others where the present editor has given the right text of a maimed poem for the first time.

Thus, for example, the current edition of the old collected poems contains a piece in eleven stanzas beginning, "A something in a summer's day." This actually represents the first six stanzas of a poem in seven stanzas that begins thus, followed by the whole of an independent poem in five stanzas beginning, "Like Flowers, that heard the news of Dews." The error was pointed out in *Ancestors' Brocades*, where the missing seventh stanza was first published; the whole of the first poem then appeared in *NEQ*. The two poems are now printed here in their separate identities, thus providing the first correct printing of the second poem. A similar situation results in the first correct appearance here of a fine poem in three stanzas beginning, "A still—Volcano—Life," which now ends with the powerful lines:

> The Solemn—Torrid—Symbol—
> The lips that never lie—
> Whose hissing Corals part—and shut—
> And Cities—ooze away—

In the old version a fourth stanza is added, which actually represents the last four lines of quite a different poem: "I tie my Hat—I crease my Shawl":

> Therefore—we do life's labor—
> Though life's Reward—be done—
> With scrupulous exactness—
> To hold our Senses—on—

This ineffective ending of an inferior poem has, we can now see, spoiled the unity of one of the better poems in the canon.

In other places a "new" poem is achieved by reuniting stanzas that have appeared as separate poems, in volumes published fifty years apart. Thus the superb love-poem, "If I may have it, when it's dead," has been hitherto bisected: the first three stanzas appeared in *Poems* (1896), and the last four in *Bolts of Melody* (1945). The same is true of "This World is not Conclusion," where the first twelve lines appeared in 1896, the last eight in 1945. Perhaps the most striking example of such separation is found in "Doubt Me! My Dim Companion!" The first two stanzas appeared in *Poems* (1890), while the third and final stanza appeared in *Bolts of Melody* as a complete poem in two quatrains. Now we can see how the whole poem gains strength from its powerful conclusion, especially since the word "Caviler" in the last line is now accurately given instead of the misreading, "cavalier":

> Sift her, from Brow to Barefoot!
> Strain till your last Surmise—
> Drop, like a Tapestry, away,
> Before the Fire's Eyes—
> Winnow her finest fondness—
> But hallow just the snow
> Intact, in Everlasting flake—
> Oh, Caviler, for you!

Thus by proper reunion, three of Emily's finest achievements now appear for the first time in their true dimensions.

Another kind of newness is found in the case of the famous anthology-piece, "Safe in their Alabaster Chambers." We have known this, perhaps have even memorized it, as a poem in three stanzas; but it now appears that this form is an unauthorized reconstruction made by the early editors from two versions containing two stanzas apiece. Mr. Johnson's brilliant four-page note (I, 152–5) makes it clear that Emily worked over this poem intently, trying, in four different efforts, to produce a second stanza that could satisfy herself and her sister-in-law Sue. What we have known as the third stanza ("Grand go the Years") is really a substitution for the weaker stanza that we have known as the second ("Light laughs the breeze"). A similar misconstruction seems to have occurred in the poem on Charlotte Bronte's grave ("All overgrown by cunning moss"). This has been known as a poem in five stanzas; but the manuscript shows the word "Or" placed between stanzas three and four, thus indicating that we have here a poem designed in three stanzas, with an alternate (and superior) version given for the last two stanzas.

Such examples could be multiplied by a dozen; and yet all this is only a beginning, for, as the above quotations may have suggested, the new effects of these volumes extend to all the minutiae of spelling, line-arrangement, or punctuation. Perhaps the best way to show this would be to concentrate upon the following famous poem as it now appears:

> Because I could not stop for Death—
> He kindly stopped for me—

The Carriage held but just Ourselves—
And Immortality.

We slowly drove—He knew no haste
And I had put away
My labor and my leisure too,
For His Civility—

We passed the School, where Children strove
At Recess—in the Ring—
We passed the Fields of Gazing Grain—
We passed the Setting Sun—

Or rather—He passed Us—
The Dews drew quivering and chill—
For only Gossamer, my Gown—
My Tippet—only Tulle—

We paused before a House that seemed
A Swelling of the Ground—
The Roof was scarcely visible—
The Cornice—in the Ground—

Since then—'tis Centuries—and yet
Feels shorter than the Day
I first surmised the Horses Heads
Were toward Eternity—

A thoughtful reading of this version aloud will show how subtly and effectively the dashes indicate dramatic pause and pacing, and how accurately the capitals guide us toward a proper emphasis, as in the last stanza, where the "Centuries" are made to stand out in sharp contrast with the "Day," which then leads into the unbroken concluding speed-up towards the crashing word, "Eternity." All this is lost in the old published version, where only two capitals are retained, and the frequent use of semicolons and periods (nine times) breaks up the continuous dramatic action of the language. Moreover, we realize with something of a start, a whole stanza, the fourth, has been hitherto omitted and unknown; but now it seems impossible to do without it, for the strongly emphasized reversal ("—He passed Us—") indicates a sudden awakening to the passage of time: it is growing late, turning cold, and the speaker is caught unprepared, defenceless in her finery, while the word "Gossamer" seems to carry an eerie foreshadowing of the spider's web. Other alterations by the early editors serve to moderate the original pungent phrasing. In stanza three "strove" is changed to "played," while the second line reads, "Their lessons scarcely done," thus forming a proper rime with "sun." In 1924 this line was again changed to read, "At wrestling in a ring," thus giving up the rime, but still insisting that children could not "strive" at "recess"; but the paradox is clear and sharp: play is stern competition to the child. In the fifth stanza we have another "improvement":

"The cornice but a mound"; this avoids the unseemly but accurate and insistent repetition of "Ground," and destroys the understated impact of the original image, with its eerie architectural detail. And finally, the early editors conventionalized the syntax of the last stanza, giving "but each" in the first line for "and yet"; "each" thus refers neatly to "Centuries," but the original elliptical phrasing says much more—it says that all the time "since then" feels shorter than the day this speaker made her notable surmise.

Mr. Johnson clearly lists all these invalid verbal changes that occur in earlier editions—and they run into many hundreds. Usually the alterations made within a single poem are not so extensive as those we have just seen: most of them consist of a word here, a word there, to set a rime, remove a localism, or normalize a peculiar usage—such as the author's addiction to the use of verbs in what may look like a subjunctive or hortatory way, when the indicative would normally be expected. This often amounts to a sort of elliptical condition (equal to "may be," "could be"); but perhaps it is best described as a way of achieving an effect of absolute, immediate action:

> Unmoved—she notes the Chariots—pausing—
> At her low Gate—
> Unmoved—an Emperor be kneeling
> Upon her Mat—

The "be" is changed to "is" by the early editors; and the number of changes motivated by this abnormal usage mounts up, score upon score, seven times within the single poem, "There is a flower that Bees prefer." Thus the total effect of all these small changes is finally immense, especially since they often pile up within a very important poem, as in "I heard a Fly buzz—when I died," where drastic alterations are made in three out of the four stanzas; or in "I measure every Grief I meet," where among many other changes the effort to create a rime destroys one of the poet's finest phrases:

> Or would they go on aching still
> Through Centuries of Nerve—

Here the word "above" is substituted for "of Nerve," in order to match with "Love"; while in the last stanza of this poem, the fierce understatement of the casual—

> To note the fashions—of the Cross—
> And how they're mostly worn—

is ruined by making the last line here read: "Of those that stand alone," which, to be sure, rimes correctly with the following "Own."

Even where the changes within a given poem are very few, these often occur in a crucial position that centrally affects the total poem. Thus in the well-known poem of twelve stanzas, "I cannot live with You," we find only three words altered: but two of these occur in the last stanza, and change the meaning so drastically that the whole poem loses force. Here is the correct reading:

So We must meet apart—
You there—I—here—
With just the Door ajar
That Oceans are—and Prayer—
And that White Sustenance—
Despair—

In the old version "meet" has been changed to "keep," thus spoiling the point of the poem: that these two must meet in this lover's agonized devotion, even though so distant in bodily fact. Then in the fifth line "White" has been changed to "pale," thus destroying the ironical suggestion of the Manna. Or consider the small Herbertian poem, "Poor little Heart!" which concludes:

Gay little Heart—
Like Morning Glory!
Wind and Sun—wilt thee array!

The last line has been altered to read: "Thou'll wilted be; thou'll wilted be!" Finally, consider the opening stanza of this famous poem:

There's a certain Slant of light,
Winter Afternoons—
That oppresses, like the Heft
Of Cathedral Tunes—

The early editors have added a small word in the second line to read: "On winter afternoons," while "Heft" is changed to "weight"—and the effect of colloquial intimacy is lost. In poems so finely wrought as Emily Dickinson's best, the change of the slightest word may be enough to mar the working of the whole delicate organism.

This continual effect of newness, of freshness, operates in this edition even when, as Mr. Johnson moderately says, "The text is identical with that in *Poems*"—identical, that is, except for punctuation and spelling. But consider the unique and subtle effects created by the dashes, capitals, quotation marks, and exclamation point in this brief poem:

I shall know why—when Time is over—
And I have ceased to wonder why—
Christ will explain each separate anguish
In the fair schoolroom of the sky—

He will tell me what "Peter" promised—
And I—for wonder at his woe—
I shall forget the drop of Anguish
That scalds me now—that scalds me now!

The old version, with all these pointings and pacings and emphases removed, is strangely tame. The full bitterness of the ambiguous attitude does not emerge: we have lost the easy ironical movement between lines two and three; we have lost the doubt cast on "Peter's" identity; we have lost the

sense of inadequacy that this promise creates when set against "the drop of Anguish" that could produce the cry of the final line.

This is not to say that Emily's constant use of dashes and capitals is always so effective. In the weaker poems—and there are of course hundreds of weak poems within this huge body of work—it is often hard to see any function in her peculiar pointing and spelling; but the value of these devices in the better poems is more than enough to justify Mr. Johnson's steadfast decision to keep close to the manuscripts. When the time comes to publish a convenient one-volume edition based on the present text, it is to be hoped that the editor will likewise insist on keeping all the manuscript peculiarities; for these are not mere eccentricities: they are essential to the unique impact of her successful poems.

All these peculiar things, then: her localisms, her strangely effective use of the active verb, her dashes and capitals, her willingness to vary stanza-form in the interest of a special emphasis, her love of half-rime—all these things play their part in bringing us close to that inner meditative being which knows so well the "Hound within the Heart." It is an inner being poised on a hard-won point, from which the meditative vision reaches out to include the universe: to see "Eternity's vast pocket, picked," to find that Gethsemane "Is but a Province—in the Being's Centre." From that centre, gained and maintained by rigorous self-analysis, she can assail "These Gentlewomen" of "Dimity Convictions," who show

> A Horror so refined
> Of freckled Human Nature—
> Of Deity—ashamed—

For her Deity, like George Herbert's, is one who never minds an honest disagreement or a "freckled" opinion. She can take issue with his justice and sympathize with "that Old Moses" who, like herself, was barred from the promised land; somehow, she feels, the "Romance" of Moses "In point of injury" surpasses that "Of Stephen—or of Paul—"

> For these—were only put to death—
> While God's adroiter will
>
> On Moses—seemed to fasten
> With tantalizing Play
> As Boy—should deal with lesser Boy—
> To prove ability.

She can subtly mock the Calvinistic vision of a God whose arbitrary will violates her passionate belief in the value of each individual being:

> It's easy to invent a Life—
> God does it—every Day—
> Creation—but the Gambol
> Of His Authority—

It's easy to efface it—
The thrifty Deity
Could scarce afford Eternity
To Spontaneity—

The Perished Patterns murmur—
But His Perturbless Plan
Proceed—inserting Here—a Sun—
There—leaving out a Man—

Such a theology, though perhaps entertained as a possibility in moments of bitterness, is ultimately not to be endured by one who could write, during the same era of her life:

To be alive—is Power—
Existence—in itself—
Without a further function—
Omnipotence—Enough—

To be alive—and Will!
'Tis able as a God—
The Maker—of Ourselves—be what—
Such being Finitude!

That inner confidence in the validity of the creative Will enables her to maintain "This Consciousness that is aware/ Of Neighbors and the Sun," to hold her Deity and her pet dog within a single purview, to address God as though she were addressing a note to Sue or to some other friend. I think we can see this in a remarkable poem which the editor here prints from a copy signed (like many of her poems), "Emily"; this copy, the editor says, "was sent to an unidentified recipient." But the ultimate recipient seems to be divine: the allusion to a "dizzy knee" suggests the superhuman:

What shall I do—it whimpers so—
This little Hound within the Heart
All day and night with bark and start—
And yet, it will not go—
Would you *untie* it, were you me—
Would it stop whining—if to Thee—
I sent it—even now?

It should not tease you—
By your chair—or, on the mat—
Or if it dare—to climb your dizzy knee—
Or—sometimes at your side to run—
When you were willing—
Shall it come?
Tell Carlo—
He'll tell *me*!

This suggestion of a double address is found in a number of her best poems, especially in her love-poems, where she sometimes writes in a way akin (though ultimately opposite) to Herbert's mode of adapting the idiom of popular love-poetry in appeals to his divine Friend. This poem strikes a clear Herbertian note:

That I did always love
I bring thee Proof
That till I loved
I never lived—Enough—

That I shall love alway—
I argue thee
That love is life—
And life hath Immortality—

This—dost thou doubt—Sweet—
Then have I
Nothing to show
But Calvary—

Taken by itself, the poem could be addressed either to Christ or to a human lover; in the context of other poems here written "about 1862," the poem emerges as a guarded address to her human love; as in good Petrarchan poetry, the religious element serves to exalt earthly love. She is turning Herbert's technique back to the service from which he had attempted to divert it.

In other poems of this sort the balance is hardly in doubt, as in the famous "Wild Nights," which gave some pause to Col. Higginson in choosing poems for the 1891 edition, as Mr. Johnson notes: "One poem only," wrote Higginson, "I dread a little to print—that wonderful "Wild Nights,"—lest the malignant read into it more than that virgin recluse ever dreamed of putting there. Has Miss Lavinia any shrinking about it? You will understand and pardon my solicitude. Yet what a loss to omit it! Indeed it is not to be omitted." The slight ambiguity of the wording could allow Higginson to take a spiritual view of its meaning; yet the poem seems essentially sexual. That "freckled Maiden," as she calls herself, is not ashamed of human nature. One poem, above all, can leave us in no doubt about the physical nature of her passion; in "I cannot live with You" she sets her two lords face to face, declaring:

Nor could I rise—with You—
Because Your Face
Would put out Jesus'—
That New Grace

Grow plain—and foreign
On my homesick Eye—
Except that You than He
Shone closer by—

They'd judge Us—How—
For You—served Heaven—You know,
Or sought to—
I could not—

Because You saturated Sight—

No wonder, then, that when Higginson said the "gait" of her poems was "spasmodic," she gave the terse, polite rebuke: "I am in danger, sir."

No poet ever wrote with tighter grip on the realities of inner existence, a grip achieved by unremitting analysis of every object, every idea, every mood that entered that acute Consciousness:

I measure every Grief I meet
With analytic eyes—
I wonder if It weighs like Mine—
Or has an Easier size.

It must all be so measured, somehow: even the imagery of outer nature serves only to explore her inner states. As in all great meditative poetry, the action, the analysis, the exploration, is all performed, dramatically, in "Being's Centre":

I felt a Funeral, in my Brain,
And Mourners to and fro
Kept treading—treading—till it seemed
That Sense was breaking through—

In that dramatic action the peculiarities of her idiom and orthography play their essential part; and that is why the great achievement of this new edition lies in bringing us closer to the vital meditative self created in this poetry. Moreover, as my allusions to Herbert may have suggested, the text of this edition helps us to align her more firmly with other poets of the meditative genre—not only with Herbert and Vaughan, whom we know that she read and admired, but also with Hopkins, Donne, Yeats, Edward Taylor, and other poets of this meditative kind. It seems important to stress this alignment, for there is still perhaps too great a tendency to read her work in the way suggested by Mr. Johnson in his separate volume on her life and writings: "the poetry that she wrote can be understood only within the context of the Valley traditions which she inherited and the dynasty into which she was born." Certainly the traditions of the Connecticut Valley and the heritage of her family throw significant lights upon her poetry; and yet it asks to be read in a larger context. Her tradition, her dynasty, is that of all great meditative poetry: the dynasty of those poets whose inner discipline gave them command of Being's Centre.

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
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

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

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
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